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Summary 
In comparison to other, equally-sized mammalian species, primates have relatively large 
brains and outstanding cognitive skills. Since brain tissue is energetically very costly, 
several hypotheses on possible selection pressures that might have favoured the 
evolution of such large brains and increased cognitive skills have been proposed. Some 
hypotheses focus on ecological aspects, whereas others suggest social complexity as the 
main factor shaping cognitive evolution. Comparative studies on cognitive abilities of 
multiple species are essential for answering this evolutionary puzzle. Such studies have 
been conducted in various haplorhine primates (great apes, Old- & New World 
monkeys), but systematic studies on cognitive skills in strepsirrhine primates (lemurs & 
lorises) were missing until now. As strepsirrhines can serve as living models of the 
ancestral primate state, knowledge about their cognitive abilities could help elucidate 
the evolution of primate cognition.  
Therefore, the aim of my thesis was to first review all existing studies on 
cognitive skills in lemurs and then to test three species of lemurs in a systematic battery 
of experiments covering the physical and social cognitive domain. Subjects were black-
and-white ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata), ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta) and grey 
mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), chosen for differences in key socioecological traits. 
To facilitate comparisons to haplorhines, I used the experimental setup of the Primate 
Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) which has been tested with great apes (chimpanzees & 
orangutans; Herrmann et al., 2007) and Old World monkeys (baboons & macaques; 
Schmitt et al., 2012).  
Results showed that the three lemur species did not differ significantly in 
performance and in general had a better understanding of the physical than the social 
domain. Surprisingly, an overall comparison with the four haplorhine species revealed 
that although lemurs performed slightly inferior in the physical domain, they were at 
level with haplorhines in the social domain. Specifically, lemurs were outperformed by 
haplorhines particularly on the scale on spatial understanding and in the active tool use 
task. All other scales revealed comparable results for all seven species and in the scale 
theory of mind lemurs even outperformed great apes. However, in several of the 
experimental setups results might have been influenced by confounding factors such as 
lemurs’ limited dexterity, local enhancement or the heterospecific human demonstrator 
in the social tasks, and thus results have to be discussed carefully.  
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To investigate some of the possible influences on the performance of individuals 
within cognitive tasks, I incorporated two additional studies on selected tasks of the 
PCTB. First, I explored whether the reason for the lemurs’ poor performance in the tool 
use task was caused by their limited dexterity. I increased the number of trials by 
retrieving the stick if it was lost by the subject. In contrast to the original setup in which 
only one ring-tailed lemur solved the task, in total 13 individuals from all three species 
managed to obtain the reward. In addition, lemurs performed at the same level as 
haplorhines in a task testing the understanding of tool properties. Thus, my results 
revealed that lemurs may lack the necessary fine motor skills to actively use more 
difficult tools, but they nevertheless appear to have an understanding of tool 
functionality comparable to naturally tool-using species. 
The second additional study concerned the influence that different kinds of 
demonstrators may have on performance in gaze following tasks and in object-choice 
tasks using pointing cues. In the original PCTB results may have been biased by only 
using a human as demonstrator and thus, I additionally presented subjects with photos 
and videos of conspecifics. Only ring-tailed lemurs followed human gaze. Photos did not 
have an influence on general performance of lemurs, but videos increased performance 
in the gaze following task. Comparing two differently handled populations revealed that 
in the object-choice tasks performance was positively influenced by a high level of 
socialisation with humans. Thus, performance of individuals in social cognitive tasks can 
be influenced by the exact nature of the stimulus as well as the level of human 
socialisation. 
The overall results of my thesis suggest that in many aspects of the physical and 
social domain, haplorhines and strepsirrhines do not differ substantially from each 
other, at least in the experiments of the PCTB. Since they differ strongly in their 
absolute brain sizes, my results question the notion of a clear-cut correlation between 
brain size and cognitive abilities, as well as assumptions of domain-general cognitive 
skills in primates. My thesis represents the first systematic comparative investigation of 
the cognitive skills of lemurs and thus provides important insights into the cognitive 
evolution of primates. However, further comparative studies on a wide range of species 
using tasks from both cognitive domains are essential to fully understand the 
evolutionary puzzle of cognition.   
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Zusammenfassung 
Im Vergleich zu anderen Säugetieren haben Primaten in Bezug auf ihre Körpermasse 
relativ große Gehirne und herausragende kognitive Fähigkeiten. Da das Gehirn 
energetisch gesehen äußerst kostspielig ist, wurden bereits diverse Hypothesen zu 
möglichen Selektionsdrücken aufgestellt, welche die Evolution von größeren Gehirnen 
und erhöhter kognitiver Kompetenz beeinflusst haben könnten. Einige Hypothesen 
erwägen ökologische Aspekte, während andere die Komplexität des Sozialgefüges als 
Haupteinfluss für die kognitive Evolution vorschlagen. Um Antworten auf dieses 
evolutionäre Rätsel zu erlangen, sind vergleichende Analysen der kognitiven Fähigkeiten 
unterschiedlicher Arten unerlässlich. Diverse Haplorhini-Arten (Menschenaffen, Alt- & 
Neuweltaffen) wurden diesbezüglich bereits erforscht, aber systematische 
Untersuchungen der kognitiven Fähigkeiten von Strepsirrhini (Lemuren & Loris) fehlen 
bislang gänzlich. Dabei sind gerade die Strepsirrhini für die Erforschung der kognitiven 
Evolution von Primaten besonders geeignet, da sie zu den phylogenetisch basalsten 
Primaten gehören und als lebendes Modell ursprünglicher kognitiver Fähigkeiten dienen 
können. 
 Aus diesem Grund waren die Ziele meiner Doktorarbeit zunächst alle bisherigen 
Studien zur Kognition in Lemuren zu sichten und zusammenzufassen, sowie 
anschließend drei Lemurenarten in einer systematischen, experimentellen Testreihe zu 
untersuchen, die sowohl die technische als auch die soziale Kognition abdeckt. Aufgrund 
der Unterschiede in ihren sozioökologischen Merkmalen wurden schwarz-weiße Varis 
(Varecia variegata), Kattas (Lemur catta) und graue Mausmakis (Microcebus murinus) 
ausgewählt. Desweiteren sollte auch ein Vergleich zu Haplorhini ermöglicht werden, 
weshalb ich den experimentellen Aufbau der Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) 
verwendete, welche schon mit Menschenaffen (Schimpansen & Orang-Utans; Herrmann 
et al., 2007) und Altweltaffen (Paviane & Makaken; Schmitt et al., 2012) durchgeführt 
wurde. 
 Die Ergebnisse weisen kaum relevante Unterschiede zwischen den drei 
Lemurenarten auf. Generell zeigten Lemuren ein besseres Verständnis für Aufgaben aus 
dem Bereich der technischen als der sozialen Kognition. Vergleiche zu den vier 
Haplorhini-Arten zeigten überraschenderweise, dass Lemuren im Bereich der 
technischen Kognition leicht unterlegen, im sozialen Bereich allerdings ebenbürtig 
waren. Lemuren wurden besonders beim räumlichen Verständnis und im aktiven 
   General Introduction  
 
vi 
Werkzeuggebrauch von Haplorhini übertroffen. In allen anderen Bereichen gab es keine 
klaren Unterschiede zwischen den sieben Arten, mit der Ausnahme, dass Lemuren im 
Bereich der theory of mind besser abschnitten als Menschenaffen. Allerdings könnten 
einige der Experimente durchaus durch Faktoren wie die limitierte Fingerfertigkeit von 
Lemuren, local enhancement oder, im sozialen Bereich, durch einen artfremden 
menschlichen Experimentator beeinflusst worden sein, weshalb diese Ergebnisse auch 
mit Vorsicht diskutiert werden müssen. 
Mit dem Hintergrund einige dieser möglichen Einflüsse auf das Abschneiden in 
kognitiven Experimenten zu untersuchen, erweiterte ich einige ausgewählte 
Experimente der PCTB: Zunächst untersuchte ich, ob die limitierte Fingerfertigkeit von 
Lemuren eine Ursache für ihr schlechtes Abschneiden im aktiven Werkzeuggebrauch 
sein könnte. Hierfür erhöhte ich für sie die Zahl möglicher Versuche im Vergleich zur 
ursprünglichen PCTB, in welcher nur ein Katta die Aufgabe lösen konnte. Durch diese 
Erweiterung schafften es insgesamt 13 Tiere aus allen drei Arten. Zusätzlich zeigten 
Lemuren ein ebenso gutes Verständnis für die Eigenschaften von Werkzeugen wie 
Haplorhini. Folglich scheint es Lemuren an der nötigen Fingerfertigkeit zu mangeln um 
kompliziertere Werkzeuge zu benutzen, jedoch weisen sie ein Verständnis für die 
Funktionalität von Werkzeugen auf, das vergleichbar zu Arten ist, die von Natur aus 
Werkzeuge verwenden.     
Die zweite Unterstudie befasste sich mit dem Einfluss unterschiedlicher Arten 
von Stimuli auf die Leistung in Experimenten zum gaze following und zur Objektwahl 
mittels Zeigegesten. In der ursprünglichen PCTB könnten die Ergebnisse dieser Tests 
verfälscht worden sein, da nur mit einem menschlichen Experimentator gearbeitet 
wurde. Deshalb präsentierte ich zusätzlich Fotos und Videos von Artgenossen als soziale 
Stimuli. Nur Kattas folgten der Blickrichtung des menschlichen Experimentators, 
allerdings hatten auch Fotos keinen positiven Einfluss auf die Lemuren; nur Videos 
führten zu einer besseren Leistung im gaze following-Experiment. Der Vergleich von 
zwei Populationen mit unterschiedlich starkem Menschenkontakt zeigte, dass im 
Experiment zur Objektwahl die Leistung der Tiere durch ein hohes Maß an Sozialisierung 
zum Menschen positiv beeinflusst wurde. Folglich kann die Leistung in Experimenten zur 
sozialen Kognition durch die Art des Stimulus sowie das Maß an Sozialisierung zu 
Menschen beeinflusst werden.   
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 Insgesamt legen meine Ergebnisse nahe, dass Haplorhini und Strepsirrhini in 
vielen Aspekten der technischen und sozialen Kognition nur geringfügige Unterschiede 
aufweisen, zumindest in den Experimenten der PCTB. Da sich beide Gruppen jedoch 
stark in ihren absoluten Gehirngrößen unterscheiden, stellen meine Ergebnisse die 
Annahmen einer eindeutigen Verbindung zwischen Gehirngröße und generellen 
kognitiven Fähigkeiten, sowie bereichsübergreifender kognitiver Fähigkeiten in 
Primaten in Frage. Meine Doktorarbeit stellt die erste systematische und vergleichende 
Untersuchung kognitiver Fähigkeiten von Lemuren dar und liefert dadurch wichtige 
Einblicke in die kognitive Evolution von Primaten. Dennoch sind weitere vergleichende 
Studien mit einer Vielzahl von Arten und mit einem breitgefächerten experimentellen 
Aufbau, welcher beide kognitiven Bereiche abdeckt, unerlässlich um das evolutionäre 
Rätsel der Kognition zur Gänze zu verstehen.  
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General Introduction 
 
 
“Closeness to animals creates the desire to understand them, and not just a little piece of them, 
but the whole animal. It makes us wonder what goes on in their heads even though we fully 
realize that the answer can only be approximated.” 
(de Waal, 2001 p. 40) 
 
With this statement, Frans de Waal describes the basis of the field of animal cognition, 
which is the study of the mental and cognitive capacities of animals. At the same time, 
he points out one of its main weaknesses, as cognitive mechanisms can only be studied 
indirectly by observing the animals’ behaviour and performance in cognitive tests 
(Byrne, 2000). Still, the comparative investigation of the cognitive skills of animals, and 
especially non-human primates, allows integrating findings from morphology and 
behaviour (Byrne, 2000), which is of great importance for understanding how selective 
environmental forces have shaped cognitive abilities (Byrne, 1995; Shettleworth, 2010). 
Commonly accepted, Shettleworth (2010 p. 4) defined the term cognition as “the 
mental processes by which we acquire, process, store and act on information from the 
environment including perception, learning, memory and decision-making”. In general, 
cognitive abilities are divided into skills belonging to the physical domain, which deals 
with the spatial-temporal-causal relations of inanimate objects, and the social domain, 
which encompasses intentional actions, perceptions and knowledge of conspecifics and 
other animate beings (Tomasello & Call, 1997).  
Since the first cognitive studies in chimpanzees nearly 100 years ago (Koehler, 
1925; Yerkes & Yerkes, 1929), the field of comparative cognition has grown enormously 
in the last decades (e.g. Rogers & Kaplan, 2004; Bentley-Condit & Smith, 2010; 
Shettleworth, 2010; Menzel & Fischer, 2011). The majority of studies were conducted in 
mammals, such as cetaceans (e.g. Marino, 1996; Smolker et al., 1997; Tschudin et al., 
2001; Connor, 2007), carnivores (e.g. Holekamp et al., 2007; Benson-Amram et al., 
2016), rodents (e.g. Klement et al., 2008; Schweinfurth & Taborsky, 2016), domestic 
animals like dogs, goats or horses (e.g. Hare et al., 2002; Kaminski et al., 2005; Maros et 
al., 2008) and of course various primate species (e.g. Whiten et al., 1999; Herrmann et 
al., 2007; Amici et al., 2010; Rosati et al., 2010; Schmitt et al., 2012; MacLean et al., 
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2013). However, birds, particularly corvids and parrots, have also been the focus of 
multiple studies, which indicated that in many aspects they may possess cognitive skills 
equal to those of primates (e.g. Bugnyar et al., 2004; Clayton & Emery, 2005; Seed et al., 
2006; Emery & Clayton, 2009; Isler & van Schaik, 2009; Auersperg et al., 2011; 
Güntürkün & Bugnyar, 2016). Studies on reptiles, fish or invertebrates are still rather 
rare, but their numbers have been increasing in the last years as well (e.g. Wilkinson et 
al., 2010; Schluessel & Bleckmann, 2012; Schluessel et al., 2015; Loukola et al., 2017). 
However, our understanding of the cognitive evolution and the distribution of cognitive 
capacities between taxa and species is still incomplete and studies which systematically 
test cognitive abilities of multiple species are scarce. To complete this puzzle, such 
systematic studies are essential, as they enable comparisons of cognitive skills and brain 
sizes between different species, and connect these cognitive adaptations to the species-
specific ecological and social environments (MacLean et al., 2012).  
Throughout this general introduction, I will briefly explain why primates are of 
particular interest for studies on comparative cognition and review the main theories 
concerning the cognitive evolution in general and particularly in primates. 
Subsequently, I will introduce the Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) and provide an 
overview on the species that have so far already been tested. Finally, I will shortly 
explain the importance of lemurs for cognitive comparisons and highlight the most 
crucial aspects of the three lemur species which were tested in my studies. 
 
1.1 Why study Cognition in Primates?  
 
Since the beginning of cognitive research, non-human primates and especially 
chimpanzees have been the centre of attention. The main reason is most likely their 
close relatedness to humans (e.g. Pruefer et al., 2012), suggesting that by investigating 
their cognitive abilities, implications can be drawn concerning our own cognitive 
evolution. Another reason for the high interest in primate cognition is that all primates 
have evolved larger brains and superior cognitive skills in comparison to equally-sized 
mammal species. Within the primate order, this effect even increases 
disproportionately from strepsirrhines (lemurs, lorises & galagos), to haplorhines (New- 
& Old World monkeys), to hominins (apes) and finally to humans, which have the largest 
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brains and a unique set of cognitive skills (Jerison, 1973; Dunbar, 1992; Isler et al., 2008; 
Kappeler & Silk, 2010).  
 
But does a bigger brain automatically imply increased cognitive skills? Opinions 
are still deeply divided on whether any measure of brain size, be it relative (brain/body-
ratio) or absolute brain size (measured in cc or g), can predict cognitive capabilities in 
animals and especially non-human primates (Byrne, 1996; Reader & Laland, 2002; 
Emery & Clayton, 2004; Deaner et al., 2007). The fact that brain tissue is metabolically 
extremely expensive (Jerison, 1973; Aiello & Wheeler, 1995) raises the question about 
the evolutionary forces selecting for such large brains and exceptional cognitive abilities 
in primates, and particularly humans (Herrmann et al., 2007; Shettleworth, 2010; 
Navarrete et al., 2011).  
 
1.2 How did (Primate) Cognition Evolve? 
   
Several mutually non-exclusive hypotheses explaining the evolution of primate 
brain size and cognition have been suggested so far. These theories can be categorised 
depending on whether they see primate cognition as a more domain-general or 
domain-specific ability (Reader & Laland, 2002). There are two main hypotheses 
following the domain-general assumption. First, the General intelligence hypothesis 
(Spearman, 1904) states that humans had evolutionary advantages through their larger 
brains by simply being cognitively more efficient than other species, which would imply 
advantages in terms of faster learning and possessing more memory. This hypothesis 
predicts an elevation in human cognition compared to non-human primates which is 
uniform between the physical and social domain. Still, it remains controversial and has 
recently met renewed opposition (Herrmann et al., 2007).  
The second domain-general hypothesis, the Ecological intelligence hypothesis, 
arose from research on non-human primates. It suggests that skills required for finding 
and memorizing seasonally available fruits or for tool use and extractive foraging are the 
driving force for brain size evolution (Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1980; Milton, 1981; 
Byrne, 1996). In accordance, Aiello and Wheeler (1995) proclaimed in their expensive-
tissue hypothesis that energetically costly large brains could have only evolved in 
species with a rich diet, such as fruits. In line with this, frugivorous primates were found 
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to have larger brains and increased cognitive skills compared to folivorous species (e.g. 
Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1980; Rosati et al., 2014). Furthermore, the Ecological 
intelligence hypothesis has recently received support by a comprehensive meta-analysis 
on over 140 species of primates (DeCasien et al., 2017). By including multiple 
socioecological variables of each species in a phylogenetic model, the results of this 
study mainly exclude social measures, such as group size or social system, as possible 
explanations for brain size variations in primates (Social brain hypothesis, see below). 
Instead, authors showed a correlation between the diet of a species and its brain size, 
also in favour of frugivorous species (DeCasien et al., 2017; Venditti, 2017).  
As a more domain-specific hypothesis, Byrne and Whiten (1988) introduced the 
Social brain hypothesis (Jolly, 1966a; Humphrey, 1976; Dunbar, 1992; also called Social 
intelligence hypothesis or Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis). It posits that the 
complexity of the social skills of primates, which evolved in response to the cognitive 
demands of constant competition and cooperation between group members, has 
ultimately driven the distinctive cognitive evolution of primates (Dunbar, 1998, 2003, 
2009; Zuberbühler & Byrne, 2006; Byrne & Bates, 2010). This hypothesis was supported 
by several studies across primates, showing positive correlations between social factors, 
such as group size, and relative brain size (or neocortex size; e.g. Dunbar, 1992, 2003; 
Kudo & Dunbar, 2001; Byrne & Corp, 2004; MacLean et al., 2013). Complex fission-
fusion dynamics in primate social groups have also been associated with enhanced 
cognitive abilities in tasks of inhibitory control (Amici et al., 2008). Interestingly, in bats 
and some insectivores, relative brain size also correlates with social group size (e.g. 
Barton et al., 1995; Dunbar & Bever, 1998; Byrne & Bates, 2010), whereas in carnivores 
this relationship is rather disputed (Dunbar & Bever, 1998; Dunbar & Shultz, 2007; 
Holekamp et al., 2007; Pérez-Barbería et al., 2007; Finarelli & Flynn, 2009; Benson-
Amram et al., 2016), and no such direct correlation was found in ungulates (Shultz & 
Dunbar, 2006, 2007). Moreover, highly developed cognitive abilities have been 
described for some birds, in particular in several corvid species (Emery et al., 2007), 
which cannot be explained by an effect of group size since they are usually social 
monogamists (Byrne & Bates, 2010). Hence, the generality of the Social brain hypothesis 
across orders is still being debated and, as mentioned above, it has recently been 
questioned by DeCasien and colleagues (2017; see also MacLean et al., 2014).  
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Two additional hypotheses that derive from the Social brain hypothesis have also 
been proposed rather recently, to specifically account for the relatively large brains of 
primates and humans. First, based on the assumption that humans are not just social 
but “ultra-social” (Richerson & Boyd, 1998; Herrmann et al., 2007), the Cultural 
intelligence hypothesis suggests that culture would select for intelligence and argues 
that exchanging knowledge within cultural groups of humans requires some specific 
socio-cognitive skills, such as social learning, special forms of communication and a 
“theory of mind” (Herrmann et al., 2007, 2010; Burkart et al., 2007, 2009; van Schaik & 
Burkart, 2011). Supporting this hypothesis, in a comprehensive, comparative study on 
the cognitive skills of children, chimpanzees and orangutans, Herrmann and colleagues 
(2007) found that these species performed equally well in the physical domain, but that 
children outperformed great apes in the social domain. As previously mentioned, they 
also contradicted the General intelligence hypothesis with these results.  
Second, the Cooperative breeding hypothesis states more specifically that 
extensive allomaternal care, i.e. care for the offspring provided by individuals other than 
the mother, has a positive impact on prosocial behaviour and social cognition (Hrdy, 
1999, 2009; Burkart et al., 2007, 2009; Burkart & van Schaik, 2010; van Schaik & Burkart, 
2011). Cooperative breeding is accompanied by psychological changes that lead to 
greater prosociality, which directly enhances performance in social cognition, i.e. social 
learning, vocal communication, teaching-like behaviours, gaze understanding and 
cooperative problem solving (Burkart et al., 2009, Burkart & van Schaik, 2010). 
Accordingly, primates exhibiting higher levels of allomaternal care should perform 
better in the socio-cognitive domain than primates with lower levels of allomaternal 
care (Burkart et al., 2009; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011).  
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, most of these hypotheses are not 
mutually exclusive and an increasing number of researchers agree that cognitive 
evolution is most likely based on several selection pressures acting together (Seyfarth & 
Cheney, 2002; Healy & Rowe, 2007; Burkart et al., 2016). To fully understand the 
evolution of primate and human cognition it seems mandatory to conduct systematic, 
comparative studies on the capabilities within both cognitive domains and across the 
entire primate order and beyond.                    
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1.5 The Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) 
 
In the attempt to compile a comprehensive series of tests that would investigate 
a great variety of cognitive skills, Esther Herrmann and colleagues assembled the 
Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB; Herrmann et al., 2007). This systematic 
comparative analysis consists of 16 different experiments from the physical, as well as 
the social domain (for a detailed description see Chapter 3). The ten tasks of the 
physical domain can be grouped into three scales, namely space, quantities and 
causality. As these abilities are, for example, necessary to locate, evaluate and 
remember objects in space, they are essential for everyday survival when used to avoid 
predators or forage for food. The six tasks of the social domain of the PCTB can also be 
grouped into three different scales, which are social learning, communication and 
theory of mind. Interacting socially with other individuals, for example by following their 
gaze, communicating actively or understanding each other’s intentional actions, is an 
important way of information transfer to spot predators, locate food sources or gain 
social knowledge within a group (Tomasello et al., 1998; Emery, 2000; Dunbar, 2003; 
Zuberbühler & Byrne, 2006; Zuberbühler, 2008).  
With this compilation of tasks, Herrmann et al. (2007) tested the cognitive skills 
of 2.5-year-old children and compared them to those of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, 
N=106) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus, N=32). Their results showed that children 
and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world 
(both being slightly more successful than orangutans), while children had the most 
sophisticated cognitive skills for dealing with the social world. Hence, these results 
contradict the hypothesis that humans are generally more intelligent than other 
primates, but support the Cultural intelligence hypothesis.  
Only a few years later, Vanessa Schmitt and colleagues ran the same test battery 
on olive baboons (Papio anubis, N=5) and long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis, 
N=10-13), to compare the results of humans and great apes to those of monkeys 
(Schmitt et al., 2012). Surprisingly, the results of this study revealed that both Old World 
monkey species had cognitive abilities largely comparable to those of great apes. 
Specifically, chimpanzees performed better than macaques only in tasks on spatial 
understanding and tool use, but in none of the tasks concerning social cognition. Since 
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chimpanzees have relatively larger brains than macaques or baboons (Jerison, 1973; 
reviewed in Kudo & Dunbar, 2001), the results of the same tests applied to these four 
primate species questioned the clear-cut relationship between cognitive performance 
and brain size (Schmitt et al., 2012).  
In conducting some of the experiments of the PCTB with white-handed gibbons 
(Hylobates lar, N=5-8), in her dissertation Anna Yocom (2010) included another 
haplorhine primate species in the comprehensive species comparison. Since she did not 
complete the entire set of experiments of the PCTB, I did not include her results in the 
overall comparison of all non-human primate species (see Chapter 3). Still, gibbons, as 
lesser apes, fall in-between great apes and monkeys and therefore remain interesting 
for the overall comparison. Hence, I will include a brief comparison of their results with 
the performance of lemurs in the discussion (see Chapter 6). The gibbons overall 
performed better than the great ape and monkey species in the physical domain, but 
they performed inferior to all of them in the social domain. Their poor performance in 
the latter might originate in their social structure of very small, pair-bonded groups 
(Bartlett, 2007; Yocom, 2010).  
However, looking at the test battery more closely, the comparison between 
children and non-human primates in the two domains might be biased from the 
beginning (Yocom, 2010; Schmitt et al., 2012). After all, all social tasks are carried out 
with a human as demonstrator, which implies that the children work with a conspecific, 
whereas the non-human primate species do not. The disadvantage of having a 
heterospecific demonstrator may easily lead to an underestimation of the non-human 
primates’ cognitive abilities in the social domain (Boesch, 2007; Ruiz et al., 2009; Botting 
et al., 2011). Moreover, while testing children, the experimenters occasionally asked 
motivating questions, such as “Where did the toy go?”, whereas non-human primates 
had no such additional input on the experimental setup. Accordingly, in addition to the 
original setup of the test battery, I modified demonstrators in two social cognitive tasks 
in order to quantify differences in the subjects’ performance between various 
demonstrators (see Chapter 5).  
In summary, this comprehensive test battery has been conducted with five 
haplorhine non-human primate species in the past years, while strepsirrhine primates 
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have been neglected. Hence, the quest to understand the cognitive evolution of 
primates remains incomplete.               
 
1.3 Why study Cognition in Lemurs?                                                               
 
“Lemurs are […] hopelessly stupid towards unknown inanimate objects. In this branch of the 
primates, the basic qualities of primate society have evolved without the formal inventive 
intelligence of true monkeys.” 
(Jolly, 1966b p. 165-166) 
 
Since this quote by Allison Jolly, a variety of experiments and observations have 
already shown that lemurs are in physical cognitive tasks not quite as stupid as she 
suggested in the early days of research on strepsirrhine primates. Nevertheless, as there 
is still no systematic and comprehensive investigation on the cognitive skills of 
strepsirrhine primates, this is the next logical step on the way to understanding the 
evolution of primate cognition. Within the primate order, strepsirrhine primates 
constitute the evolutionarily most distant relatives of humans and apes (Yoder, 2007). 
They split from the main primate lineage approximately 60 million years ago, and 
retained many ancestral primate traits (Yoder et al., 1996; Martin, 1990; Yoder & Yang, 
2004). As an example, strepsirrhines are not able to oppose their thumbs and have 
therefore a rather limited dexterity (Torigoe, 1985) since they lack a precision grip 
(Holtkötter, 1997). Thus, they might be physically unable to perform certain tasks of the 
PCTB which require a high level of manual precision. To acknowledge and at least partly 
quantify these constraints, I offered additional trials in one of these tasks, in order to 
investigate whether lemurs would be able to solve it at all (see Chapter 4). 
Previous comparative research has already established multifold variations in 
relative brain size across the more than 400 species of primates (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007; 
Isler et al., 2008), with a significant part of the interspecific variation being explained by 
the shift between strepsirrhines and haplorhines (Martin, 1981). Not only do 
strepsirrhines have relatively smaller brains than haplorhines, but their brain size does 
not correlate with group size (MacLean et al., 2009). Hence, they represent the best 
living models of the earliest primates and the link between primates and other 
mammalian orders (MacLean et al., 2008; Fichtel & Kappeler, 2010) and studying their 
cognitive skills would certainly shed light on the evolution of cognition in primates. 
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However, in contrast to haplorhines, the cognitive abilities of strepsirrhine 
primates have only been studied fragmentarily and not in a comprehensive systematic 
approach (reviewed in Fichtel & Kappeler, 2010; Kittler et al., 2015; see Chapter 2). 
Therefore, a comparison of a representative range of cognitive skills across all primates 
is currently not possible. Moreover, the existing studies on cognitive skills in 
strepsirrhines and especially lemurs revealed contradicting results: For the physical 
domain, older studies suggest that lemurs possess cognitive abilities inferior to 
haplorhines’ (e.g. Maslow & Harlow, 1932; Jolly, 1964; Ehrlich et al., 1976), whereas in 
more recent studies lemurs’ physical cognitive skills often match those of haplorhines 
(e.g. Santos et al., 2005b; Lührs et al., 2009). Information on the social cognitive skills of 
strepsirrhines is even more contradictory. Some studies on lemurs have reported social 
cognitive skills comparable to other primates in specific aspects, such as social learning 
(e.g. Schnoell & Fichtel, 2012). Observations on wild lemurs indicate however, a lack of 
certain social cognitive skills, such as abilities of within-group coalitions or tactical 
deception (reviewed in Fichtel & Kappeler, 2010; Kappeler, 2012; both domains 
summarised in Chapter 2). 
In summary, the existing knowledge on cognition in lemurs is still rather 
fragmented. Therefore, a comprehensive, systematic and most of all comparative study 
on the cognitive abilities of lemurs that covers multiple species and works with a 
sufficient number of individuals per species, seems overdue. Such a comparative 
investigation of lemurs’ cognitive capacities would help to complete the picture of 
primate cognitive evolution. 
 
1.4 The Lemur Species of my Study 
 
Selecting species for comparison which differ in key socioecological traits (see 
Table 1), such as ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta), black-and-white ruffed lemurs 
(Varecia variegata) and grey mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), facilitates the testing 
of the hypotheses mentioned above. Thus, the most important differences between 
these three lemur species lie within their brain sizes, social organisation and level of 
allomaternal care. Absolute brain size increases from mouse lemurs to ring-tailed 
lemurs and to ruffed lemurs (e.g. Dunbar, 1992; Isler et al., 2008; MacLean et al., 2013), 
whereas mouse lemurs are solitary foragers and ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs are 
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group-living with different average group sizes. Concerning the level of allomaternal 
care, in ruffed lemurs parental care is shared among all community members and even 
allonursing and adoption of rejected infants have been observed (Pereira et al., 1987; 
Morland, 1990; Sussman, 1999; Vasey, 2007; Baden et al., 2013). Mouse lemur females 
can form sleeping-groups during the day, in which related females care for all offspring 
present, including allonursing (Eberle & Kappeler, 2006). In contrast, in ring-tailed 
lemurs the mother is the primary caregiver for the first three weeks of life (Hosey & 
Jacques, 1994). Thus, the extent of allomaternal care gradually decreases from ruffed 
lemurs, to mouse lemurs and to ring-tailed lemurs.  
 
                                     Table 1 Detailed socioecological traits of the three tested lemur species. 
 
Ruffed lemurs                  
(Varecia variegata) 
Ring-tailed lemurs 
(Lemur catta) 
Grey mouse lemurs  
(Microcebus murinus) 
activity pattern diurnal diurnal nocturnal 
feeding ecology frugivorous omnivorous omnivorous 
main diet fruits, nectar (leaves) 
fruits, leaves, buds, 
insects  
insects, nectar, gum, 
fruits 
social organisation 
group-living, dynamic 
fission-fusion system  
group-living 
solitary foragers, female 
sleeping-groups 
group size1 5.4 15.6 1 
brain size (cc)2 32.12 22.90 1.63 
body mass (g)2 3512 2200 60 
litter size4 2-3 (4) 1 (2) 2-4 
nest building yes no yes 
parking 
yes, guarded by other 
group members 
no yes, not guarded 
infant transport3 
by mouth between  
parking spaces 
cling to their mothers’ 
belly or back 
by mouth between 
parking spaces 
allomaternal care4 high*  low*  medium* 
communal breeding yes no yes (females) 
indications 
guarding, grooming, 
carrying (all group 
members), allonursing & 
adoption (related females) 
grooming, occasionally 
carrying & allonursing 
(related females) 
grooming, allonursing & 
adoption (related 
females) 
  
* Level of allomaternal care among the three species; 1MacLean et al., 2014; 2Isler et al., 2008; 3Ross, 2001; 4(Hosey & 
Jacques, 1994; Eberle & Kappeler, 2006; Vasey, 2007; Baden et al., 2013). 
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1.6 Objectives and Structure of this Thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis was to systematically examine the cognitive abilities of 
three lemur species in a set of tasks covering many aspects of the physical and social 
cognitive domain and compare their results to those of previously tested great ape and 
monkey species. To do this I replicated the methodology of the Primate Cognition Test 
Battery, which was developed and tested on chimpanzees and orangutans by Herrmann 
et al. (2007), and later applied to baboons and macaques by Schmitt et al. (2012). To 
attain a meaningful dataset that allows reasonable interspecific comparisons, one of my 
aims was to include highest possible sample sizes for each species. Similar to both 
preceding studies on the PCTB, I also investigated some of the aspects that might 
influence the performance of the individuals in the cognitive experiments irrespective of 
species, such as rank level in the group, personality traits or level of inhibitory control. 
Finally, I adapted some of the test paradigms of the PCTB in additional experiments to 
make them more suitable for lemurs and to answer some specific questions.  
In the chapters of my thesis I start with a review on what is already known about 
cognitive skills in lemurs and then present the overall results of the PCTB in comparison 
to the haplorhine species. I continue with two chapters on more elaborated tasks from 
the physical and social domain of the PCTB. In the end, I review and discuss all my 
results in a greater context. In detail, the chapters are ordered as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 reviews studies reporting on the cognitive abilities of lemurs in the 
physical and social domain, with a special focus on ring-tailed lemurs as they are the 
most frequently studied lemur species. This manuscript was published in a special issue 
on ring-tailed lemurs of Folia Primatologica.  
 
Chapter 3 summarises and compares the performance of all three lemur species 
in the PCTB. Their performance is also compared to the monkey and ape species, and 
the general implications of these results for cognitive testing and theories on the 
evolution of primate cognition are discussed. This manuscript was submitted to Animal 
Cognition. 
Chapter 4 focusses on an aspect of physical cognition, the active usage of tools 
and the understanding of their crucial properties. Therefore, I elaborate on two of the 
tasks of the physical domain of the PCTB (tool use and tool properties) and discuss their 
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applicability to lemurs. This manuscript was accepted for publication by the Journal of 
Comparative Psychology.  
 
Chapter 5 investigates an important aspect of the social cognitive domain of the 
PCTB in more detail: The social-visual co-orientation. Additional trials were conducted 
for the gaze following task and the comprehension task of the PCTB, to investigate how 
performance varies with three kinds of demonstrators, a human experimenter, a 
conspecific modelled in photos and one modelled in videos. This manuscript was 
submitted to Animal Cognition. 
 
 
Chapter 6 summarises and discusses various aspects of the results of my studies 
as well as the problems associated with a comparative cognitive approach. Possible 
future steps towards a comprehensive picture of the evolution of primate cognition are 
also proposed.   
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Abstract 
In order to better understand the evolution of cognitive abilities in primates, 
information on cognitive traits of the most basal living primates can provide important 
comparative baseline data. Compared to haplorhine primates, lemurs have relatively 
smaller brains and reduced abilities to solve problems in the technical and social 
domain. However, recent studies have suggested that some cognitive abilities of lemurs 
are qualitatively en par with those of haplorhines. Here, we review studies investigating 
cognitive abilities in the technical and social domain of ring-tailed lemur cognition. In 
the physical domain, ring-tailed lemurs exhibit similar qualitative cognitive skills as other 
lemurs but also haplorhine primates. In the social domain, ring-tailed lemurs appear to 
be more skilled in visual perspective taking than other lemurs. Compared to other 
lemurs, they also have highly elaborated communicative skills. Moreover, within-group 
coalitions have been observed in female ring-tailed lemurs during rare events of female 
evictions but not in other lemur species. However, in several other aspects of social 
cognition, such as reconciliation and social learning, ring-tailed lemurs’ cognitive 
abilities are en par with those of other lemurs. Thus, additional systematic comparative 
studies in physical and social cognition are required for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the processes of cognitive evolution among primates.  
 
 
Keywords: Ring-tailed lemurs, Lemur catta, physical cognition, social cognition, 
comparative research, communication, social structure 
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Introduction 
Understanding the evolution of cognition has been widely regarded as a major 
challenge in evolutionary research. Primates stand out in this context because they have 
larger brains compared to equally-sized other mammals (Isler & van Schaik, 2009). 
These effects also increase disproportionately within the primate order from 
strepsirrhines to haplorhines to hominins and humans (Dunbar, 1992; Isler et al., 2008). 
Given that larger brains are energetically more expensive (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995), the 
most puzzling questions in this context are how and why primates, and especially 
humans, have evolved such powerful and distinctive cognitive abilities requiring so 
much costly neural tissue (Herrmann et al., 2007; Navarrete et al., 2011). Research on 
cognitive abilities of strepsirrhine primates is of particular interest because after their 
split from other primates about 60 million years ago (Yoder et al., 1996; Yoder & Yang, 
2004; but see Seiffert et al., 2003 for paleontological records) they retained many 
ancestral primate traits, making them the best living models of early primates and the 
link between primates and other mammals (Martin, 1990; Fichtel & Kappeler, 2010). 
However, cognitive abilities of strepsirrhine primates remain understudied, and the 
existing studies revealed conflicting results.   
Alison Jolly (1966a) established the importance of comparative studies of lemur 
social intelligence in the early days of primatology. She concluded that „Lemur and 
Propithecus are both socially intelligent and socially dependent. They are, however, 
hopelessly stupid towards unknown inanimate objects. In this branch of the primates, 
the basic qualities of primate society have evolved without the formal inventive 
intelligence of true monkeys“ (Jolly, 1966a: 165-166). Accordingly, these older studies 
suggested that lemur cognitive abilities in the physical domain are inferior to those of 
haplorhines (e.g. Maslow & Harlow, 1932; Jolly, 1964; Ehrlich et al., 1976), but more 
recent studies indicated that their cognitive abilities often match those of haplorhines 
(reviewed in Fichtel & Kappeler, 2010).   
Here, we review the cognitive abilities of ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta), which 
live in multi-male, multi-female groups with one of the largest group sizes among 
lemurs and which exhibit clear dominance hierarchies (Sauther et al., 1999; Jolly et al., 
2006). These aspects of their social system allow evaluation of the influence of social 
complexity on cognition by comparing cognitive abilities of ring-tailed lemurs with those 
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of other lemur species organized into smaller groups. These same features make them 
comparable to many haplorhines (Jolly, 1966a, b; Kappeler, 2012), opening a window of 
opportunities for comparative cognition research. Because many previous studies have 
been hampered by very small sample sizes, we only consider studies that have tested at 
least 4 ring-tailed lemurs in our review of physical and social cognition below.  
 
Physical Cognition 
Dealing effectively with objects and their spatial, numerical and causal relationships is 
critically important for everyday survival when searching for food, shelter or avoiding 
predators. Spatial cognition enables animals to identify their position, to remember 
what is located where, and to travel efficiently between sites (Gallistel, 1989). A 
comparative study of spatial memory in four lemur species (Table 1) revealed that 
frugivorous lemurs have more robust spatial memory than folivorous species, with ring-
tailed lemurs exhibiting intermediate spatial cognitive abilities (Rosati et al., 2014). 
However, solitary wild grey mouse lemurs with an omnivorous diet also learned the 
spatial location of feeding sites rapidly (Lührs et al., 2009).  
Regarding numerical understanding, ring-tailed lemurs are able to form abstract 
numerical ascending rules and can apply them to novel sets of numerosities (Merritt et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, ring-tailed lemurs are as good as brown, mongoose and ruffed 
lemurs in understanding the outcome of simple arithmetic operations of up to three 
items (Table 1, Santos et al., 2005a). As in other primates, ring-tailed and mongoose 
lemurs’ ability to discriminate between quantities depends on the ratio between 
choices being at least 1:3 or larger to successfully select the larger quantity in a 
spontaneous food choice task (Table 1, Jones & Brannon, 2012). In addition, the 
precision of their approximate number system is comparable to that of rhesus monkeys 
(Macaca mulatta; Jones et al., 2014).  
Ring-tailed lemurs are also able to organize sequences in memory and to retrieve 
ordered sequences. Indeed, their accuracy and response times were similar to 
haplorhine monkeys (Merritt et al., 2007). Moreover, ring-tailed as well as black lemurs 
were able to deal efficiently with large numbers of discriminative problems in visual 
discrimination learning sets (Table 1, Cooper, 1974; Ohta et al., 1984).  
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Table 1 The cognitive abilities of Lemur catta and comparison with other lemur species.  
a   Physical/technical intelligence 
Categories Species Common name n Success? n success or mean % Reference 
Space and objects      
Spatial memory 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 9-12 y/n* 55.0% & 95.0% 
Rosati et al., 
2014 
 
Eulemur 
mongoz mongoose lemurs 11 y/n* 60.6% & 77.3% 
Propithecus 
coquereli Coquerel's sifakas 12-13 y/n* 56.9% & 87.3% 
Varecia sp. ruffed lemurs 12-15 y 80.0% & 95.8% 
Microcebus 
murinus mouse lemurs 6 y 4 
Lührs et al., 
2009 
Inhibitory 
control 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 11 y - 
MacLean et al., 
2013 
Eulemur fulvus brown lemurs 10 y - 
Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 10 y - 
Eulemur 
mongoz mongoose lemurs 10 y - 
Propithecus 
coquereli Coquerel's sifakas 10 y - 
Varecia 
variegata ruffed lemurs 11 y - 
Tools and causality      
Simple box 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 18 y 8 / - Kappeler, 1987 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 28 y - Kendal et al., 2010 
Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 4 y 2 / - Fornasieri et 
al., 1990 Eulemur fulvus brown lemurs 8 y 2 / - 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 4 y 3 / - 
Eulemur fulvus brown lemurs 12 y 8(4) / - Anderson et al., 1992 
Eulemur 
rufifrons 
redfronted 
lemurs 37 y 20 
Schnoell & 
Fichtel, 2012 
Understanding 
of tools 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 3 y - Santos et al., 
2005b Eulemur fulvus brown lemurs 3 y - 
Daubentonia 
madagascarie
nsis 
aye-ayes 6 n 0 Sterling & Povinelli, 1999 
Features and categories      
Learning sets 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 5 y 5 / - Ohta et al., 1984 
Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 3 y 3 Cooper, 1974 
Serial ordering Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 2 y 2 / - Merritt et al., 2007 
Quantities       
Estimating 
numerosity 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 31 y - Jones & Brannon, 2012 
Eulemur 
mongoz mongoose lemurs 9 y 89.5% 
Lewis et al., 
2005 
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Simple 
arithmetic 
operations      
of 1+1 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 6 y - 
Santos et al., 
2005a 
Eulemur fulvus brown lemurs 6 y - 
Eulemur 
mongoz mongoose lemurs 4 y - 
Varecia rubra ruffed lemurs 3 y - 
Numerical rule-
learning Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 2 y 2 / - 
Merritt et al., 
2011 
 
y=yes; n= no; *= depending on the task 
 
Tool use has not been reported for any strepsirrhine primate, perhaps because 
they have limited dexterity (Torigoe, 1985) due to a lack of a precision grip (Holtkötter, 
1997). They may therefore be physically unable to perform certain tasks requiring a high 
level of manual precision. However, recent research suggests that they nevertheless 
have some understanding of tool properties and functionality. Ring-tailed lemurs are 
able to choose between a functional and a non-functional tool to retrieve an 
inaccessible reward as quickly as capuchins, tamarins and vervet monkeys (Santos et al., 
2005b). They are as black, brown and redfronted lemurs, also able to acquire a novel 
behaviour pattern to solve simple puzzle-box problems (Table 1, Kappeler, 1987; 
Fornasierei et al., 1990; Anderson et al., 1992; Kendal et al., 2010; Schnoell & Fichtel, 
2012).  
Finally, a basic problem-solving skill that is essential for an effective interaction 
with the environment is inhibitory control, which is the ability to control ones’ 
behaviour and impulsive reactions that would disrupt, for example, the efficient 
completion of a task leading to a potential food reward (Vlamings et al., 2010). Ring-
tailed lemurs are able to successfully use inhibitory control to acquire a reward but did 
not outperform other lemurs (Table 1, MacLean et al., 2013, 2014). Thus, their abilities 
in the physical cognitive domain are qualitatively similar to those of other lemurs, but 
also to those of many haplorhine primates (Fichtel & Kappeler, 2010). 
 
Social Cognition 
In contrast to haplorhine primates, brain size of lemurs does not correlate with group 
size (MacLean et al., 2009). However, performance in a social cognitive task did 
correlate with the species-typical group size, but not with brain size, suggesting the 
potential for cognitive evolution without concomitant changes in brain size (MacLean et 
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al., 2013). In particular, ring-tailed lemurs exhibit some similarities in social organization 
and social structure with haplorhines (Kappeler, 1999), suggesting convergent socio-
cognitive evolution (Sandel et al., 2011). Below, we will summarize the current 
knowledge of ring-tailed lemurs’ social cognition, focusing on the structure of social 
relationships (competition, post-conflict behaviour, coalitions), gaze following, social 
learning and innovations, as well as communication. 
Ring-tailed lemurs live in multi-male, multi-female groups with some of the 
largest group size among lemurs (Kappeler, 2012). Males and females exhibit separate 
linear dominance hierarchies (Jolly, 1966b), but rank is not inherited maternally as in 
many Old World primates (Kappeler, 1993a). Ring-tailed lemurs are able to use 
transitive interference, a form of deductive reasoning that might be a cognitive 
mechanism by which animals can learn the relationships within their group’s dominance 
hierarchy (MacLean et al., 2008). Ring-tailed lemurs mastered transitive interference 
better than pair-living mongoose lemurs, suggesting that social complexity is an 
important selective force for the evolution of cognitive abilities relevant to transitive 
reasoning (MacLean et al., 2008).  
 One mechanism of social behaviour that is exhibited by many haplorhine 
primates is reconciliation after aggression, and some studies suggest that ring-tailed 
lemurs do reconcile after conflicts (Rolland & Roeder, 2000; Palagi et al., 2005), whereas 
other studies found no evidence for it (Kappeler, 1993b). Reconciliation has also been 
documented in black, brown and redfronted lemurs as well as in sifakas (Table 1, 
Kappeler, 1993b; Roeder et al., 2002; Palagi et al., 2008). Third-party affiliation after 
aggression seems to be absent in this species (Kappeler, 1993b). The formation of 
coalitions appears to be limited to specific contexts in ring-tailed lemurs. Although male 
ring-tailed as well as redfronted lemurs tend to form partnerships during migration, 
they do not actively support each other in within group conflicts (Gould, 1997a, Ostner 
& Kappeler, 2004). Female ring-tailed lemurs experience high levels of competition over 
reproduction, resulting even in eviction of potential competitors (Vick & Pereira, 1989). 
In contrast to males, related females occasionally form within-group colations during 
eviction of other females (Jolly, 1998). In contrast, female coalitions have not been 
documented in redfronted lemurs during eviction of other females (Kappeler & Fichtel, 
2012). 
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Another benefit of group-living is to gather information about the environment, 
for instance about what to feed on, what to avoid, or about appropriate sex-specific 
behaviours, by observing conspecifics (Gould, 1997b; O’Mara & Hickey, 2012). Ring-
tailed lemurs as well as black and brown lemurs use gaze following to track the 
attention of conspecifics (Sheperd & Platt, 2008; Ruiz et al., 2009). In contrast to black, 
mongoose and red ruffed lemurs, brown and ring-tailed lemurs are also able to follow 
human gaze (Botting et al., 2011; Sandel et al., 2011). Ring-tailed lemurs as many 
Eulemur species, red ruffed lemurs and Aye-Ayes are able to learn socially (Kappeler, 
1987; Fornasieri et al., 1990; Anderson et al., 1992; Kendal et al., 2010; Schnoell & 
Fichtel, 2012). However, studies on social learning in the wild indicate that, in contrast 
to redfronted lemurs (Schnoell & Fichtel, 2012), the spread of information appears to be 
limited to subgroups of individuals that tolerate each other in close proximity (Kendal et 
al., 2010). Although ring-tailed lemurs are able to learn socially, there is only one report 
of a potential behavioural tradition, which describes the innovation and spread of a 
novel way of drinking in a captive population (Hosey, 1997). Behavioural traditions in 
the wild have also been found in Verreaux’s and Coquerel’s sifakas and potentially in 
redfronted lemurs (Fichtel & van Schaik, 2006; Fichtel & Kappeler, 2011; Schnoell & 
Fichtel, 2013). Finally, ring-tailed lemurs are more skilled in using social cues in 
comparison to brown, black, mongoose as well as black and white ruffed lemurs and 
Coquerel’s sifakas in a food competition task in which the experimental subject was 
supposed to avoid food that an experimenter was facing (Sandel et al., 2011; MacLean 
et al., 2013).  
Thus, in the realm of social intelligence, ring-tailed lemurs appear to be more 
skilled than other lemurs in using social cues during food competition tasks. Within-
group coalitions appear to be rare and limited to rare events of female evictions. 
However, in several other aspects of social cognition, such as reconciliation and social 
learning, ring-tailed lemurs’ performance is en par with those of other lemurs.  
In the realm of communication, non-human primates have a limited repertoire 
of signals, but they can provide listeners with an open-ended, highly, modifiable, and 
cognitively rich set of meanings (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2010). Among lemurs, ring-tailed 
lemurs have the largest vocal repertoire, produce the largest number of facial 
expressions and have elaborated olfactory communication (Fichtel, unpubl. data). They 
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produce functionally referential alarm calls in response to both, aerial and terrestrial 
predators (Pereira & Macedonia, 1991), whereas sifakas and redfronted lemurs produce 
functionally referential alarm calls only in response to aerial predators (Fichtel & 
Kappeler, 2002, 2011; Fichtel & van Schaik, 2006). Redtailed sportive lemurs and grey 
mouse lemurs, however, produce general alarm calls instead of predator-specific ones 
(Fichtel, 2007; Rahlfs & Fichtel, 2011). Ring-tailed lemurs also produce more visual 
signals than redfronted or ruffed lemurs (Pereira et al., 1988; Pereira & Kappeler, 1997). 
They also use various scent marks to signal individuality as well as dominance and 
reproductive status (Kappeler, 1990; Drea, 2007; Charpentier et al., 2008; Crawford et 
al., 2011). Ring-tailed lemurs are also able to recognize kin or chose mating partners by 
means of olfactory signals (Charpentier et al., 2010; Crawford et al., 2011). Even cross-
modal recognition of individuals by means of olfactory and vocal signals has been 
demonstrated in ring-tailed lemurs (Kulahci et al., 2014). Thus, ring-tailed lemurs appear 
to have more elaborated communicative skills than many other lemurs.  
 In summary, although only limited data are available, this review indicates that 
ring-tailed lemurs exhibit similar qualitative cognitive skills in the physical domain as 
other lemurs and many haplorhines primates (Fichtel & Kappeler, 2010). In the social 
domain, ring-tailed lemurs are better skilled in using social cues in food competition 
tasks than other lemurs. Coalitions have only been observed in female ring-tailed 
lemurs during rare events of female evictions. However, in several other aspects of 
social behaviour, such as reconciliation and social learning, ring-tailed lemurs’ cognitive 
abilities are en par with those of other lemurs with the caveat that the social behaviour 
and cognitive abilities of other lemurs have not yet been studied in comparable detail. 
Thus, additional systematic comparative studies in physical and social cognition are 
required for a more comprehensive understanding of the processes of primate cognitive 
evolution. 
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Table 1 The cognitive abilities of Lemur catta and comparison with other lemur species.  
b   Social intelligence 
Categories Species Common name n Success? n success or mean % Reference 
Social complexity & social relationship structure    
Transitive 
inference 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 3 y - MacLean et al., 
2008 Eulemur 
mongoz mongoose lemurs 3 y - 
Coalitions 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 9 grps y - Sussmann, 1992 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 12 grps y - Jones, 1983 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 10 y - Gould, 1997a 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs - y - Jolly, 1998 
Eulemur 
rufifrons                     
redfronted 
lemurs 4 grps y - 
Ostner & 
Kappeler, 2004 
Eulemur 
rufifrons                     
redfronted 
lemurs 5 grps n - 
Kappeler & 
Fichtel, 2012 
Post-conflict 
behaviour 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 2 grps n 7.2% 
Kappeler, 1993b Eulemur 
fulvus brown lemurs 2 grps y/n 13.6% 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 16 y 57.7% Rolland & Roeder, 2000 
Eulemur 
rufifrons                     
redfronted 
lemurs 16 y 63.7% Roeder et al., 
2002 Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 8 n 34.8% 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 2 grps y/n - Palagi et al., 2005 
Propithecus 
verreauxi Verreaux’s sifakas 16 y 44.7% 
Palagi et al., 
2008 
Gaze following and related skills     
Gaze following Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 2 y 2 Shepherd & Platt, 2008 
 
Eulemur 
fulvus and 
Lemur catta 
brown lemurs 
and ring-tailed 
lemurs 
5 y 3-4 / - Botting et al., 2011 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 17 y - 
Sandel et al., 
2011 
Eulemur 
mongoz mongoose lemurs 10 n - 
Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 8 n - 
Varecia rubra ruffed lemurs 14 n - 
Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 4 n 0 / - 
Anderson & 
Mitchell, 1999 
Eulemur 
fulvus brown lemurs 4 y - 
Ruiz et al., 2009 Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 2 y - 
Visual 
perspective 
taking 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 10 y 4 / 75.8% & 69.2% 
Sandel et al., 
2011 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 10 y 1 / 63.3% 
Sandel  et al., 
2011 
Eulemur 
mongoz mongoose lemurs 10 n 0 / 35% 
Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 10 n 0 / 47.5% 
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Varecia rubra ruffed lemurs 10 n 0 / 45% 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 10 y 75% 
MacLean et al., 
2013 
Eulemur 
fulvus brown lemurs 10 y 63% 
Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 10 y 58% 
Eulemur 
mongoz mongoose lemurs 10 n 55% 
Propithecus 
coquereli Coquerel's sifakas 10 y 64% 
Varecia 
variegata ruffed lemurs 10 n 48% 
Social learning and innovations 
Social learning 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 2 grps y - 
Jolly & Oliver, 
1985 
Varecia 
variegata ruffed lemurs 1 grp n - 
Eulemur 
mongoz mongoose lemurs 1 grp y - 
Eulemur 
fulvus  brown lemurs 4 grps y - 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 18 y 8 / - Kappeler, 1987 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 4 y 3 / - 
Fornasieri et al., 
1990 
Eulemur 
macaco black lemurs 4 y 2 / - 
Eulemur 
fulvus brown lemurs 8 y 2 / - 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 28 y - Kendal et al., 2010 
Eulemur 
fulvus brown lemurs 6 y - 
Feldman & 
Klopfer, 1972 
Eulemur 
fulvus brown lemurs 12 y 8(4) / - 
Anderson et al., 
1992 
Eulemur 
macaco  black lemurs 8 y - 
Gosset & 
Roeder, 2001 
Daubentonia 
madagascarie
nsis 
aye-ayes 6 y - Krakauer, 2005 
Eulemur 
rufifrons 
redfronted 
lemurs 37 y 17 
Schnoell & 
Fichtel, 2012 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 10 y - Gould, 1997b 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 7 grps y - O'Mara & Hickey, 2012 
Innovations 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 28 y 17 / - Hosey et al., 1997 
Eulemur 
rufifrons                     
redfronted 
lemurs 29 y 15 
Hübner & 
Fichtel, unpubl. 
Eulemur 
rufifrons                     
redfronted 
lemurs 4 grps y/n 1 group 
Schnoell & 
Fichtel, 2013 
Communication 
Functionally 
referential  
alarm calls 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 30-40 y  
Pereira & 
Macedonia, 
1991 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 1 grp y - Macedonia, 
1990 Varecia 
variegata ruffed lemurs 1 grp n - 
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Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 13 y - Oda, 1999 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 25 y - Bolt, 2013 
Lemur catta ring-tailed lemurs 15 y - Pereira & 
Kappeler, 1997 Eulemur 
rufifrons                     
redfronted 
lemurs 11 y/n - 
Eulemur 
rufifrons                     
redfronted 
lemurs 4 grps y - Fichtel & 
Kappeler, 2002 Propithecus 
verreauxi Verreaux’s sifakas 4 grps y - 
Propithecus 
coquereli Coquerel's sifakas 2 grps y - 
Fichtel & 
Kappeler, 2011 
 
y=yes; n= no; grp/s= group/s; *= depending on the task 
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Abstract 
Primates have relatively large brains, although brain tissue is energetically costly. Thus, 
the evolutionary key question is which socioecological aspects selected for large brains 
and comparative studies on the cognitive skills of multiple species can provide answers. 
However, unlike haplorhine primates (great apes, Old- and New World monkeys), 
strepsirrhine primates (lemurs and lorises) have not yet been included in systematic 
comparative studies, although they may serve as living models of primate ancestral 
cognitive skills. To begin filling this gap, we tested members of three lemur species 
(Microcebus murinus, Varecia variegata, Lemur catta) with a comprehensive set of 
experiments addressing physical and social cognitive skills that has previously been used 
on four haplorhine species. We found no significant differences in performance among 
lemur species and, surprisingly, their average performance was not different from that 
of the haplorhines in many aspects. Specifically, lemurs' overall performance was 
slightly inferior in the physical domain but matched that of haplorhines in the social 
domain. Our results question a clear-cut link between brain size and cognitive skills 
suggesting a more domain-specific distribution of cognitive abilities in primates. 
 
 
 
Key words:  Cognition, Primate Cognition Test Battery, Primates, Lemurs 
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Introduction 
One central question in comparative cognition is why primates have evolved larger 
brains and enhanced cognitive skills compared to other equally-sized mammalian 
species (Shettleworth, 2010). Among primates, this effect is paralleled by a 
disproportionate increase in brain size from strepsirrhines to haplorhines and humans 
(Jerison, 1973; Martin, 1981; Dunbar, 1992; Isler et al., 2008). Because larger brains are 
energetically more expensive (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995), they are assumed to confer 
benefits with regard to enhanced cognitive abilities (Reader & Laland, 2002; Navarrete 
et al., 2011; Reader et al., 2011). 
Several mutually non-exclusive hypotheses on the evolution of brain size have 
been proposed to account for the distinctive cognitive abilities of primates (Dunbar & 
Shultz, 2017). According to the General intelligence hypothesis, humans are thought to 
be cognitively more efficient through their larger brains than other species, and to have 
an evolutionary advantage because of faster learning and larger memory capacities 
(Spearman, 1904). The Ecological intelligence hypothesis suggests that environmental 
and ecological challenges in food acquisition, including spatial or spatio-temporal 
processes to memorize seasonally available food or manipulative skills for extractive 
foraging, selected for larger brains (Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1980; Milton, 1981; Byrne, 
1996; Heldstab et al., 2016; Powell et al., 2017). Several versions of the Social brain 
hypothesis posit that increased cognitive skills in primates evolved in response to the 
constant challenges associated with complexity of social life, such as competition and 
cooperation within larger social groups (Jolly, 1966a; Humphrey, 1976; Byrne & Whiten, 
1988; Dunbar, 1992; Kudo & Dunbar, 2001; Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). However, support 
for the Social brain hypothesis is less compelling in other taxa, with brain size correlating 
positively with measures of sociality in some insectivores, bats and ungulates (e.g. 
Barton et al., 1995; Dunbar & Bever, 1998; Shultz & Dunbar, 2006; Byrne & Bates, 2010), 
but not in corvids (Emery et al., 2007; Shultz & Dunbar, 2007) and it is equivocal in 
carnivores (Dunbar & Bever, 1998; Holekamp et al., 2007; Pérez-Barbería et al., 2007; 
Finarelli & Flynn, 2009; Benson-Amram et al., 2016). Moreover, recent comparative 
meta-analyses among primates indicated that brain size is associated with ecological 
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factors (home range size, diet, activity period), but not with social factors (DeCasien et 
al., 2017; Powell et al. 2017), also challenging the social brain hypothesis. 
Since these studies usually link brain size with certain life-history traits, it is 
essential to understand how brain size actually impacts cognitive skills. Hence, 
comparative analyses of cognitive abilities across the primate order and beyond are 
required. However, comparisons of performance in cognitive experiments across 
species often fail due to variation in the experimental set-up and specific methods 
(MacLean et al., 2012). To overcome this problem, Herrmann and colleagues (2007) 
assembled a systematic toolbox for comparative analysis, called the Primate Cognition 
Test Battery (PCTB), which compared 2.5-year-old children, chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) in their cognitive skills in various tasks in 
the physical and social domain. The physical domain deals with the spatial temporal-
causal relations of inanimate objects, while the social domain deals with the intentional 
actions, perceptions, and knowledge of other animate beings (Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
These tests revealed that children and chimpanzees have similar cognitive skills for 
dealing with the physical world, but children have increased cognitive skills for dealing 
with the social world, particularly in the scale of social learning. These results support 
the Cultural intelligence hypothesis, a variant of the Social brain hypothesis, suggesting 
that exchanging knowledge within human cultural groups requires specific socio-
cognitive skills, such as social learning or Theory of Mind (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1988; 
Herrmann et al., 2007; Whiten & van Schaik, 2007). 
Application of the PCTB to two other haplorhine primate species, long-tailed 
macaques (Macaca fascicularis) and olive baboons (Papio anubis), revealed that both 
species performed similarly to great apes in both the physical and the social domain 
(Schmitt et al., 2012). Specifically, chimpanzees outperformed macaques only in tasks 
on spatial understanding and tool use. Since chimpanzees have relatively larger brains 
than macaques or baboons (Jerison, 1973; Isler et al., 2008), these results question the 
clear-cut relationship between cognitive performance and brain size (Schmitt et al., 
2012). Therefore, further studies on additional non-human primates are required to 
explore the relationship between cognitive abilities, socio-ecological traits and brain 
size. 
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Strepsirrhine primates are the obvious choice for such an extended comparative 
approach because they represent the best living models of the earliest primates and the 
link between primates and other mammalian orders (MacLean et al., 2008; Fichtel & 
Kappeler, 2010). Strepsirrhines split off from the main primate lineage approximately 60 
million years ago, and retained many ancestral primate traits (Martin, 1990; Yoder et al., 
1996; Sauther et al., 1999; Yoder & Yang, 2004). Importantly, strepsirrhine primates 
have relatively smaller brains than haplorhines, and their brain size does not correlate 
with group size (MacLean et al., 2009). Although older studies suggested that 
strepsirrhine primates possess physical cognitive abilities that are inferior to those of 
haplorhines (e.g. Maslow & Harlow, 1932; Jolly, 1964; Ehrlich et al., 1976), recent 
studies indicated that their cognitive skills are similar to those of haplorhines (e.g. Hosey 
et al., 1997; Santos et al., 2005a, b; Deppe et al., 2009; Fichtel & Kappeler, 2010; Kittler 
et al., 2015). Hence, a comprehensive study investigating a broad variety of tasks 
addressing different cognitive skills in the same group of individuals, and replicating the 
exact same methods already used in four haplorhine primate species, seems indicated 
for a systematic comparison across both primate suborders. 
To this end, we applied the PCTB to three species of lemur that differ in key 
socio-ecological traits: ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta), black-and-white ruffed lemurs 
(Varecia variegata; in the following: ruffed lemurs) and grey mouse lemurs (Microcebus 
murinus, Table 1). Specifically, mouse lemurs have one of the smallest brain sizes among 
primates, and absolute brain size increases from mouse lemurs over ring-tailed lemurs 
to ruffed lemurs (Isler et al., 2008). Ring-tailed lemurs are diurnal opportunistic 
omnivores that live in groups of on average 14 individuals (Jolly, 1966b; Sussman, 1991; 
Gould et al., 2003). Ruffed lemurs are diurnal, frugivorous and live in small groups 
(average 6 individuals), exhibiting a fission-fusion structure (Vasey, 2003; Baden et al., 
2015; Holmes et al., 2016). Grey mouse lemurs are nocturnal, omnivorous solitary 
foragers that form sleeping-groups among related females (Eberle & Kappeler, 2006; 
Isler et al., 2008; Tecot et al., 2012). 
According to the General intelligence hypothesis, ruffed lemurs should perform 
better than ring-tailed lemurs and mouse lemurs, and lemurs should be cognitively 
inferior to haplorhine species, because they have absolutely larger brains than lemurs 
(Table 1; Reader & Laland, 2002; Deaner et al., 2007; Isler et al., 2008). In accordance 
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with the Ecological intelligence hypothesis we predicted that the most frugivorous 
ruffed lemurs should outperform both other lemur species (Table 1). However, 
according to the Social intelligence hypothesis, ring-tailed lemurs should perform better 
in the cognitive tasks than both other species, and ruffed better than mouse lemurs. 
Besides orangutans, lemurs generally live in smaller groups than monkeys and apes 
(Kappeler & Heymann, 1996) and should have inferior cognitive abilities than the other 
species according to the Social intelligence hypothesis (Table 1). In summary, systematic 
studies of lemur cognitive abilities represent a unique opportunity for testing 
predictions of the different hypotheses on the evolution of brain size and for 
investigating the existence of a functional relationship between brain size and cognitive 
abilities. 
 
Table 1 Summary of the most important traits for the seven non-human primate species.  
 
species n ECV (cc) relative brain size (%) % fruit  
social 
system 
average 
group size 
chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes) 106 368.4 0.91 66  group 47.6 
orangutans 
(Pongo pygmaeus) 32 377.4 0.71 64  solitary 1.5 
olive baboons 
(Papio anubis) 5 167.4 0.96 62  group 69 
long-tailed macaques 
(Macaca fascicularis) 10-13 64 1.63 66.9  group 26 
ruffed lemurs 
(Varecia variegata) 13 32.1 0.96 92  group 6 
ring-tailed lemurs 
(Lemur catta) 26-27 22.9 1.16 54  group 11 
grey mouse lemurs 
(Microcebus murinus) 9-16 1.6 2.76 31.3  solitary 1 
 
n=number of individuals, ECV=endocranial volume (absolute brain size), % fruit=percentage of fruit in the 
diet, allo care= level of allomaternal care; Data from: Herrmann et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2012; Isler et 
al., 2008; MacLean et al., 2014; Dammhan & Kappeler, 2008; Radespiel et al., 2006; Lahann, 2007. 
  
Methods 
Experiments were conducted with adult individuals of grey mouse lemurs (n=9-15), ring-
tailed lemurs (n=26-27) and black-and-white ruffed lemurs (n=13). All individuals were 
born in captivity and housed in enriched or semi-natural environments, either at the 
German Primate Centre (DPZ, Göttingen) or the Affenwald Wildlife Park (Straußberg). 
The lemurs at the Affenwald range freely within a 3.5 ha natural forest enclosure. At the 
DPZ, ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs are offered indoor and outdoor enclosures equipped 
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with enriching climbing materials and natural ground vegetation. The nocturnal mouse 
lemurs are kept indoors with an artificially reversed day-night-cycle and cages are 
equipped with climbing material, fresh natural branches and leaves. All individuals were 
tested individually in their familiar indoor enclosures and were unfamiliar with the 
presented tasks. Since some individuals passed away during the course of the study, not 
all individuals participated in every task of the test battery (Table S2, Supplementary 
Material, File Suppl1). To ensure comparability with the previous studies, the 
experimental setup was replicated after the PCTB (Herrmann et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 
2012), but adjusted in size for lemurs.  
  
Ethical statement 
All animal work followed relevant national and international guidelines. The animals 
were kept under conditions documented in the European Directive 2010/63/EU 
(directive on the protection of animals used for experimental and other scientific 
purposes) and the EU Recommendations 2007/526/EG (guidelines for the 
accommodations and care of animals used for experimental and other scientific 
purposes). Consultation and approval of the experimental protocols by the Animal 
Welfare Body of the German Primate Center isdocumented (E2-17). 
General testing procedure  
During the experiments, individuals were briefly separated from the group. The testing 
apparatus for all tasks consisted of a table with a sliding board on top that was attached 
to the fence of the subjects’ enclosures (see Figure S2, Supplementary Material). In 
most of the tasks two or three opaque cups (ruffed- & ring-tailed lemurs: Ø 6.8 cm x 7.5 
cm; mouse lemurs: Ø 2.5 cm x 3 cm), which were placed upside down in a row on the 
sliding board, were used to cover the food reward (other materials are reported in the 
Supplementary Material). If necessary, a cardboard occluder was put on top of the 
sliding board between the experimental setup and the individual to hide the baiting 
process from the individuals. The position of the reward was randomized and counter-
balanced across all possible locations, and the reward was never put in the same place 
for more than two consecutive trials. Once the board was pushed into reach of an 
individual, the experiment began and, depending on the task, the individual had to 
manipulate an item or indicate its choice by pointing or reaching towards the chosen 
   Chapter 3  
 
32 
item, to obtain the reward if chosen correctly. If the choice was incorrect, the correct 
location of the reward was shown to the individual after each trial. 
For most of the tasks at least 6 trials were conducted per individual and setup 
(Table S2, Supplementary Material). Raisins and pieces of banana served as rewards. 
During testing, no possible cues to where the reward was located were provided by the 
experimenter; she simply put her hands on her lap and her gaze was directed 
downwards. All experiments were videotaped and responses of the subjects to the tasks 
coded afterwards from the videos. A naïve second observer additionally scored 20% of 
all trials a second time to assess interobserver reliability. The Interclass Correlation 
Coefficient was excellent (ICC = 0.985). 
 
The Primate Cognition Test Battery 
All experimental setups and methods were replicated from the PCTB (Herrmann et al., 
2007; Schmitt et al., 2012). Following Schmitt et al. (2012), we also doubled the number 
of trials for all object-choice tasks of the test battery (Table S2, File Suppl1) to evenly 
distribute objects between all possible spatial positions and combinations of 
manipulations. In total, the PCTB consists of 16 different experimental tasks, 10 
investigating physical and 6 social cognitive skills. These tasks can be grouped into 6 
different scales: space, quantity and causality for the physical and social learning, 
communication and Theory of Mind for the social domain. In the physical domain, the 
scale space examines the ability to track objects in space in four tasks: spatial memory, 
object permanence, rotation and transposition. The scale quantity tests the numerical 
understanding of individuals and consists of two tasks: relative numbers and addition 
numbers. The scale causality consists of four tasks: noise, shape, tool use and tool 
properties to examine the ability to understand spatial-causal relationships. In the social 
domain, the scale social learning examines in one task whether individuals use social 
information provided by a human demonstrator to solve a problem. The scale 
communication examines whether individuals are able to understand communicative 
cues given by humans in three tasks: comprehension, pointing cups and attentional 
state. Finally, in the scale Theory of Mind, individuals were confronted with two tasks: 
gaze following and intentions. A detailed description of the general setup and the 
methodology of the experiments can be found in the supplementary material (File 
Suppl1). 
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Temperament, inhibitory control, rank and learning effect 
To assess the influence of temperament, inhibitory control and dominance rank on 
lemurs’ performances in the test battery, individuals participated in a set of additional 
tests (Herrmann et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2012). Due to logistic reasons, the 
temperament and dominance rank tests could only be conducted with ring-tailed and 
ruffed lemurs. For temperament, we measured whether individuals would approach 
novel objects, people and foods (for details see Supplementary Material). Inhibitory 
control was measured during an additional session of the spatial memory task, in which 
out of three cups only the two outer one were baited with a reward and hence, 
individuals had to skip the middle one. Dominance rank (high, middle or low-ranking) 
was inferred by additional focal observations, using criteria proposed by Pereira and 
Kappeler (1997). We also controlled for potential learning effects within the trials of a 
task by calculating Pearson’s correlations between performance in the first and second 
half of trials. 
Data analyses 
We measured the performance of individuals by the proportion of correct responses for 
each task. To determine whether individual performance in each task was above chance 
level, we conducted binomial tests using the specific chance levels. On the species level, 
we applied for each task and lemur species Wilcoxon tests followed by Benjamini-
Hochberg corrections (for multiple testing) to examine whether they performed above 
chance level. Since no individual solved the social learning task and only one the tool 
use task, we omitted both tasks from the between species comparisons. To analyse 
whether the three lemur species differed in their performance in the tasks of the PCTB, 
we used multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with species, sex, rank, age and 
age:species as between-subject factor and their performance in all tasks as dependent 
variable. Afterwards, to compare all three species’ performances between the different 
tasks, we used univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA, for normally distributed data) or 
Kruskall-Wallis tests (for not normally distributed data) followed by post hoc analyses 
(Bonferroni correction). For significant results, we used an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) to control for age in these tasks.  
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For comparisons in performance between the three lemur species and the four 
haplorhine species that were already tested with the PCTB, we applied on the scale level 
a MANOVA, followed by ANOVAs or Kruskall-Wallis tests and post hoc corrections 
(Bonferroni) in case of significant results. All statistical analyses were conducted in R 
version 3.2.2 (R Core Team, Vienna, Austria). 
Results 
Lemur performance in the physical domain 
The chance level was at 33% in all four tasks of the scale space. The three lemur species 
performed significantly above chance level in the spatial memory and the rotation task 
(Table 2, Fig. 1). In the object permanence tasks only ruffed lemurs performed above 
chance level, while in the control task, all three species performed above chance level 
(all p<0.05). In the scale quantity, the three lemur species performed significantly above 
chance level (50%) in both tasks (Table 2, Fig. 1). In the scale causality, the tool use task 
was successfully solved by only one ring-tailed lemur. However, in the shape and tool 
properties tasks, all three lemur species performed above chance level (50%; Table 2). 
Lemur performance in the social domain 
No lemur could solve the social learning task using a similar technique as demonstrated 
by the human experimenter (Table 2, Fig. 1). In the scale communication, all three 
lemur species performed significantly above chance level (50%) in the comprehension 
task, whereas only mouse lemurs performed above chance level (50%) in the pointing 
cups task, and no lemur species performed above chance level in the attentional state 
task. In the scale Theory of Mind, none of the lemur species did follow the gaze of the 
human experimenter upwards significantly more often than in the control condition in 
which no cue was given (baseline: 20%; Table 2, Fig. 1). In contrast, all lemur species 
performed significantly above chance level (50%) in the intentions task (Table 2, Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1 Average performance of the three lemur species in all tasks of the PCTB. Represented are 
medians (black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), upper and lower hinges (whiskers), and outliers 
(circles). 
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Comparison of the three lemur species 
Because the tool use task was solved by only one individual and the social learning task 
by none, the two tasks were excluded from this comparison. A multivariate analysis of 
variance of the 14 remaining tasks revealed no differences between the three lemur 
species (MANOVA; Wilk's Λ=0.498, F(19,14)=1.37, p=0.257). Furthermore, performance 
was not influenced by sex (Wilk's Λ=0.461, F(19,14)=1.59, p=0.173), rank (Wilk's 
Λ=0.273, F(38,28)=1.24, p=0.268), age (Wilk's Λ=0.568, F(19,14)=1.03, p=0.466) or age 
within species (age:species; Wilk's Λ=0.599, F(19,14)=0.91, p=0.566). Follow-up 
univariate analyses of each task only revealed significant differences in performance 
between species in the pointing cups (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2=10.14, df=2, p=0.006) and 
the intentions task (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2=9.88, df=2, p=0.007; Fig. 1). In the pointing 
cups task, mouse lemurs performed significantly better than ruffed (pairwise t-tests 
with Bonferroni corrections, p=0.007) and ring-tailed lemurs (p=0.003), while in the 
intentions task, ring-tailed lemurs outperformed mouse lemurs (p=0.015). These 
differences remained significant when we controlled for age (ANCOVA, pointing cups: 
mouse vs. ruffed lemurs: p=0.017, mouse vs. ring-tailed lemurs: p=0.002; intentions: 
ring-tailed vs. mouse lemurs: p=0.007). 
Influence of personality, inhibitory control and learning effect 
The three personality measures (latency, proximity and duration) of ring-tailed or ruffed 
lemurs did not correlate with the performance in the physical domain of the PCTB 
(Pearson’s correlations, all p>0.05, see Supplementary Material), and performance of 
ring-tailed lemurs in the social domain. In ruffed lemurs, however, the latency to 
approach and proximity to a novel stimulus correlated with performance in the social 
domain (latency to approach: Pearson’s correlation, r(11)=0.61, p=0.026; proximity: 
Pearson’s correlation, r(11)=-0.59, p=0.032). Ruffed lemurs approaching a novel object 
more slowly performed better in the social domain, and individuals that came closer to 
the novel stimulus performed less well in the social domain. No correlation was found 
between time individuals spent close to the setup (duration) and performance 
(Pearson’s correlation, r(11)=-0.30, p=0.323). Performance in the inhibitory control task 
did not differ between the three species (Kruskal-Wallis test: χ2=2.34, p=0.311) and did 
not correlate with performance in the physical and social domain (see Table S4, File 
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Suppl1). In addition, we did not find a learning effect in performance between the first 
and second half of trials within the tasks (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test: V=806.5, p=0.585). 
Comparison of lemurs and haplorhines in the physical and social domain 
The comparison of chimpanzees, orangutans, baboons, macaques, ruffed-, ring-tailed- 
and mouse lemurs in their overall performance in the two domains using a MANOVA 
revealed differences among species (Wilk's Λ=0.383, F(406,12)=20.87, p<0.001). Species 
differed in performance in the physical domain (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2=127.26, df=6, 
p<0.001; Fig. 2) but not in the social domain (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2=10.25, df=6, 
p=0.115; Fig. 2). In the physical domain, only chimpanzees performed significantly 
better than ruffed lemurs, and chimpanzees and orangutans outperformed ring-tailed 
and mouse lemurs (see Table S1, File Suppl1). 
Figure 2 Average performance of the overall performance of the apes & monkeys (light grey) and the 
lemurs (dark grey) in the two domains. Represented are medians (black bars), interquartile ranges 
(boxes), upper and lower hinges (whiskers), and outliers (circles). 
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Comparison of lemurs and haplorhines in the different scales 
For a more detailed comparison of all seven species, we conducted a MANOVA including 
each individuals’ overall performance in all six scales, which revealed significant 
differences among species (Wilk's Λ=0.284, F(833,36)=7.68, p<0.001). Species differed in 
all scales except the scale communication (ANOVAs or Kruskal-Wallis tests, see Table 3; 
Fig. 3). In the scale space, chimpanzees outperformed all other species, except baboons. 
Orangutans performed better than ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs, baboons performed 
better than all three lemur species, and macaques performed similar to all lemur 
species (Table 4; Fig. 3). In the scale quantity, only chimpanzees performed better than 
ring-tailed lemurs (Table 4; Fig. 3), and in the scale causality, chimpanzees 
outperformed all other species and orangutans performed better than mouse lemurs 
(Table 4; Fig. 3). However, this scale was strongly biased by the results of the tool use 
task, which was only solved by chimpanzees, orangutans and one ring-tailed lemur. 
Excluding the tool use task from this comparison revealed that only chimpanzees 
performed better than mouse lemurs (Table 4; Fig. S1, File Suppl1). Except for the great 
apes, all other species performed poorly in the social learning task, whereas all species 
performed equally well in the scale communication. In the scale Theory of Mind, 
however, chimpanzees were outperformed by macaques and ring-tailed lemurs. 
Orangutans were outperformed by all other species, except mouse lemurs and 
macaques, as well as ring-tailed lemurs outperformed mouse lemurs (Table 4; Fig. 3). 
 
Table 3 Univariate analyses for the species differences for 
the six scales.  
 
ANOVAs Df F-value P-value 
Quantity 6 3.49  0.0026 ** 
Communication 6 2.10     0.0549 
 
Kruskal-Wallis tests Df χ2 P-value 
Space 6 111.68 <0.001 *** 
Causality 6 68.59 <0.001 *** 
Social learning 6 20.17  0.0026 ** 
Theory of mind 6 55.08 <0.001 *** 
 
                                         **<0.01; ***<0.001 - significance levels        
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Figure 3 Average performance of the apes & monkeys (light grey) and the lemurs (dark grey) over the six 
scales. Represented are medians (black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), upper and lower hinges 
(whiskers), and outliers (circles). 
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Table 4 Comparisons of performance among the seven non-human primate species for all six scales of the 
PCTB. Presented are the results of post hoc multiple comparisons (Bonferroni); significant results are in 
boldface. Causality II: The scale causality without the tools use task. 
 
Space Quantity Causality 
Causality 
II 
Social 
learning 
Commun-
ication 
Theory 
of Mind 
Chimp - Orang <0.001 0.275 <0.001 1 1 1 1 
Chimp - Baboon 1 1 0.003 1 1 1 0.082 
Chimp - Macaque <0.001 1 <0.001 1 0.699 1 <0.001 
Chimp - Ruffed lemur <0.001 1 <0.001 1 0.352 1 0.077 
Chimp - Ring-tailed lemur <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1 0.025 0.29 <0.001 
Chimp - Mouse lemur <0.001 1 <0.001 0.041 0.229 1 1 
 
Orang - Baboon 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0.677 
 
0.014 
Orang - Macaque 1 1 0.433 1 1 1 <0.001 
Orang - Ruffed lemur 0.004 1 1 0.560 1 1 0.009 
Orang - Ring-tailed lemur <0.001 1 0.643 1 0.919 1 <0.001 
Orang - Mouse lemur 0.237 1 0.046 0.918 1 1 1 
 
Baboon - Macaque 
 
0.176 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0.591 
 
1 
Baboon - Ruffed lemur 0.001 1 1 1 1 0.653 1 
Baboon - Ring-tailed lemur <0.001 1 1 1 1 0.094 1 
Baboon - Mouse lemur 0.023 1 1 1 1 0.424 0.816 
 
Macaque - Ruffed lemur 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Macaque - Ring-tailed lemur 0.074 0.307 1 1 1 1 1 
Macaque - Mouse lemur 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.033 
 
Ruffed - Ring-tailed lemur 
 
1 
 
0.409 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Ruffed - Mouse lemur 1 1 1 0.008 1 1 1 
 
Ring-tailed - Mouse lemur 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0.106 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0.036 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we applied the Primate Cognition Test Battery to three lemur species 
differing in socioecological traits and brain size and compared lemurs’ performance in 
these tasks with four haplorhine species tested in previous studies. Lemurs’ 
performance did not differ in the scales of the physical cognitive domain, but in some of 
the social cognitive domain, with mouse lemurs performing better than ruffed lemurs in 
the pointing task and ring-tailed lemurs performing better than ruffed and mouse 
lemurs in the intention task. The comparison with the four haplorhine species revealed 
that lemurs performed slightly inferior in the physical domain, but at level to them in 
the social domain. Most interestingly, in the scale Theory of Mind, great apes were 
outperformed by all other species except mouse lemurs. Hence, since these species 
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differ in relative and absolute brains size (Table 1) with a more than 200fold difference 
in brain size between mouse lemurs and orangutans or chimpanzees, our results do not 
support the notion of a clear-cut link between brain size and cognitive skills, but suggest 
a more domain-specific distribution of cognitive abilities in primates. 
Comparison of the three lemur species 
Despite differences in socioecological traits and brain size, the three lemur species 
performed similarly in the physical domain and differed in performance only in two 
tasks from the social domain. Although it has been suggested that frugivorous ruffed 
lemurs should have a better spatial memory than omnivorous ring-tailed and mouse 
lemurs (Rosati et al., 2014; Rosati, 2017), they performed similarly in these experiments. 
As mouse lemurs feed on gum and spend the day in tree holes, a good spatial memory 
might be advantageous to locate feeding and sleeping trees, as already indicated by 
studies in captivity and the wild (Picq, 1993; Lührs et al., 2009). In both tasks on 
quantities, all three lemur species showed a numerical understanding supporting results 
of other studies investigating numerosities and simple arithmetic operations (Santos et 
al., 2005a; Merritt et al., 2011; Jones & Brannon, 2012). 
Within the scale causality, all three lemur species performed poorly in the tool 
use task. However, lemurs appeared to exhibit an understanding for the necessary 
functional properties of pulling tools (Santos et al., 2005b; Kittler et al., in press or see 
Chapter 4), although they have never been observed to use tools in the wild (Fichtel & 
Kappeler, 2010; Kittler et al., 2015 or see Chapter 2). In the noise task, mouse lemurs 
performed rather poorly, although they rely on acoustic cues when foraging for insects 
and are even able to discriminate prey-generated rustling sounds representing insects 
of different size (Goerlitz & Siemers, 2007; Siemers et al., 2007). However, food rattling 
in artificial metal cups might have been a too artificial stimulus for them. Among the 
tests in the physical domain, the three lemur species showed the best performance in 
the shape task, indicating that they can make use of inferential reasoning when it comes 
to visual discrimination. 
In the social domain, all three lemur species failed in the social learning task. 
However, in ring-tailed lemurs the ability to learn socially has already been reported 
(e.g. Kappeler, 1987; Kendal et al., 2010; O’Mara & Hickey, 2012), whereas there is no 
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support for social learning in ruffed lemurs (Jolly & Oliver, 1985; Dean et al., 2011) and it 
remains unstudied in mouse lemurs. Since the social learning task required the ability to 
grab and shake a transparent tube or insert a stick with the other hand, this task, as well 
as the tool use task, which also required grabbing a stick, might have been too difficult 
for lemurs due to their limited dexterity and the lack of precision grip (Torigoe, 1985). 
Therefore, an easier social learning task adapted to the limited manipulative skills of 
lemurs (Schnoell & Fichtel, 2012) might be more informative in future studies. 
All three lemur species could make use of communicative cues given by the 
experimenter in object-choice tasks, whereas they were less good in inferring the 
attentional state of the experimenter. In the pointing cups task, mouse lemurs 
outperformed both other lemur species. Since in this task individuals basically had to 
remember under which cup the reward was hidden, this task might have rather tested 
spatial memory abilities than social skills. The scale Theory of Mind consisted of gaze 
following and understanding intentions. None of the lemur species performed above 
chance level in the gaze following task, despite studies showing that at least ring-tailed 
lemurs do follow the gaze of conspecifics (Shepherd & Platt, 2008) and are also able to 
follow and evaluate gaze directions of a human experimenter (Botting et al., 2011; 
Sandel et al., 2011; MacLean et al., 2013). In contrast, in the task of inferring the 
intention of a human experimenter, lemurs performed much better. Since in this task 
the experimenter tried in vain to reach the baited cup, lemurs might have used the 
movement cue as local enhancement. These results, in combination with the pointing 
cups task, support the notion that it is not always possible to disentangle the underlying 
cognitive processes in solving specific tasks (Burkart et al., 2016). In summary, no clear 
pattern of which lemur species performed best in the PCTB, neither in the physical nor 
the social domain, could be found, suggesting that variation in brain size, group size or 
diet do not predict performance in these tests. 
Comparison of lemurs and haplorhines 
The quantitative comparison between the cognitive skills of lemurs and haplorhines, 
revealed that in the physical domain, lemurs performed inferior than haplorhines, 
supporting results of a study testing two problem-solving tasks in several primate 
species (MacLean et al., 2014). However, in the social domain, lemurs matched the 
   Chapter 3  
 
44 
performance of haplorhines and, interestingly, ring-tailed lemurs outperformed 
chimpanzees as well as orangutans, and ruffed lemurs outperformed orangutans in one 
task of the Theory of Mind scale.  
In the physical domain, lemurs were outperformed by all haplorhines in the scale 
of spatial reasoning, but not in the scale of quantities and causality, when the tool use 
task was excluded. Because in the scale of quantities all seven species performed 
similarly, a certain level of numerical understanding appears to be a basal cognitive trait 
in all primates. Indeed, a comparable numerical understanding as tested in the PCTB has 
already been reported for various taxa outside the primate order, including fish and 
insects (e.g. Chittka & Geiger, 1995; Agrillo et al., 2012; Pahl et al., 2013). In the scale 
causality, lemurs performed equally well as both monkey species, but all were 
outperformed by chimpanzees, due to their better performance in the tool use task. All 
other species, including natural tool users as orangutans and long-tailed macaques (van 
Schaik et al., 2003; Brotcorne et al., 2017), hardly solved the task (Schmitt et al., 2012). 
Excluding this task from the scale quantities resulted in a rather equal overall 
performance of all species, with ruffed lemurs exceeding all other species. An earlier 
meta-analysis on performances in several tasks in the physical cognitive domain among 
primates suggested a domain-general distinction between haplorhines and 
strepsirrhines (Deaner et al., 2006). However, our results do not support this domain-
generality but instead suggest rather domain-specific cognitive differences. 
In the social domain, species differences were less pronounced, and lemurs’ 
overall performance was equal or even superior (Theory of Mind) to that of halporrhine 
primates. In the scale social learning neither lemurs, nor baboons or long-tailed 
macaques, which exhibit cultural variation in stone handling techniques in the wild 
(Brotcorne et al., 2017), solved the task. Since in this task individuals had to copy a 
human demonstrator, the phylogenetic distance between species and the demonstrator 
might have influenced learning abilities, because great apes performed better than Old 
World monkeys and lemurs (Schmitt et al., 2012). Hence, it remains an open question 
whether monkeys and lemurs would perform better when tested with conspecific 
demonstrators. Moreover, the task required inserting a stick into a plastic tube, which 
might have been too challenging for species exhibiting either a medium (baboons, 
macaques) or low (lemurs) level of precision grip (Torigoe, 1985).  
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In the scale communication, all species performed equally well. In contrast, in 
the scale Theory of Mind, species differences emerged, with great apes performing 
inferior to both monkeys and lemurs. This difference was mainly due to monkeys’ and 
lemurs’ better performance in the intentions task, in which a human observer tried to 
reach in vain a cup with a hidden reward. As discussed for lemurs above, baboons and 
monkeys may also have used the hand movement cue as local enhancement (Schmitt et 
al., 2012). Still, it remains puzzling why chimpanzees and orangutans did not use the 
hand movement as cue for the location of the hidden reward. In contrast to these 
results, a comparative study among seven non-human primate species examining 
Theory of Mind compatible learning styles in a simple dyadic game revealed that 
performance in these tests is correlated with brain volume but not with social group 
size (Devaine et al., 2017). This result supported the scaffolding hypothesis, stating that 
the ability to develop a sophisticated Theory of Mind is mostly determined by general 
cognitive capacity. Hence, additional cognitive Theory of Mind tests are required to 
obtain a better understanding of the relationship between brain size and cognitive 
abilities in the social domain. 
Altogether, performances were generally not as different as it might have been 
expected in view of the various hypotheses on the evolution of cognitive abilities. The 
overall comparison does not provide support for the General intelligence hypothesis, 
since variation in brain size cannot explain the observed results. Similarly, performances 
of the seven species did not reflect any clear patterns concerning their feeding ecology, 
i.e. the percentage of fruit in the diet or dietary breadth (see Table 1); hence these 
results do not provide support for the Ecological intelligence hypothesis. In contrast, 
comparative studies among primates suggests that performance in two tasks of 
inhibitory control is best predicted by absolute brain size and dietary breadth or that 
variation in brain size is best predicted by ecological factors such as diet or home range 
size (Decasien et al., 2017; Powell et al., 2017). Moreover, our results do not provide 
support for the Social intelligence hypothesis because lemurs and especially the solitary 
mouse lemurs should have performed inferior compared to the haplorhine species, 
considering social group size as a proxy for social complexity (Dunbar & Shultz, 2017). 
Earlier comparative studies among primates linking performance in a range of 
comparable cognitive tests of the physical or social domain or compiling information on 
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social learning, innovation, extractive foraging and deception revealed a link between 
performance in these tasks and brain size (Reader & Laland, 2002; Deaner et al., 2006, 
2007; Reader et al., 2011). However, studies using the exact experimental set up 
revealed contradictory results, with either a positive relationship between brain size 
and performance in inhibitory control tasks (Maclean et al., 2014), or no clear-cut 
relationship between brain size and cognitive abilities, such as various tests on 
inhibitory control and spatial memory tasks (Amici et al., 2008, 2010, 2012) or tasks of 
the Primate Cognition Test Battery as in this or earlier studies (Herrmann et al., 2007; 
Schmitt et al., 2012), highlighting the importance of using the exact experimental set up 
for comparisons of cognitive abilities among species. 
Even though lemurs performed at level with monkeys and great apes in many of 
these experiments, we do not suggest that their cognitive abilities are per se on par with 
those of larger-brained primates. In the physical domain, the PCTB examines rather 
basal cognitive abilities, which might not be specific enough to reveal actual differences 
between species, as studies revealed that fish and insects possess similar basal cognitive 
skills in the physical domain (Fuss et al., 2014; Schluessel et al., 2015; Loukola et al., 
2017). In the social domain, performance in some tasks might have been influenced by 
local enhancement (Schmitt et al., 2012), and individuals might also have recruited 
other abilities to solve the problems, as discussed for the pointing cups task. 
The PCTB was designed to examine the spontaneous ability to solve the tasks 
and not to examine how long individuals need to learn the task. Hence, a test battery 
that continued testing until individuals reached a certain criterion (e.g. 80 % correct 
responses) or detailed analyses of applied learning strategies as in Devaine et al. (2017) 
may allow to compare not only species differences in their spontaneous ability to solve 
the task, but also species-specific learning curves as well as learning strategies, which 
might reveal more informative differences. 
To conclude, our study generated the first systematic results on cognitive 
abilities in lemurs, and the comparison with haplorhines suggested that in many aspects 
of the physical and social domain, the average performance in these tests of members 
of these two clades do not differ substantially from each other. These results reject the 
notion of a direct correlation between brain size and cognitive abilities and question 
assumptions of domain general cognitive skills in primates. Overall, our results 
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strengthen the view that when comparing cognitive abilities among species, it is of vital 
importance to include a diverse set of tests from both cognitive domains which are 
applicable to a diverse range of species and taxa (Auersperg et al., 2011; MacLean et al., 
2012; Schmitt et al., 2012; Auersperg et al., 2013; Burkart et al., 2016) and to carefully 
consider the external validity of the specific tests. 
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Supplementary Materials 
1. Additional Results  
Table S1 Comparisons of performances of the seven non-human primate species within the two domains. 
Presented are the results of post hoc multiple comparison analyses (Bonferroni); significant results are in 
boldface. 
       physical domain social domain 
Chimp - Orang <0.001 1 
Chimp - Baboon 0.075 0.087 
Chimp - Macaque <0.001 0.842 
Chimp - Ruffed lemur <0.001 1 
Chimp - Ring-tailed lemur <0.001 1 
Chimp - Mouse lemur <0.001 1 
Orang - Baboon 1 0.032 
Orang - Macaque 0.700 0.269 
Orang - Ruffed lemur 0.150 1 
Orang - Ring-tailed lemur <0.001 1 
Orang - Mouse lemur <0.001 1 
Baboon - Macaque 1 1 
Baboon - Ruffed lemur 1 0.291 
Baboon - Ring-tailed lemur 0.070 0.207 
Baboon - Mouse lemur 0.082 0.093 
Macaque - Ruffed lemur 1 1 
Macaque - Ring-tailed lemur 1 1 
Macaque - Mouse lemur 1 0.927 
Ruffed lemur - Ring-tailed lemur 1 1 
Ruffed lemur - Mouse lemur 1 1 
Ring-tailed lemur - Mouse lemur 1 1 
  
 
Figure S1 Average performance of apes & monkeys (light grey) and the lemurs (dark grey) in the scale 
causality excluding the tool use task. Represented are medians (black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), 
upper and lower hinges (whiskers), and outliers (circles). 
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2. Detailed Methodology of the Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) 
Experimental setups were adopted from Herrmann et al. (2007) and reasonable changes 
in the experimental procedure, which we partly adopted from Schmitt et al. (2012), are 
marked in the detailed descriptions below by using parentheses. As suggested by 
Schmitt et al. (2012) we doubled the number of trials for all object-choice tasks from 3 
to 6 (see Table S2) to include all possible locations and combinations. In addition, some 
of the original tasks were extended by using control conditions and the quantity 
combinations in experiments 5 and 6 were adopted from their methodology (2012). 
Otherwise the experimental setups are the same in the PCTB by Herrmann et al. (2007). 
To avoid confusion, we used a similar wording to describe the tasks. The size of the 
items and objects used was adjusted to make them operable for lemurs, especially for 
the small mouse lemurs. Most of the experiments were conducted by the same 
experimenter (E1), but for some of them (2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 2.2.6) a second person (E2) 
was required. Two different second persons assisted in different experiments, but the 
same person assisted always in one task for all trials and individuals.  
 
 
 
Figure S2 Basic experimental setup of the PCTB (depicted here experiment 3, Rotation). The table with 
the sliding board on top is attached to the mesh of the sujects’ cage and the subject is positioned in the 
centre of the setup using a carabiner (they have been previously trained to stay put wherever the 
carabiner is positioned). In this example, after watching the placement of the reward and the subsequent 
rotational movement, the sliding board was pushed towards the individual to choose between the three 
cups.  
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       Table S2 Summary of the PCTB and the number of trials per task and individuals per species and task. 
 
 scale task trials 
Lemur 
catta 
Varecia 
variegata 
Microcebus 
murinus 
ph
ys
ic
al
 
space 2.1.1 Spatial memory 6 27 13 16 
2.1.2 Object permanence 
 a) Single displacement 
 b) Double-adjacent displacement  
 c) Double non-adjacent displacement 
 d) Single displacement touch 
24 
6 
6 
6 
6 
27 13 12 
2.1.3 Rotation 
a) 360° 
b) 180° middle 
c) 180° side 
18 
6 
6 
6 
26 
 
13 12 
2.1.4 Transposition 
 a) Single 
 b) Double unbaited 
 c) Double baited 
18 
6 
6 
6 
27 13 12 
quantities 2.1.5 Relative numbers 16 27 13 9 
2.1.6 Addition numbers 14 26 13 9 
causality 2.1.7 Noise 
 a) Noise full 
 b) Noise empty 
12 
6 
6 
27 13 15 
2.1.8 Shape 
 a) Board 
 b) Cloth 
12 
6 
6 
27 13 15 
2.1.9 Tool use 1 27 13 16 
2.1.10 Tool properties 
 a) Side 
 b) Bridge 
 c) Ripped 
 d) Broken wool 
 e) Tray circle 
30 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
27 13 15 
so
ci
al
 
social 
learning 
2.2.1 Social learning 
a) Paper tube 
b) Banana tube 
c) Stick tube 
4 
1 
1 
1 
26 13 15 
commun-
ication 
2.2.2 Comprehension 
 a) Head & eyes  
 b) Head, eyes & paw  
 c) Marker 
42 
18 
18 
6 
27 13 13 
2.2.3 Pointing cups 8 27 13 15 
2.2.4 Attentional state 
 a) Away 
 b) Towards 
 c) Away body-facing 
 d) Towards body-facing 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
26 13 15 
theory of 
mind 
2.2.5 Gaze following 
 a) Head & eyes  
 b) Back  
 c) Eyes  
9 
3 
3 
3 
27 13 16 
2.2.6 Intentions 
 a) Trying 
 b) Reaching 
12 
6 
6 
27 13 15 
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2.1 Tasks of the physical domain 
2.1.1 Spatial memory 
On the experimental sliding board three cups were placed in a row. While the individual 
was watching, two rewards were first presented and then openly placed under two of 
three cups. After the board was moved towards the individual the individual had to 
choose between the three cups and point at the chosen one. The individual could 
choose two times consecutively, but if it chose the cup without reward first, no further 
choices were allowed. Individuals had to choose both cups correctly to count as a 
correct response.  
2.1.2. Object permanence 
Again, three cups were placed in a row. A smaller fourth cup (placed in the beginning on 
the far left or right side of the board) was used for displacing the reward into one of 
these three cups. Therefore, while the individual was watching, a reward was placed 
under the fourth cup and afterwards four different displacement-scenarios were 
conducted: 
a) Single displacement: The fourth cup, including the reward, was moved under one of 
the three big cups without touching the other two cups. 
b) Double adjacent displacement: The fourth cup was moved consecutively under two 
adjacent cups and the reward was left under one of these cups without touching the 
third. 
c) Double non-adjacent displacement: The fourth cup was moved under the two outer 
cups and the reward was left under one of these cups without touching the cup in 
the centre. 
d) Single displacement touch: The fourth cup was moved under one of the three cups 
and the reward was left there. E1 touched the other two cups in order to find out 
whether the individuals simply chose the cup touched last by E1 or indeed followed 
the small cup to the last location it was moved to.  
After these displacements, the empty fourth cup was shown to the individual and the 
board was moved towards it. The individual was now allowed to make one choice for 
the single displacement and two consecutive choices for the double displacements. If it 
chose a cup that had not been part of the displacement-scenario no further choices 
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were allowed. Individuals had to choose the reward-cup as first choice to count as a 
correct response.  
2.1.3 Rotation 
A movable tray is put on top of the board with three cups placed on it in a row. While 
the individual was watching, a reward was first presented and then openly placed under 
one of the three cups. The tray and hence the cups were then rotated in three different 
spatial scenarios: 
a) 360°: The reward was placed under one of the outer cups and the tray was rotated 
360° in clockwise (or counter clockwise) direction. Hence, the reward was in the end 
again in the same position as before the rotation. 
b) 180° middle: The reward was placed under the cup in the centre and the tray was 
rotated 180° in clockwise (or counter-clockwise) direction. Hence, the reward was in 
the end still in the same position as before the rotation. 
c) 180° side: The reward was placed under one of the outer cups and the tray was 
rotated 180° in clockwise (or counter-clockwise) direction. Hence, the reward was in 
the end in the opposite position as before the rotation. 
After the rotations, the board was moved towards the individual and it could choose a 
cup once. Individuals had to choose the reward-cup correctly to count as a correct 
response. 
2.1.4 Transposition 
Again, three cups were placed in a row and while the individual was watching a reward 
was first presented and then openly placed under one of the cups. The cups were then 
transpositioned in three different spatial scenarios: 
a) Single transposition: The position of the reward-cup was switched with one of the 
empty cups without touching the third cup. 
b) Double unbaited transposition: The position of the reward-cup was switched with 
one of the empty cups and afterwards the positions of the two empty cups were 
switched. 
c) Double baited transposition: The position of the reward-cup was switched with one 
of the empty cups and afterwards again switched with the other empty cup. 
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After the transpositions, the individual could make a choice once and only the reward-
cup being the first choice counted as a correct response. 
2.1.5 Relative numbers 
Two plastic plates were placed on the testing board and then hid from the view of the 
individual using an occluder. Both plates were then baited with different amounts of 
equally sized reward pieces, covered with lids and placed in the middle of the board. 
After removing the occluder the lids of both plates were simultaneously lifted and 
hence the individual could see the amounts of reward pieces in each plate for about 5 
seconds. Then the plates were moved to the sides of the board, one right and one left, 
and the individual could make its choice. Each of the following pairs of numbers of 
reward pieces was trialled once per individual2 (the order of presentation was 
randomized):       
1:0 II 1:2 II 1:3 II 1:4 II 1:5 II 2:3 II 2:4 II 2:5 II 2:6 II 3:4 II 3:5 II 3:6 II 3:7 II 4:6 II 4:7 II 4:8  
(Additional four control conditions 1:1 II 2:2 II 3:3 and 4:4 were tested to monitor any 
possible side biases, e.g. choosing the same side in every trial.)  
The individual had to choose the larger quantity first to count as a correct response. 
2.1.6 Addition numbers 
Hidden behind the occluder, three plastic plates were baited with different amounts of 
reward pieces and then covered with lids and placed in the middle of the board. The 
occluder was removed, the lids of the outer plates were lifted simultaneously, and the 
individual could see them for about 5 seconds. Then they were covered again, and the 
lid of the middle plate was uncovered, allowing the individual to see its amount of 
reward pieces for 5 seconds. Afterwards the contents of the middle plate were 
transferred into one of the outer plates, with the individual being able to watch the 
transfer but not the content of the side plates. The empty middle plate was removed 
from the board and the individual could make its choice between the two covered outer 
plates. Each of the following pairs of reward pieces is trialled once per individual (the 
order in which they are presented is randomized):  
1:0 + 3:0 = 4:0 II 6:1 + 0:2 = 6:3 II 2:1 + 2:0 = 4:1 II 4:3 + 2:0 = 6:3 II 4:0 + 0:1 = 4:1 II 2:1 + 
0:2 = 2:3 and 4:3 + 0:2 = 4:5 
   Chapter 3  
 
54 
(Each combination was presented with the resulting higher number being once on the 
left and once on the right side, resulting in 14 trials in total.) The individual had to 
choose the larger quantity first to count as a correct response. 
2.1.7 Noise 
Behind the occluder a reward was hidden in one of two opaque cups. After the occluder 
was removed, the cups were manipulated in the two following ways while the individual 
was watching, and it had to choose the reward cup first to count as a correct response:  
a) Noise full: The reward cup was shaken three times, letting the food rattle inside and 
the empty one was simply lifted once without shaking (order was randomized). 
b) Noise empty: The empty cup was shaken three times, producing no sound and the 
baited cup was simply lifted once without shaking (order was randomized). 
2.1.8 Shape 
Behind the occluder a reward was hidden beneath one of two identical pieces of plastic 
board or cloth, thereby changing the appearance of the baited piece. After removing 
the occluder the individuals were presented with two different situations and they 
could choose once between the two possibilities. The individual had to choose the 
reward board or cloth first to count as a correct response. 
a) Board: The reward was hidden underneath one of two plastic boards (sized 15x10 
cm; 4x3 cm for mouse lemurs). The reward plastic board was not lying flat on the 
surface but inclined a bit. 
b) Cloth: The reward was hidden underneath one of two pieces of cloth (sized 15x10 
cm; 4x3 cm for mouse lemurs). A visible bump in the cloth was made by the reward 
instead of remaining flat on the surface. 
2.1.9 Tool use 
A reward was placed on the board out of reach of the individual (about 25 cm; 8 cm for 
mouse lemurs). Because the reward itself was out of reach for the individual it could 
only gain the food item by manipulating the tool, in this case a simple wooden stick 
(length 30 cm; 10 cm for mouse lemurs) that was provided to the individual. It had to 
retrieve the reward using the tool within two minutes; otherwise the attempt was not 
counted as a correct response. 
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2.1.10 Tool properties 
Behind the occluder two different tool setups, one intact and effectively functioning to 
gain the food reward and the other not, were placed on the sliding board. The individual 
could choose a tool once by pulling it and the first choice had to be the functioning tool 
to count as a correct response. Five different tool setups and objects were used: 
a) Side: Two identical pieces of cloth (sized 15x10 cm; 4x3 cm for mouse lemurs) were 
placed next to each other on the board. On top of one piece a reward was placed 
and for the other piece it was placed directly next to the cloth, making it the 
ineffective tool. The individual could only gain the reward placed on top of the cloth 
by pulling at it.  
b) Bridge: Again, two identical pieces of cloth (see above) were placed on the board, 
but this time two identical plastic bridges were placed over each of their far ends. 
For the ineffective tool, the reward was placed on top of the bridge and for the 
other underneath it. Hence the individual could obtain the reward by pulling the 
cloth. 
c) Ripped: Two pieces of cloth were again used, but only one of them intact the other 
was ripped apart in the middle. The two broken pieces were placed on the board 
with a gap of 1 cm in between, making it visually obvious that they were not 
connected. It was important that the intact piece of cloth (sized 15x10 cm; 5x3 cm 
for mouse lemurs) was equally sized as the ripped pieces including the gap (2 
smaller pieces sized 7x10 cm; 2x3 cm for mouse lemurs). For both cloths, the reward 
was placed on top of the far end, hence for the ripped cloth on the unreachable 
piece, making it ineffective. The individual could choose one cloth and obtain the 
reward by pulling at it. 
d) Broken wool: This task was basically identical to the previous one, except that pieces 
of wool string were used instead of cloth. The rewards were tied to the far ends of 
the wool pieces, making the broken one ineffective. The individual needed to pull at 
the intact string in order to gain a reward. 
e) Tray circle: Two small plastic trays (sized 6x6.5 cm; 2x2.5 cm for mouse lemurs) were 
placed on the board. One of them had a round hole cut in the middle (Ø 3 cm; 1 cm) 
and the other a u-shaped hole cut from out of its back. A reward was placed in the 
middle of each of the holes with the round one surrounding it effectively and the u-
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shaped one not holding it when pulled towards the individual. Using a string 
attached to the trays the individual was then allowed to pull at one of them to 
obtain the reward. Only the tray with the round hole would work effectively as it 
would push the reward towards the cage.  
2.2 Tasks of the social domain 
2.2.1 Social learning 
In the three different treatments of this task there was always a piece of reward stuck 
inside a plastic tube and E1 demonstrated the solution of this problem to the individuals 
once. The observing individual was then given two minutes to solve the problem on its 
own. A trial counted as correct only if the individual obtained the reward successfully by 
using a method highly similar to the previously demonstrated one. 
a) Paper tube: A reward was placed inside a 10 cm long transparent plastic tube with a 
piece of paper attached over both ends. E1 demonstrated how to open the tube: 
First E1 poked her finger through the paper on one end and then wiggled her finger 
in the tube to rip the paper further, making the hole in the paper larger (i.e. as 
opposed to using her mouth or hands to tear the paper off the tube). Finally, E1 
tilted the tube in order to let the reward fall in her hand. After the demonstration, 
an identical tube was handed to the individual. 
b) Banana tube: A small slice of banana was placed in the centre of a transparent 
plastic tube (15 cm) and a specific force had to be applied to get the reward out of 
the tube. E1 demonstrated how to get the reward by banging one end of the tube 
on the table (as opposed to shaking it forcefully). An identical tube with banana 
inside was afterwards handed to the individual. 
c) Stick tube: An opaque plastic tube with caps on each end was baited with a reward. 
One of the caps had a hole in it but was glued to the tube, whereas the other cap 
had no hole but could be removed. E1 demonstrated how to open the tube: First E1 
inserted a stick through the cap with a hole, and then she pushed the stick through 
the hole which forced the cap on the other end to fall off. After the successful 
demonstration, an identical grey tube was handed to the individual. 
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2.2.2 Comprehension  
Behind the occluder a reward was hidden under one of two cups placed on the board in 
a row. After the occluder was removed E1 indicated the rewards’ hidden location 
through three different possible pointing cues: 
a) Look (Head & eyes): E1 alternated her gaze three times between the individual and 
the baited cup while calling the individuals’ name and afterwards continuously 
looked towards the cup until the individual chose.  
b) Point (Head, eyes & hand): E1 alternated her gaze three times between the 
individual and the baited cup while calling the individuals’ name and continuously 
looked towards the cup and additionally pointed at it with the extended index finger 
of her cross-lateral hand until the individual chose.  
c) Marker: E1 held an iconic photo marker, which depicted the reward (banana pieces), 
in her hand and alternated her gaze three times between the photo and the 
individual while calling the individuals’ name. Then E1 placed the photo on top of 
the baited cup.  
After the board was moved towards the individual it could choose between both cups. It 
had to choose the reward-cup first to count as a correct response. 
2.2.3 Pointing cups 
Two identical cups were placed at the far ends of the sliding board. The individual was 
directed to a starting point in the middle of the board and E2 (a second experimenter) 
entered the testing area, placed a reward under one of the two cups while the 
individual was watching and left again. After E2 left, E1 entered the area and centred 
the individual again on its starting point using a piece of food. Then E1 stood in the 
middle between both cups and waited for the individual to choose one of the cups. 
Given the individual chose the reward cup correctly within 60 seconds E1 offered it the 
reward and a correct response was scored. 
2.2.4 Attentional state 
In the beginning a second experimenter (E2) entered and placed a reward in front of the 
cage but out of reach of the individual, randomly varied either on its right or left side, 
and left the room again. Afterwards E1 entered but stood at the end of the room 
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opposite of the reward and thus did not notice the reward on the floor. The attentional 
state of E1 varied in the different trials by looking in 4 different directions:  
a) Away: E1 turned around and looked away from the reward. The individual had to 
approach from her front to gain her attention. If the individual did so within 20 sec, 
E1 turned around and waited for the individual to direct her attention to the reward 
by moving back to it. If the individual indicated the rewards’ location within 20 sec, 
E1 handed it to the individual. 
b) Towards: E1 looked towards the reward and waited for the individual to approach 
the reward and direct her attention towards it within 20 sec. If the individual 
indicated the rewards’ location within 20 sec, E1 handed it to the individual. 
c) Away Body-facing: This trial was identical to “Away”, except that E1s’ body faced 
toward the reward and only her face was turned away. 
d) Towards Body-away: This trial was identical to “Towards”, except that E1s’ body was 
turned away and only her face was directed towards the reward. 
Indicating the location of the hidden food item was possible by pointing to the rewards’ 
location if it was in view of E1 or by first moving into E1s’ view (i.e. gaining her 
attention) and then pointing to the location. To count as a correct response, the 
individual had to successfully gain the reward by indicating its location to E1, otherwise 
E1 left the room and E2 entered again and removed the reward.  
2.2.5 Gaze following 
By calling and presenting a reward the attention of the individual was attracted and 
once the individual looked at E1 one of three different communicative gaze cues 
(implemented on different days to minimize any kind of habituation) was performed by 
orienting in the corresponding direction:  
a) Head & eyes: E1 called the individuals’ name and showed a reward. Then she hid the 
food in her hand, which remained in front of her body. Afterwards she looked up 
with both her head and eyes for ~10 sec.   
b) Back: E1 sat with her back facing the individual. She called the individuals’ name and 
showed a reward. Then she hid the food in her hand, which remained in front of her 
body. Afterwards she looked up at the ceiling for ~10 sec. Within the ~10 sec she 
looked back over her shoulder at the individual three times to ensure the 
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individuals’ attention. If it was not paying attention when E1 looked the second 
time, the trial was repeated.                                        
c) Eyes: E1 called the individuals’ name and showed a reward. Then she hid the food in 
her hand, which remained in front of her body. Afterwards she looked up at the 
ceiling for ~10 sec while her face was still facing the individual.  
To count as a correct response the individual had to follow the gaze of the conspecific 
during the first 10 seconds after the E1 changed the gaze direction.  
2.2.6 Intentions 
Behind the occluder a reward was hidden by E1 in one of two closed metal tins placed 
on the board in a row. The occluder was removed and the tins were manipulated by E2 
as follows:  
a) Trying: E2 tries in vain to open the reward tin by removing the lid while looking at 
the tin.  
b) Reaching: E2 tries in vain to reach for the reward tin by extending the equilateral 
arm and looking at the tin, but a Plexiglas barrier blocks the access to the tin. The 
cue is given continuously until the individual indicates its choice. 
About 3 seconds after each demonstration E1 approaches again and moves it towards 
the individual, allowing it to make a choice. The reward tin had to be chosen first to 
count as a correct response.   
3. The Personality Study 
As temperament or personality of individuals can influence performance in problem 
solving tasks (Hare & Tomasello, 2005), study individuals were tested with respect to 
their reaction to 29 different items (novel objects, persons, foods; Herrmann et al., 
2007; Schmitt et al., 2012). The testing situations varied depending on 1) the nature of 
the different items presented (humans, objects or food pieces), 2) whether the items 
were presented in combination or alone (e.g. non-familiar human moving a novel 
object), and 3) the level of activity of the items that took place during their presentation 
(e.g. novel object moving, also see Table S3).  
The items were presented by a second, unfamiliar experimenter (E2) sitting in front of 
the cage (except the very first test, in which the familiar human experimenter E1 is 
presented to the individual). The individual was then directed to a starting point offering 
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food and the stimuli ware each presented for 30 seconds. Each individual participated in 
one session per day on three consecutive days with the same order of stimuli (see Table 
S3). The first day all the items were presented and placed on the board by E2 and the 
individual was only allowed to view them (visible). Additionally, two non-social trials 
were also run during which the individual could either view the empty board alone or a 
bright red spot was placed on the board before E2 left the area. During the sessions of 
the second day (movement) E2 moved the different items from left to right over the 
board and on the third day (touch) the items were put close to the cage allowing the 
individual to potentially touch them if they wanted to.  
 
        Table S3 Summary of the items and methods used in the Personality Study. 
 
 category item description 
Vi
sib
le
 
Human a) Familiar (E1)   
b) Non-familiar (E2) 
E1/E2 sits behind the board, hands on the lap facing the 
mesh. 
Object a) Film roll canister 
b) Plastic animal  
c) Police car 
E2 sits behind the board, hands on her lap with the object 
placed in the middle of the board.           
In the police car condition E2 holds the remote control 
and presses the horn button ten times. 
Food a) Undesirable food 
b) Dried fruit piece 
c) 3 Raisins 
d) Banana piece 
E2 sits behind the board, hands on her lap with the food 
placed in the middle of the board. 
Non-Human a) Red spot    
b) Nothing 
E2 places a red spot in the middle of the board and leaves. 
Nothing is on the board and E2 is out of sight. 
M
ov
em
en
t 
Human a) Hand   
 
b) Body 
E2 sits behind the board and moves her right hand from 
the left side to the right side. 
In the body condition E2 nods up and down while seating. 
Object a) Film roll canister 
b) Plastic animal 
c) Police car 
E2 sits behind the board and moves the object from the 
left side to right side and back on the board. 
In the police car condition E2 lets the car drive to the 
other side of the board, left to right, two times. 
Food a) Undesirable food 
b) Dried fruit piece 
c) 3 Raisins 
d) Banana piece 
E2 sits behind the board and moves the food from the left 
side to right side and back on the board. 
To
uc
h 
Human Hand E2 sits behind the board and puts her right fist on the 
board. 
Object a) Film roll canister 
b) Plastic animal 
c) Police car 
d) Box 
E2 sits behind the board, hands on her lap with the object 
placed on the board within reach of the individual. 
Food a) Undesirable food 
b) Dried fruit piece   
c) 3 Raisins 
d) Banana piece 
E2 sits behind the board, hands on her lap with the food 
placed on the board within reach of the individual. 
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  All experiments were videotaped. Each individual’s degree of anxiety and/or 
disinterest as a response to the different testing situations was scored from the video 
recordings. Therefore, the time it took the individual to approach the new item (latency) 
or whether they did it at all was noted and also whether they tried to touch it or not. In 
addition, the time the individual spent near the item (duration) and also how close it 
approached (proximity) was noted. Overall, this part of the study allows controlling for 
temperamental factors (anxiety-boldness/interest-disinterest) influencing cognitive 
abilities. 
3.1 Data analyses and detailed results 
Results for the correlations between the three personality measures (latency, proximity 
and duration) and the performance in the two cognitive domains of the PCTB are 
reported in the main article. A multivariate analysis of variance of the three personality 
measures revealed no differences between the ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs (Wilk's 
Λ=0.941, F(3,34)=0.71, p=0.550) and neither sex (Wilk's Λ=0.828, F(3,34)=2.35, p=0.090) 
nor the interaction between species and sex (species:sex; Wilk's Λ=0.955, F(3,34)=0.54, 
p=0.660) had an influence on individuals’ performance. Univariate analyses (ANOVAs or 
Kruskal-Wallis-Tests) of each measure confirmed these insignificant differences 
between both species in all three personality measures.   
 
4. Inhibitory Control Test 
Testing inhibitory control of individuals (the ability to control one’s impulses) might help 
to explain potential species differences in the physical or social domain of the tasks 
(Herrmann et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2012). It has been shown that inhibitory control 
can constrain apes in solving tasks in the physical (e.g. chimpanzees, Boysen & Berntson, 
1995) and the social domain (e.g. chimpanzees, Melis et al., 2006b; Stevens & Hauser, 
2004). The inhibitory control test of this study consisted of six additional trials of the 
spatial memory task of the PCTB (experiment 2.1.1), assessing whether the individuals 
would skip the middle one out of three cups. Therefore, while the individual was 
watching, rewards were placed under the two outer cups and the middle cup was left 
empty. The individual could then choose one of the cups, and if it chose one of the 
baited cups correctly, it could choose a second time. No second choice was allowed if 
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the individual chose the middle cup first. To correctly perform this task, individuals had 
to inhibit their tendency to choose the empty middle cup, which was positioned closest 
to them. Hence, a response was only scored as correct when the individual 
consecutively chose the two outer cups and skipped the middle cup. We found no 
differences in performance between the three species (Kruskal-Wallis test: χ2=2.34, 
p=0.31) and there were no correlations for inhibitory control and performance in any 
species, neither in the social nor the physical domain (Table S4). 
 
Table S4 Spearman rank correlation between inhibitory control 
and performances in the physical and social domain.  
 
species domain n rho p-value 
Ruffed lemurs 
physical 13 -0.13 0.662 
social 13 -0.09 0.772 
Ring-tailed lemurs 
physical 27 -0.08 0.691 
social 27 -0.06 0.765 
Mouse lemurs 
physical 15 -0.19 0.502 
social 15 -0.12 0.677 
 
5. Rank 
The possible influence of the individuals’ rank on performance was examined as well, 
except for the mouse lemurs that are housed solitarily. In all lemur groups, rank was 
inferred through additional focal animal observations. 
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Abstract 
Apes and some New and Old World monkeys (i.e., haplorhine primates) are known to 
routinely use tools. In strepsirrhine primates (i.e., lemurs & lorises), no tool use has 
been reported, even though they appear to have some basic understanding of spatial 
relations required for using a pulling-tool. To facilitate direct comparisons of the 
underlying abilities between haplorhine and strepsirrhine primate species, we 
experimentally examined instrumental problem-solving abilities in three captive lemur 
species (Microcebus murinus, Varecia variegata, and Lemur catta), using methods from 
previous experiments with haplorhine primates. First, lemurs were supposed to use a 
stick to gain access to an inaccessible food reward. Only one ring-tailed lemur solved 
this task spontaneously on the first attempt. After offering the stick repeatedly, 13 
individuals of all three species solved it successfully. Second, lemurs had to choose 
between pairs of reachable objects with a food reward on or near them, where one 
object did not afford pulling in the food. Ring-tailed and grey mouse lemurs generally 
selected the correct (connected) object, thus performing comparably with haplorhine 
primates, and ruffed lemurs even matched chimpanzees in their performance. Thus, 
although strepsirrhine primates may lack the fine motor skills to use a stick as a 
reaching tool, they performed comparable with naturally tool-using haplorhine primates 
on means-end problems. Our findings suggest a dissociation in primates between the 
judgment of spatial relations between two objects, which appears to be roughly 
equivalent across species, and facility at handling sticks for instrumental purposes, 
which favours species with enhanced manual dexterity. 
 
Key words:  Primate cognition, lemurs, instrumental problem-solving, physical 
cognition, means-end reasoning 
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Introduction 
Although tool use among animals is relatively rare, it is taxonomically widespread, 
including various mammals, birds, fish and invertebrates, and the number of reports of 
this behaviour has steadily increased in recent years (reviewed in Bentley-Condit & 
Smith, 2010; Fellers & Fellers, 1976; Sanz, Call & Boesch, 2013; Shumaker et al., 2011). 
Animals use tools mainly in foraging contexts, to deter predators, or for personal 
hygiene or comfort. Examples include sea otters (Enhydra nutri nereis) carrying rocks to 
the surface to crack open invertebrate prey (Fisher, 1939); baboons (Papio ursinus) 
deliberately throwing stones from elevated positions towards possible threats, such as 
unfamiliar observers (Hamilton, Buskirk & Buskirk, 1975); or elephants (Elephas 
maximus) using branches to chase off insects (Darwin, 1871). 
Most recent reports of tool use are based on observations or experiments with 
birds and primates. Several passerine bird species, such as the woodpecker finch 
(Cactospiza pallida) or the New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides), use stick-tools 
that are sometimes manufactured by themselves from twigs or leaves to forage for 
larvae in tree holes and are occasionally also cached for later use (Hunt, 1996; Klump et 
al., 2015; Millikan & Bowman, 1967). Among nonhuman primates, only a few haplorhine 
species, that is, monkeys and apes, regularly use tools spontaneously (reviewed in 
Bentley-Condit & Smith, 2010). One of the best-known examples is the use of stones or 
solid branches as pounding hammers in combination with wood or stone anvils to crack 
open hard-shelled foods in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; Beatty, 1951; Boesch & 
Boesch, 1993), long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis; Carpenter, 1887; 
Malaivijitnond et al., 2007), and black-striped capuchins (Cebus libidinosus; Anderson, 
1990; Fragaszy et al., 2004).  
In strepsirrhine primates, that is, lemurs and lorises, which represent the most 
basal living primates (Yoder, 2007), no unequivocal observations of tool use have been 
reported so far, even though they comprise about 150 species with very diverse 
ecologies (Kappeler, 2012). Why tool use in this order is apparently absent or very rare 
might be due to several reasons: First, it might simply be underreported because most 
lemurs and lorises are nocturnal and relatively small, making behavioural observations 
difficult. Second, even though many strepsirrhines are exposed to seasonal resource 
variation, which has been suggested to be a selective pressure in some haplorhines to 
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access energy-rich resources with the help of tools (Bentley-Condit & Smith, 2010), 
lemurs and lorises evolved other tactics, like torpor and hibernation, to deal with 
ecological bottlenecks (Schülke & Ostner, 2007). Third, strepsirrhines have relatively 
smaller brains than haplorhines (Isler et al., 2008) and may therefore lack the cognitive 
abilities to use tools, even though some of their cognitive abilities in the physical 
domain are on par with those of many haplorhines (reviewed in Fichtel & Kappeler, 
2010). Finally, unlike some haplorhines, strepsirrhines are not able to oppose their 
thumbs and have therefore limited dexterity (Torigoe, 1985), which might hamper their 
ability to manipulate tools. Indeed, most strepsirrhine primates prefer to carry and 
manipulate objects or food with their mouth rather than with their hands (Jolly, 1964). 
Interestingly, food-grasping behaviour in lemurs appears to have coevolved with infant-
carrying styles (Peckre et al., 2016). Species in which infants cling to their mothers’ fur 
used more unimanual grasps and less mouth grips during feeding sessions than species 
that carry their infants orally, suggesting that the fur-clinging ability coevolved with 
more precise manipulative skills (Bishop, 1962; Peckre et al., 2016).  
Although lemurs apparently do not spontaneously use tools, studies with captive 
lemurs demonstrated that they are able to reason about spatial relations between 
objects: Individuals of two lemur species (Eulemur fulvus and Lemur catta) confronted 
with two different canes, varying in their functionality and properties, were able chose 
the one that allowed them to gain access to an out-of-reach food reward (Santos et al., 
2005a). The lemurs solved this task as quickly as two monkey species faced with the 
same experimental situation (Saguinus oedipus oedipus and Cercopithecus aethiops; 
Hauser, 1997; Santos et al., 2005b). Because relational spatial reasoning is a cognitive 
requisite to solve instrumental problems and use tools, comparative studies of this 
ability can contribute to our understanding of its origins and elaboration (Cummins-
Sebree & Fragaszy, 2005).  
We therefore investigated the ability to judge spatial relations between objects 
in three lemurid primate species in tasks that have already been investigated in 
haplorhine primates (Herrmann et al., 2012). To this end, we experimentally 
investigated the ability to use a stick to extend the reach to get access to a reward and 
to solve dichotomous object-choice tasks between connected and disconnected 
object/reward pairs in captive populations of grey mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), 
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black-and-white ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata; hereafter called “ruffed lemurs”) and 
ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta). To directly compare the performance of lemurs with 
haplorhine primates, we performed experiments that have already been conducted 
with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), Sumatran orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), olive 
baboons (Papio anubis) and long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) as part of the 
Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB; Herrmann et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2012). The 
PCTB included one so-called tool-use experiment (Experiment 1) in which individuals 
could use a stick to pull in an out-of-reach reward. Because this task basically requires 
the ability to reason about the relation between the stick and the reward, as well as the 
ability to manipulate the stick, but not the ability to alter the physical properties of 
another object an important criterion for tool-use (Beck, 1980; St Amant & Horton, 
2008; page 1203), we, henceforth, refer to this task as the “stick task”. We additionally 
conducted experiments in which the subjects chose between a food item on a 
continuous support or a food item on a discontinuous support, a task thought to tap 
means-end reasoning (Experiment 2). In the stick-task the two great ape species, which 
possess a higher precision grip level, outperformed the two monkey species, which 
exhibit a medium precision grip level (Torigoe, 1985). In contrast, the results for the 
means-end reasoning tasks were indistinguishable among the four species. 
Grey mouse lemurs are nocturnal, solitarily foraging primates with an 
omnivorous diet and carry their infants orally (Eberle & Kappeler, 2006; Ross, 2001; 
Tecot et al., 2012). In contrast, ring-tailed lemurs are diurnal, live in groups of 11 
individuals on average, are opportunistic omnivores, and have infants who cling to the 
fur of the mother (Gould et al., 2003; Jolly, 1966; Ross, 2001; Sussman, 1991). Ruffed 
lemurs are also diurnal, live in small groups (average six individuals), mainly feed on 
fruits, and have infants who are carried orally (Ross, 2001).  
We predicted that among lemurs the stick task would be solved only by ring-
tailed lemurs because infants cling to their mothers’ fur. However, due to the lemurs’ 
inferior level of precision grip and dexterity (Torigoe, 1985), we predicted them to be 
generally less successful than the four haplorhine species. Because dexterity is 
irrelevant in the means-ends choice problems, and because brown and ring-tailed 
lemurs performed similar to haplorhine primates in a previous study using a slightly 
different setup (Santos et al., 2005a), we predicted that the three lemur species would 
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perform equally and also at levels comparable with the four haplorhine primate species 
tested with the same experimental set-up (Herrmann et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2012).    
 
Methods 
This study was conducted between October 2014 and November 2015 with animals 
housed at the German Primate Center, Göttingen, Germany, and the Affenwald Wildlife 
Park, Sondershausen, Germany (www.affenwald.info/en). Both experimental setups are 
originally part of the PCTB and were adopted from Herrmann et al. (2007) and Schmitt 
et al. (2012). Only the size of the items and objects needed some adjustment to make 
them operable for lemurs, especially for the mouse lemurs (average body mass: Ruffed 
lemurs 3500 g, ring-tailed lemurs 2200 g and mouse lemurs 60 g; Isler et al., 2008). 
 
Ethical statement 
All experiments were noninvasive and based on a voluntary participation of the animals 
which obtained desired food as rewards, using positive reinforcement. The experiments 
took place without any food reductions, and water was always available ad libitum in 
both locations. This study is in accordance with the German ethical requirements of 
appropriate animal procedures. Consultation of the Animal Welfare Body of the German 
Primate Center is documented (E2-17). 
 
Study subjects and general testing procedure 
The experiments were conducted with a total of 56 adult individuals, including 15 to 16 
grey mouse lemurs, 27 to 29 ring-tailed lemurs, and 13 ruffed lemurs. All study subjects 
were born in captivity and are housed at the German Primate Center (DPZ) or the 
Affenwald. In both facilities, animals are provisioned with fresh food twice a day. At the 
German Primate Center, ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs are offered an outdoor enclosure 
equipped with enriching climbing material and natural ground vegetation. At the 
Affenwald, both species range freely within a large natural outdoor enclosure (3.5 ha), 
covered mainly with beech trees (Fagus sylvatica). The nocturnal mouse lemurs are kept 
indoors at the German Primate Center, with an artificially reversed day-night cycle, and 
their cages are equipped with climbing material, fresh natural branches, and leaves.  
All animals were individually tested in familiar surroundings and were unfamiliar 
with the tasks presented. The testing apparatus for all tasks consisted of a sliding board 
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attached to the fence of the subjects’ enclosure. Once pushed into reach, the subject 
had to either manipulate a stick (Experiment 1) or indicate its choice by pointing or 
reaching through the mesh wire towards the chosen item (Experiment 2; Fig. 1). The 
setup was identical for ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs but adapted in size for the mouse 
lemurs. Raisins or pieces of banana served as rewards for all species. During testing, no 
possible cues to the rewards’ location were provided by the experimenter. Experiments 
were videotaped, and the subjects’ responses to the tasks were coded afterwards from 
the videos. A naïve second observer additionally scored 20% of all trials. With an 
agreement of 100%, interobserver reliability was very good (Interclass Correlation 
Coefficient =1). 
 
Experiment 1: The stick task 
A piece of banana (ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs: about 1.5 cm thick; mouse lemurs: 
about 0.5x0.5 cm) was placed on the board out of reach of the test individual. The 
individual could only gain access to it by manipulating a straight wooden stick (length 
for ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs: 30 cm; for mouse lemurs: 6 cm). The stick was placed 
next to the banana, and the individual could retrieve the reward by using the tool in 
their first attempt and within two minutes; otherwise the attempt was not counted as a 
correct response. 
 
Experiment 2: Means-end problems 
Two different surfaces were set up on the sliding board behind an occluder, one with 
continuous connection or enclosure of the distal food reward with the reachable 
surface, and one with discontinuous connection or enclosure of the distal food reward 
with the reachable surface. Afterward, the individual was allowed to choose one 
reachable surface once by touching or pulling it, and the first choice had to be the 
continuous surface to count as a correct response. Five different means-end problems 
were tested (Fig.1): 
a) Side: Two identical pieces of cloth (ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs: 15x10 cm; mouse 
lemurs: 5x2 cm) were placed next to each other. On one piece of cloth, the reward was 
placed on top, and for the other piece of cloth, the reward was placed directly next to it, 
making it the ineffective tool. The cloth with the reward placed on top was the correct 
choice.  
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Figure 1 (A) The different setups of the means-end choice task (a-e) and (B) the general experimental 
setup. A ruffed lemur sitting in front of the sliding table, pulling the reward towards itself using the 
connected object (Experiment 2e).   
 
b) Bridge: Two identical pieces of cloth were placed next to each other, but this time, 
two identical transparent plastic bridges were placed above each of their far ends. For 
the incorrect choice, the reward was placed on top of the bridge, and for the correct 
choice the reward was placed on the cloth underneath the bridge. 
c) Ripped: In this task two pieces of cloth were used again, but only one of them was 
intact; the other one was ripped apart in the middle. The two broken pieces were 
placed with a gap of 1 cm between them, to make it visually obvious that they were not 
connected. The intact piece of cloth (ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs: 15x10 cm; mouse 
lemurs: 5x2 cm) had the same size as the ripped pieces including the gap (two smaller 
pieces, ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs: 7x10 cm; mouse lemurs: 2x2 cm). For both cloths, 
the reward was placed on top of the far end. The individual was now allowed to choose 
one cloth and try to obtain the reward by pulling at it. 
d) Broken wool: This task was basically identical to the previous one, except that pieces 
of wool string were used instead of cloth. The rewards were tied to the far ends of the 
wool pieces, making the broken one ineffective.  
e) Ring: In this task two small plastic rings (ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs: 7 cm diameter; 
mouse lemurs: 3 cm) with a round hole in the middle (Ø 3 cm and 1 cm) were placed on 
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the board. One ring had a segment (approximately 60°) removed from the back of the 
ring (see figure 1B). A reward was placed in the centre of each ring, and, using a string 
attached to the rings, the individual could pull one of them to obtain the reward. The 
string attached to the intact ring was the correct choice. 
For each of the five problems, six trials were conducted per individual, as per Schmitt et 
al. (2012), who increased the number of trials, compared with the three trials per task 
originally conducted by Hermann et al. (2007), to use both possible spatial positions 
evenly (left and right). Accordingly, the position of the reward was randomized and 
counterbalanced across both possible locations, and the reward was never put in the 
same place for more than two consecutive trials. 
 
Data analyses 
For the stick task, a descriptive comparison of all species, including the great apes and 
monkeys (Herrmann, et al. 2007; Schmitt et al., 2012) was implemented. A Kruskall-
Wallis test was conducted to compare the species in the number of sticks (or trials) 
needed by the successful lemurs. All analyses were conducted in R version 3.2.2 (R Core 
Team Vienna, Austria), and the critical p value was set at α = 0.05. To determine 
whether lemurs’ overall performance in the means-ends choice problems was 
significantly better than expected by chance (chance-level at 50%), we used a 
generalized linear mixed model (GLMM; R-package “lme4”, Bates et al., 2015). Correct 
responses combined with failures (c-binded) were used as binomial response variable, 
species as fixed factors, and individual identity as random grouping factor, and we 
estimated species-level specific intercept coefficients.  
GLMMs were also used to test for differences in the performance in choosing 
the functional surface among the lemur species. Correct responses combined with 
failures (c-binded) were included as binomial response variable, whereas species, task, 
location, sex, and age were fitted as fixed factors and individual identity as random 
factor. To test all possible pairings among species and tasks, additional post hoc 
analyses using Tukey's multiple comparison test (R-package “multcomp”, Hothorn et al., 
2008) were implemented. All full models (including the predictors and control factors) 
were compared to the null model (only with the control factors) by analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). To test for a learning effect, we applied a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, using 
performances of the first three trials and the second three trials of each problem. For an 
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overall comparison of performance in the means-end problems among lemur species, 
long-tailed macaques, olive baboons, chimpanzees and Sumatran orangutans, we 
calculated a one-way ANOVA with species as between-subject factor and performance 
of the species as dependent variable (data for nonlemurs from Herrmann et al., 2007 
and Schmitt et al., 2012). To examine differences in performance of all possible pairings 
among the species, a Tukey‘s multiple comparison test was used.  
 
Results 
Experiment 1: The stick task 
Nearly all individuals at least grabbed the stick once (ruffed lemurs: 93%, ring-tailed 
lemurs: 97%, mouse lemurs: 94%), and more than half of them were also able to move 
the food reward using the stick, albeit not within reach (ruffed lemurs: 73%, ring-tailed 
lemurs: 55%, mouse lemurs: 56%). Only one female ring-tailed lemur solved the stick 
task on the first attempt.  
 
 
Figure 2 Proportion of success of the different primate species in the first attempt of the stick task (data 
for nonlemurs from Herrmann et al., 2007 and Schmitt et al., 2012); precision grip-level applied after 
Torigoe (1985). 
 
Compared with lemurs, macaques and baboons performed equally poorly, with 
no successful subject in the first attempt, whereas in orangutans and chimpanzees, 
more individuals were successful (Fig. 2). In contrast to the experimental design of the 
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original PCTB, we also put the stick back on the table after it fell down so that 
individuals had more trials to solve the problem. In total, 13 individuals (5 ruffed, 4 ring-
tailed, and 4 mouse lemurs) used the stick to retrieve the reward during subsequent 
trials. Of these successful individuals, ring-tailed lemurs needed fewer trials (median: 3 
trials ±1.3) to solve the task than did mouse (4.5 trials ±3.6) and ruffed lemurs (5 trials 
±3.3), but this trend was not statistically significant (Kruskall-Wallis test: χ2=4.67, 
p=0.097). Some individuals developed specific methods when handling the stick 
repeatedly, which can be mainly divided into two categories labelled “push” and “pull”. 
In total, more than half of all individuals used one of these two methods in an attempt 
to obtain the reward (ruffed lemurs: 73%, ring-tailed lemurs: 59%, mouse lemurs: 50%). 
 
Experiment 2: Means-end problems 
In total, all three lemur species chose the correct object more often than expected by 
chance (binomial GLMM: χ2=40.5, df=3, P<0.001; Table 1). With an average proportion 
of 64.6% correct responses, ruffed lemurs performed better than mouse lemurs but not 
better than ring-tailed lemurs (ring-tailed lemurs: 58.6%; mouse lemurs: 55.6%; see 
Table 2; binomial GLMM: χ2=17.4, df=9, P=0.043; Table 3, Fig. 3).  
Because the two study groups of ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs were both housed 
in two different facilities with different levels of enrichment, we also tested whether 
their housing location had an influence on their performance, which was not the case 
(Table 3). Furthermore, neither sex nor age influenced performance, and the 
performance of the lemurs did also not differ between the five different setups on 
means-end reasoning (Table 2, 3 and Fig. 4). In addition, we did not find a learning 
effect between performances in the first and second half of all trials (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test: V=752.5, p=0.403).                                   
 
Table 1 Results on whether the three different lemur species’ 
performance was above chance level in the means-end choice task.  
 
Fixed effects Estimate Odds ratio SE P-value 
Ruffed lemurs 0.56 1.75 0.11 <0.001 *** 
Ring-tailed lemurs 0.35 1.42 0.07 <0.001 *** 
Mouse lemurs 0.22 1.25 0.10    0.019 * 
 
                                 *<0.05; ***<0.001 - significance levels 
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Table 2 Summary of the average proportions of correct responses of the three lemur species in the five 
different tasks of the means-end choice experiment and the overall results per species.  
 
  Ruffed lemurs  Ring-tailed lemurs  Mouse lemurs 
 trials n Av SD ind  n Av SD ind  n Av SD ind 
side 6 13 67.9 19 2  27 53.7 13 0  15 61.1 16 0 
bridge 6 13 66.7 18 1  27 63.0 18 2  15 57.8 12 0 
ripped 6 13 66.7 20 2  27 54.3 16 0  15 57.8 18 0 
broken wool 6 13 57.7 18 0  27 57.4 13 0  15 51.1 15 0 
tray circle 6 13 59.0 18 0  27 64.8 16 2  15 50.0 19 0 
totals 30 13 63.6 12 4  27 58.6 8 4  15 55.6 9 2  
Trials=number of trials per task; chance-level for each task: 50%; n=number of participating individuals; Av=average 
performance; SD=standard deviation; ind= individuals performing above chance level. 
 
 
 
Table 3 Results on the influence of species, task, location, sex and age on the 
performance in the different tasks of the means-end choice experiment (p-values 
corrected for multiple testing, Tukey's).  
 
Fixed effects Estimate Odds ratio SE P-value 
Intercept (mouse lemurs, task a) 0.09 1.09 0.20  
Ring-tailed lemurs – mouse lemurs 0.26 1.30 0.15 0.20 
Ruffed lemurs – mouse lemurs 0.60 1.82 0.18 0.0021** 
Ruffed lemurs – ring-tailed lemurs 0.33 1.40 0.15 0.06 
Task b – a 0.14 1.15 0.16 0.90 
Task c – a -0.04 0.96 0.16 1.00 
Task d – a -0.14 0.87 0.16 0.91 
Task e – a 0.01 1.01 0.16 1.00 
Task c – b -0.18 0.84 0.16 0.80 
Task d – b -0.28 0.76 0.16 0.41 
Task e – b -0.13 0.88 0.16 0.93 
Task d – c -0.10 0.91 0.16 0.97 
Task e – c 0.05 1.05 0.16 1.00 
Task e – d 0.15 1.16 0.16 0.88 
Location (DPZ) 0.12 1.13 0.14 0.37 
Sex (m) -0.13 0.88 0.10 0.19 
Age -0.03 0.97 0.02 0.06 
 
               **<0.01 - significance level 
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Figure 3 Comparison of the lemur species tested in the means-end choice task (**comparison ruffed vs. 
mouse lemurs: p=0.0021; ruffed vs. ring-tailed lemurs, ring-tailed vs. mouse lemurs: ns; binomial GLMM). 
Represented are medians (black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), upper and lower hinges (whiskers), 
and the chance level (50%; dashed line). 
   
 
Figure 4 Comparison of the lemur species in the tasks of the means-end choice experiment. Represented 
are medians (black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), upper and lower hinges (whiskers), averages 
(squares), and outliers (circles).    
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All three lemur species performed at levels comparable with the haplorhines 
(Fig. 5). Ruffed lemurs were even slightly better (median: 63.6% correct responses) than 
a natural tool user, the chimpanzees (median: 60.6% correct responses). Ring-tailed and 
mouse lemurs performed on average as well as the other nonhuman primates (1-way-
ANOVA, F[6, 204]=1.45). 
 
 
Figure 5 Comparison of all nonhuman primate species tested in the means-end choice task. Represented 
are medians (black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), upper and lower hinges (whiskers), averages 
(squares), and outliers (circles; data for nonlemurs from Herrmann et al., 2007 and Schmitt et al., 2012). 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, 13 out of 56 individuals of three lemur species used a stick to pull a 
reward within reach, but only one individual managed to do so successfully in the first 
trial. In comparison with the haplorhine primate species, both ape species, but none of 
the other primate species could solve this task on the first trial. In the means-end 
problems examining judgments about spatial continuity between the food reward and 
the supporting, reachable surface, all three lemur species performed above chance level 
and their performance was similar to the performance of the haplorhine species. Hence, 
correct judgments about physical support relations do not seem to be restricted to 
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naturally tool-using haplorhine species. These findings suggest that perceiving spatial 
support relations between objects appears to be a shared cognitive feature across 
primates.  
In the stick task almost all lemurs failed in their first attempt to make use of the 
stick that required fine-scale motor control. Only one female ring-tailed lemur 
spontaneously used the tool successfully on the first attempt. Indeed, all five species 
exhibiting a low or medium level of precision grip (lemurs, long-tailed macaques, and 
olive baboons; Torigoe, 1985) that have been tested in this way were unable to use the 
stick to pull a reward into reach on the first attempt. However, returning the stick for 
additional trials, thereby giving the lemurs additional opportunities to explore and 
handle the stick, revealed that they tried to grab the stick but had problems handling it, 
although a few individuals solved the task in these subsequent trials. These findings 
support theoretical perspectives from ecological psychology, which suggest that animals 
visually perceive relevant features of spatial relations between objects and surfaces and 
that this visual information initially guides action (Shaw, 2003; Cummins-Sebree & 
Fragaszy, 2005). With regard to manipulative activity, animals may seek additional 
information that is not available from the visual array while manipulating objects, which 
provides information on the properties and consequences of acting with objects in 
different ways. As a consequence, animals learn from this activity which in turn guides 
future actions (Gibson, 1988).  Hence, species-specific manipulative activities in 
everyday life have been suggested to predict the form and flexibility of different species 
in instrumental problem-solving tasks or tool-use (Cummins-Sebree & Fragaszy, 2005). 
For example, a comparison of the ability to manipulate objects to retrieve an out-of-
reach reward between cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and tufted capuchins 
(Cebus apella), which are extractive foragers whereas tamarins are not, revealed that 
capuchins discovered different ways to manipulate the objects through exploratory 
actions whereas tamarins did not (Cummins-Sebree & Fragaszy, 2005). Hence, the strict 
criterion to use the stick on the first attempt as suggested by Herrmann et al. (2007) 
might be too strict and too simple to investigate the abilities of solving instrumental 
problems across species. In addition, the experimental setup in which individuals had to 
reach the stick through the wire mesh might have hampered the subjects’ ability to fully 
explore the propensities of the stick to reach the reward.  
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Among lemurs, which are all not extractive foragers, ring-tailed lemurs required 
fewer trials during subsequent opportunities to use the stick to get access to the out-of-
reach reward than did members of the other two species. Because ring-tailed lemurs 
are the only one among the three species that cling to the fur of their mothers as 
infants, infant-carrying style might have facilitated the evolution of manipulative skills 
(Bishop, 1962; Peckre et al., 2016). Because brain size also correlates with manual 
dexterity (Heldstab et al., 2016), the relative importance of manual and cognitive 
constraints in limiting the manipulation of the stick remains unclear from these 
experiments. 
Therefore, we also investigated the subjects‘ means-end reasoning about the 
continuity of contact between two objects in the second experiment, in which they had 
to choose between objects, but did not have to grasp an object, to obtain an out-of-
reach food reward. As in a previous study (Santos et al., 2005a), members of all three 
lemur species tested in our study showed a similar sensitivity to the continuity of a 
supporting surface as the already tested haplorhines. Thus, a basic understanding of this 
feature of spatial relations between objects is apparently shared across the main 
primate lineages, irrespective of whether they use tools in the wild or not (Hauser, 
1997; Hauser et al., 2002; Santos et al., 2005a).  
Although it has been shown that the performance in tool using tasks can 
improve with practise (e.g. Cummins-Sebree & Fragaszy, 2005), we did not find an effect 
of experience in the tasks on means-end reasoning about spatial relations between 
objects. However, these experiments consisted of only six trials each, and a potential 
learning effect might only be evident with an increased number of trials. In addition, 
presenting lemurs with a series of more complex tasks with different difficulty levels 
concerning means-end reasoning, as well as the actual use of tools, seems now 
indicated. For example, we would like to investigate if lemurs would not only choose 
between objects to use as tools but also learn to move an object to create an 
appropriate interface with another object to solve the problem at hand (Cummins-
Sebree & Fragaszy, 2005; Santos et al., 2005a). More information on strepsirrhine 
primates’ abilities to manipulate objects in instrumental tasks might ultimately 
contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the evolution of tool use in 
primates and other orders. 
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Supporting Online Material: Movies 
 
Stick-task 
The individual can only gain access to an out-of-reach food reward by manipulating a 
straight wooden stick that was placed next to the banana. 
 
Movie S1 
Stick-task - successful trial; ring-tailed lemur (Lemur catta) 
 
Movie S2 
Stick-task - problems handling the stick; ruffed lemur (Varecia variegata) 
 
Means-end problems 
The individual has to use means-end reasoning in order to choose between a 
continuous and a discontinuous surface in order to pull in a distal food reward. Mouse 
lemurs were attracted to the working platform by tapping on the mesh of the cage with 
the tweezers. In addition, individuals were usually “centred” using a small piece of food 
reward before pushing the board towards them to choose.  
 
Movie S3 
Means-end problems, task a) Side; mouse lemur (Microcebus murinus) 
 
Movie S4 
Means-end problems, task b) Bridge; ring-tailed lemur 
 
Movie S5 
Means-end problems, task c) Ripped; ruffed lemur  
 
Movie S6 
Means-end problems, task d) Broken wool; mouse lemur  
 
Movie S7 
Means-end problems, task e) Tray circle; ring-tailed lemur  
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Abstract 
Being able to follow the gaze and to understand gestures of other individuals is 
beneficial in intraspecific interactions. This ability has been studied in various animals, 
especially in several species of non-human primates, by conducting gaze following and 
object-choice experiments offering social-visual cues by human demonstrators to locate 
a reward. However, compared to conspecifics, humans may not be an appropriate 
model for this task. We therefore tested whether members of three lemur species 
(Microcebus murinus, Lemur catta, Varecia variegata) are able to follow the gaze and to 
locate a hidden food reward in an object-choice experiment by using social-visual cues 
given by either a human or by human and conspecific model-demonstrators presented 
as photographs or video-clips. Lemurs followed the gaze of conspecifics in videos but 
not on photos. They did not follow the gaze of humans in photos or videos, and only 
ring-tailed lemurs followed the gaze of a human. In the object-choice experiment, all 
lemur species made use of social-visual cues when presented by a human or a photo of 
conspecifics, but not when they were presented by videos or photos of humans. Since 
the study groups were housed under different conditions of human exposure, we 
examined whether the housing condition influenced performance in these tests. Lemurs 
performed better with a human demonstrator when they were used to regular close 
human contact (tourist park). Thus, lemurs can make use of social-visual cues and the 
exact nature of the stimulus (conspecific/human), and the level of human socialisation 
modulates their performance.  
 
 
Key words:  Primates, gaze following, pointing cues, objects-choice test, social cognition 
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Introduction 
One advantage of living in groups is information transfer among group members. For 
species that rely on visual communication, it is beneficial to be able to follow the gaze of 
other individuals and to understand their communicative signals to spot predators, 
locate food sources or to obtain social knowledge from conspecifics (Emery, 2000; 
Tomasello et al., 1998; Zuberbühler & Byrne, 2006; Zuberbühler, 2008). Visual co-
orientation has been recognized as an important behavioural mechanism in this context 
(Itakura, 1996, 2004; Miklósi & Soproni, 2006; Zuberbühler, 2008). In experiments on 
this ability, animals were either tested for their ability to visually co-orient with a human 
or conspecific demonstrator (i.e. gaze following: e.g. Itakura, 1996; Tomasello et al., 
1998) or to use gaze-direction or pointing cues of a demonstrator to locate a hidden 
food reward in object-choice experiments (e.g. Anderson et al., 1995; Kaminski et al., 
2005). In the latter, individuals have not only to follow the demonstrators’ gaze to the 
target location, but they also have to infer that gazing or pointing provide salient cues. 
The ability to follow human gaze has been demonstrated in ravens (Bugnyar et 
al. 2004) and several primate species (Amici et al., 2009; Kano & Call, 2014; Liebal & 
Kaminski, 2012). Studies working with a conspecific as demonstrator revealed gaze 
following skills in reptiles (Wilkinson et al., 2010), birds (Kehmeier et al., 2011) and 
primates (Kano & Call, 2014; Tomasello et al., 1998). The usage of social-visual cues 
presented by a human demonstrator in object-choice experiments was demonstrated in 
birds (Schmidt et al., 2011), mammals, such as sea lions or dolphins (Malassis & Delfour, 
2015; Tschudin et al., 2001), domestic animals, like dogs, goats or pigs (Kaminski et al., 
2005; Miklósi et al., 1998; Nawroth et al., 2016; Wallis et al., 2015), as well as primates 
(Anderson et al., 1995; Itakura, 1996). However, a human demonstrator might not be 
able to cross the cognitive boundary required for understanding signals from a member 
of another species, leading to an underestimation of the taxonomic distribution of these 
abilities (Botting et al., 2011; Ruiz et al., 2009). 
Phylogenetic proximity to humans might be one factor explaining inter-specific 
variation in performance in gaze-following and object-choice experiments with human 
demonstrators. Among primates, haplorhines (monkeys and apes) indeed tend to 
perform better in such tests than strepsirrhines (lemurs and lorises; Kittler et al., 2015). 
Brown lemurs (Eulemur fulvus, N=3) and black lemurs (Eulemur macaco, N=4), for 
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example, did not follow human gaze, and when pointing cues were implemented they 
rather looked at the demonstrator’s finger than in the indicated direction (Itakura, 
1996; Anderson & Mitchell, 1999). More recent studies in several lemur species 
indicated a certain ability to make use of human head orientations and gaze directions 
in tasks on competitive food choice, however (Botting et al., 2011; MacLean et al., 
2013). For example, of four species of lemurs (ring-tailed lemurs, brown lemurs 
(Eulemur mongoz), black lemurs and red ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata rubra)) only 
ring-tailed lemurs were able to avoid a human competitor by choosing between food at 
which the human gazed and food that was not competed for (Sandel et al., 2011). 
However, brown and black lemurs (N=4 and 2, respectively) were able to use visual cues 
of conspecifics depicted in photographs to locate a hidden food reward (Ruiz et al., 
2009). Moreover, ring-tailed lemurs clearly follow conspecifics’ gaze, as inferred by a 
telemetric gaze-tracking device (Shepherd & Platt, 2008). Hence, so far there is mixed 
support for social-visual co-orientation in lemurs, which might be either due to the use 
of different demonstrators and/or relatively small sample sizes. In addition, knowledge 
on solitary and nocturnal lemur species is totally missing yet. 
Therefore, the objective of this study was to investigate gaze following abilities 
and the utilisation of pointing gestures in lemurs, by using human and conspecific 
demonstrators in two experimental setups on social co-orientation in three 93 lemur 
species differing in their levels of sociality. Grey mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus) are 
nocturnal, solitary foragers, whereas ring-tailed (Lemur catta) and black-and-white 
ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata; hereafter “ruffed lemurs”) are diurnal and group-
living. Specifically, we investigated whether lemurs’ ability to co-orient differs between 
conspecific demonstrators offering a social-visual cue depicted on photographs and 
videos compared to a human, presented by an actual human, as well as photographs 
and videos. By presenting either static (photo) or moving (video) stimuli, we additionally 
investigated whether the nature of the stimulus influences lemurs’ performance. 
Moreover, the level of socialisation with humans appears to influence the animal’s use 
of socio-visual cues of humans (Maros et al., 2008; Miklósi et al., 2003), but studies 
using identical methods on two populations of animals with different levels of human 
socialisation are rare (Hare et al., 2002; Miklósi et al., 2003). Therefore, we compared 
the use of socio-visual cues of ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs between populations 
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exposed to different levels of human contact (daily care-taking vs. walkable enclosure in 
a tourist park). 
We first conducted a classical gaze following experiment in which the 
demonstrator, either a human or a human/conspecific model (photos or videos), looked 
upwards and the individuals were observed for subsequent gaze-shifts during the 
following 10 seconds. We predicted that lemurs follow the gaze of conspecifics more 
often than the gaze of humans and that they follow the gaze of conspecifics depicted in 
videos more often than on photos. In addition, we predicted that the two group-living 
lemur species make more use of socio-visual cues than the solitary mouse lemurs. In the 
second experiment, we investigated whether lemurs locate a hidden food reward 
indicated by a social-visual cue (looking and looking & pointing) given by a human or a 
human/conspecific model demonstrator (photo or video). We predicted that lemurs 
make more often use of social-visual cues given by a conspecific than a human 
demonstrator and when the conspecific is depicted in a video compared to the photo. 
Finally, ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs with more and regular exposure to humans should 
perform better with a human demonstrator than those that are exposed to low levels of 
human contact.  
 
Methods 
This study was conducted with animals housed at the German Primate Center (DPZ) and 
the Affenwald wildlife park (AW) between February 2014 and October 2017. Parts of 
the experimental setup were adopted from the Primate Cognition Test battery 
(treatments with a human demonstrator; Herrmann et al., 2007), but adjusted in size to 
make it operable for lemurs. Additionally, we added experiments using photos and 
videos of humans and conspecifics. 
Ethical note 
All experiments were non-invasive and based on a voluntary participation of the 
animals. The individuals were all trained to get used to the general experimental 
procedures and to being separated from the group for the short time during the 
experiments by rewarding them with much desired food for participation, using positive 
reinforcement. All experiments took place without food restrictions. In both locations, 
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animals are provisioned with fresh food twice a day and water is available ad libitum. 
The German Primate Center is registered and authorised by the local and regional 
veterinary governmental authorities (Reference number: 32.22/VO Stadt Göttingen; 
392001/7 Stadt Göttingen) as well as the Affenwald (Veterinäramt Sondershausen & 
UNB Kyffhäuserkreis; Reference number: 13 6433-04/2 SDH Kö). This study is in 
accordance with the German ethical requirements of appropriate animal procedures. 
Consultation of the Animal Welfare Body of the German Primate Center is documented 
(E2-17). 
 
Study subjects and general testing procedure 
The experiments were conducted with adult individuals of grey mouse lemurs (n=11-
16), ring-tailed lemurs (n=20-27) and black-and-white ruffed lemurs (n=11-13). All study 
subjects were unfamiliar with the presented tasks, born in captivity and housed either 
at the German Primate Center (DPZ) in Göttingen or the Affenwald in Sondershausen 
(see supplementary material, Table S1). At the DPZ, ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs each 
inhabit an outdoor enclosure equipped with enriching climbing material and natural 
ground vegetation. The nocturnal mouse lemurs are kept indoors on an artificially 
reversed day-night-cycle, and cages are equipped with climbing material and fresh 
natural branches. The level of interaction between primates and humans (caretakers & 
scientists) is kept to a minimum at the DPZ. At the Affenwald, the lemurs range freely 
within a large natural outdoor forest enclosure (3.5ha). Since lemurs are handled by 
animal caretakers from birth on to facilitate brief veterinarian inspections, and because 
visitors can walk through the enclosure, lemurs at the Affenwald are used to close 
interaction with humans from birth on. All animals were individually tested in separated 
but familiar test rooms. The testing apparatus consisted of a sliding board attached to 
the subjects’ enclosures on which the experiments were set up (Fig. 1). The 
experimental setup was identical for ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs but adapted in size 
for the smaller mouse lemurs. Raisins or pieces of banana served as food rewards. 
All experiments were videotaped, and the performance of the subjects was 
coded afterwards from the videos. A naïve second observer additionally scored 20% of 
all trials for the pointing cues experiment and 100% of the gaze following experiment. 
The overall Interclass Correlation Coefficient was very good with ICC=0.957. In the 
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experiments the socio-communicative gaze following and pointing cues were either 
given by the experimenter (E1) or by photos and video clips of humans and conspecifics. 
For the model conspecifics, unknown individuals were used to avoid any potential 
influence of familiarity. Similar photos of conspecifics were shown to the individuals 
before the start of the experimental trials to habituate them to photos in general. Due 
to methodological problems, such as taking video-recordings under dim red-light, the 
experiments using videos were only conducted with ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs but 
not with mouse lemurs. 
 
Experiment 1: Gaze Following 
The experiment was set up behind an occluder and the trial began with the removal of 
the occluder. Each individual participated in 16 different tasks (10 for mouse lemurs) 
consisting of 3 trials each and conducted on different days to minimize habituation: 
a) Control condition: This task was conducted in order to establish a baseline 
estimate of how often the subjects look upwards in the absence of any social-visual 
cues. Therefore, E1 called the subjects’ name and showed a reward. Then she hid the 
food in her hand, which remained in front of her body and looked straight at the 
subject’s chest for 10s.  
b) Head & eyes: E1 called the subjects’ name and showed a reward. Then she hid 
the food in her hand, which remained in front of her body. Afterwards she looked up 
with both her head and eyes for 10s. In the modelled human and conspecific 
experiments, the individual (human or conspecific) in the photo or video looked up with 
both its head and eyes for 10s with the eyes open. 
c) Back: E1 sat with her back facing the subject. She looked back over her 
shoulder, called the subjects’ name and showed a reward. Then she hid the food in her 
hand, which remained in front of her body. Afterwards she turned around and 189 
looked at the ceiling for 10s, during which she looked back over her shoulder at the 
subject twice while calling its name to ensure that it was still paying attention. In the 
modelled human and conspecific experiments, the individual in the photo or video sat 
with its back towards the subject and looked up for 10s (see supplementary material, 
Fig. S1B). 
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d) Eyes: E1 called the subjects’ name and showed a reward. Then she hid the 
food in her hand, which remained in front of her body. Afterwards she looked up at the 
ceiling for 10s with her eyes only while her face was still facing the subject. In the 
modelled human and conspecific experiments, the individual in the photo or video 
glanced to the ceiling for 10s with its eyes only while the face was still oriented towards 
the subject. 
Tasks b-d were conducted with five different demonstrator categories (human, photo 
human/conspecific and video human/conspecific). To count as a correct response the 
subject had to follow the demonstrators’ gaze upwards during the 10s after the social-
visual cue was presented. 
Experiment 2: Pointing Cues 
A reward was hidden behind an occluder under one of two cups placed next to each 
other on the board. When the occluder was removed, the subject was presented with 
communicative pointing cues towards the rewards’ hidden location offered either by E1 
or by photos and videos of humans and conspecifics. To this end, the photo or small 
video screen was placed between the two cups (Fig. 1). Each individual participated in 
10 different tasks (6 for mouse lemurs) consisting of 6 trials each that were conducted 
on different days to minimize habituation: 
a) Looking (Head & eyes): E1 alternated her gaze three times between 212 the subject 
and the baited cup while calling the subjects’ name to assure its attention and 
afterwards continuously looked towards the cup until the subject made a choice. For 
the human and conspecific photos and videos, E1 always ensured the individuals’ 
attention by calling its name before presenting the cue. In the photos the background 
was always white (see supplementary material, Fig. S1) and the depicted human or 
lemur oriented its head and eyes towards the baited cup. In the videos, the individual 
first moved its head and eyes from a central position towards the correct side and then 
the screen froze, showing the correct orientation until the subject made a choice. 
b) Pointing (Head, eyes & hand/paw): In addition to the previous setup, E1 also pointed 
at the cup with the extended index finger of her cross-lateral hand until the subject 
made a choice. In the human and conspecific photos and videos the individual 
additionally also pointed/grabbed with its hand towards the baited cup (see Fig. S1C).  
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Similar to the gaze following experiment, both tasks were conducted with five 
different demonstrator categories (human, photo human/conspecific and video 
human/conspecific). After the cues were presented, the board was moved towards the 
subject and it could choose between the two cups. It had to choose the baited cup first 
to count as a correct response. The position of the reward was randomized, and counter 
balanced across both possible locations and the reward was never put in the same place 
for more than two consecutive trials. The insides of both cups were beforehand rubbed 
with a piece of reward in order to prevent any inadvertent olfactory cues, and during 
testing of the conspecific demonstrator conditions no possible cues were provided by 
E1. 
 
Figure 1 General experimental setup. A female ring-tailed lemur sitting in front of the sliding table and 
choosing between the two cups after looking at the social-visual cue (video) presented on the screen 
between the two cups. 
 
Data analyses 
All analyses were conducted in R version 3.2.2 (R Core Team, Vienna, Austria) and the 
critical p-value was set to α = 0.05. In the gaze following experiment, the control 
condition without any social-visual stimulus served as baseline against which we 
compared the performance in the other treatments. To examine whether lemurs looked 
more often up in response to one of the five categories (human, photo 
human/conspecific, video human/conspecific) than in the control condition we used a 
generalized linear mixed model (GLMM; R-package “lme4”; Bates et al., 2015). We used 
correct responses (looking upwards) combined with failures (c-binded) as binomial 
response variable, while species, category, location, sex and age were fitted as fixed 
factors, and individual identity as random factor. To compare species’ performances in 
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all possible combinations, we conducted additional post hoc analyses using Tukey's 
multiple comparison tests (R-package “multcomp”; Hothorn et al., 2008). To investigate 
differences between the categories for each species, we also used GLMMs separated 
per species, with correct responses combined with failures (c-binded) as binomial 
response variable, category, location, sex and age as fixed factors and individual identity 
as random factors. For all possible combinations of categories we conducted post hoc 
analyses (Tukey's). 
For the pointing cue experiments, we used a GLMM to determine whether lemur 
species’ overall performance was better than expected by chance (chance-level at 50%). 
We used correct responses combined with failures (c-binded) as binomial response 
variable, species as fixed factors, individual identity as random grouping factor and we 
estimated species-level specific intercept coefficients. For the overall comparison of the 
species performances between human and the photo demonstrators, we also used a 
GLMM, with correct responses combined with failures (c-binded) as binomial response 
variable, species, category, location, sex and age as fixed factors and individual identity 
260 as random factor. To test all possible combinations between the species we 
implemented an additional post hoc analysis (Tukey's). For investigating whether the 
level of socialisation had an influence on performance we conducted GLMMs separately 
for the human, photo human and photo conspecific-category, as well as by species 
(ruffed and ring-tailed lemurs). We used correct responses combined with failures (c-
binded) as binomial response variable, location as fixed factors and individual identity as 
random grouping factors. For analysing whether our models indeed explain more of the 
observed effects than just individual variation, we compared all GLMMs to their null 
model (a GLMM with the same response variable but simply individual identity as fixed 
factor) afterwards by analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
 
Results 
Experiment 1: Gaze Following 
In the control condition, members of all three lemur species looked upwards without 
any social-visual cue given by a demonstrator in about every fifth trial (ruffed 23.9%, 
ring-tailed 17.3%, mouse lemurs 18.0%; Fig. 2). Only during the presentation of video 
conspecifics, ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs looked up more often than in the control 
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condition. Overall, males looked up more often than females (males: 35.9% correct 
responses, females: 20.0%; Table 1). Species, location or age did not influence the 
frequency of looking up (Table 1).  
Figure 2 Percentage of coorientation of lemurs in response to different demonstrators in the gaze 
following experiment. In comparison to the control condition, only ring-tailed lemurs looked up more 
often when a video of a conspecific (***p<0.001) and video of a human human (**p=0.0039 was 
presented (all other conditions: n.s.; see Table 2). Represented are medians (black bars), interquartile 
ranges (boxes), upper and lower hinges (whiskers), outliers (circles), and averages (squares). 
 
 
Table 1 Summary of the influence of species, category, location, sex and age on the 
performance in the gaze-following experiment (binomial GLMM, comparison to null 
model: χ2=76.15, df=10, P<0.001; p-values are adjusted for multiple testing). 
Fixed effects Estimate SE P-value 
Intercept (Ring-tailed, Control condition) -1.93 0.34  
Ruffed lemurs - Ring-tailed lemurs -0.13 0.37      0.93 
Mouse lemurs - Ring-tailed lemurs -0.31 0.41      0.74 
Ruffed lemurs - Mouse lemurs 0.18 0.45      0.92 
Category: Human 0.42 0.25      0.55 
Category: Photo Human 0.03 0.26      1.00 
Category: Video Human 0.60 0.26      0.20 
Category: Photo Conspecific 0.29 0.25      0.87 
Category: Video Conspecific 1.36 0.26 <0.001 *** 
Location (DPZ) -0.06 0.34      0.85 
Sex (m) 0.79 0.27      0.004 ** 
Age 0.00 0.04      0.99 
 
                     *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001 - significance levels           
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Table 2 Results of the multiple comparisons for each species on the influence of the 
social cue-giver on coorientation in the gaze following tasks (Tukey’s multiple 
comparisons). 
 
Fixed effects Estimate SE P-value 
Ruffed lemurs    
  Human - Control -0.19 0.43       1.00 
  Photo Conspecific - Control 0.09 0.42       1.00 
  Photo Human - Control -0.19 0.44       1.00 
  Video Conspecific - Control 0.68 0.42       0.58 
  Video Human - Control -0.43 0.45       0.93 
  Photo Conspecific - Human 0.28 0.31       0.94 
  Photo Human - Human -0.00 0.32       1.00 
  Video Conspecific - Human 0.87 0.30       0.0380 * 
  Video Human - Human -0.23 0.34       0.98 
  Photo Human - Photo Conspecific -0.28 0.31       0.94 
  Video Conspecific - Photo Conspecific 0.59 0.28       0.30 
  Video Human - Photo Conspecific -0.51 0.33       0.61 
  Video Conspecific - Photo Human 0.87 0.30       0.0456 * 
  Video Human - Photo Human -0.23 0.34       0.98 
  Video Human - Video Conspecific -1.10 0.32       0.0062 ** 
Ring-tailed lemurs    
  Human - Control 1.10 0.39       0.05 
  Photo Conspecific - Control 0.62 0.40       0.62 
  Photo Human - Control 0.35 0.40       0.95 
  Video Conspecific - Control 2.03 0.39     <0.001 *** 
  Video Human - Control 1.42 0.39       0.0039 ** 
  Photo Conspecific - Human -0.49 0.24       0.33 
  Photo Human - Human -0.76 0.26       0.0342 * 
  Video Conspecific - Human 0.93 0.23     <0.001 *** 
  Video Human - Human 0.32 0.23       0.75 
  Photo Human - Photo Conspecific -0.27 0.26       0.90 
  Video Conspecific - Photo Conspecific 1.41 0.25     <0.001 *** 
  Video Human - Photo Conspecific 0.80 0.24       0.0127 * 
  Video Conspecific - Photo Human 1.69 0.26     <0.001 *** 
  Video Human - Photo Human 1.07 0.26     <0.001 *** 
  Video Human - Video Conspecific -0.61 0.23       0.08 
Mouse lemurs    
  Human - Control -0.02 0.49      1.00 
  Photo Conspecific - Control 0.00 0.49      1.00 
  Photo Human - Control -0.15 0.51      0.99 
  Photo Conspecific - Human 0.01 0.34      1.00 
  Photo Human - Human -0.13 0.37      0.99 
  Photo Human - Photo Conspecific -0.15 0.38      0.98 
 
   *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001 - significance levels                                    
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In comparison to the control condition ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs looked more 
often up in response to a conspecific video but not in response to human gaze changes 
or photos with a human or conspecific (Fig. 2 & Table 2). Ruffed lemurs also looked 
more often up in response to videos of conspecifics than to videos of humans. 
Interestingly, ring-tailed lemurs looked more often up in response to videos of 
conspecifics in comparison to photos of humans and conspecifics. They also looked 
more often up 284 in response to gaze changes of both, humans and videos of humans 
compared to photos of humans (Fig. 2, Table 2). All lemurs looked up more often to 
changes in human gaze directions compared to the head and back condition (Fig. S2), 
but not compared to the other conditions (Table S2).  
Experiment 2: Pointing Cues 
All three species performed above chance level (50%) in the object-choice tasks using a 
human demonstrator or a photo of a conspecific, and ring-tailed lemurs also performed 
above chance using a photo of a human (Table 3 & Fig. 3). However, ruffed and ring-
tailed lemurs did not perform significantly better than chance when cues were provided  
Table 3 Performance of lemurs in the object-choice experiments. 
Comparison with the chance level (50%) in each of the five categories 
(human, photo conspecific/human and video conspecific/human; 
binomial GLMM, comparison to null model: χ2=146.3, df=13, P<0.001).   
Fixed effects Estimate SE P-value 
Ruffed lemurs    
  Human  1.00 0.18  <0.001 *** 
  Photo Human 0.03 0.17       0.87 
  Video Human 0.14 0.17       0.41 
  Photo Conspecific  0.75 0.17  <0.001 *** 
  Video Conspecific 0.20 0.17       0.24 
Ring-tailed lemurs    
  Human  0.85 0.12  <0.001 *** 
  Photo Human 0.25 0.12       0.0412 * 
  Video Human 0.03 0.12       0.81 
  Photo Conspecific 0.68 0.12  <0.001 *** 
  Video Conspecific  0.17 0.12       0.18 
Mouse lemurs    
  Human  0.72 0.18  <0.001 *** 
  Photo Human 0.13 0.18      0.47 
  Photo Conspecific 0.63 0.18  <0.001 *** 
 
                                    *<0.05; ***<0.001 - significance levels           
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by videos of humans or conspecifics (Table 3). The frequency of correct choices was 
higher when a photo of a conspecific served as demonstrator in comparison to a human 
photo (Table 4). However, lemurs inferred more often the correct location when a 
human presented the cues compared to a human photo. 
Figure 3 Percentage of correct choices of lemurs in the object-choice experiment with the five different 
demonstrators (video demonstrators only for ruffed lemurs and ring-tailed lemurs). Comparison to 
chance level (dotted line at 50%): all three species: human and photo of a conspecific: ***p<0.001, ring-
tailed lemurs: photo human: *p=0.041 (all other conditions: p=ns, see Table 3). Represented are medians 
(black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), upper and lower hinges (whiskers), outliers (circles), averages 
(squares), and chance level (dashed line). 
 
Table 4 The influence of species, category, location, sex and age on the performance in the object-choice 
experiments (binomial GLMM, comparison to null model: χ2=35.7, df=7, P<0.001; p-values are adjusted 
for multiple testing). 
Fixed effects Estimate SE P-value 
  Intercept (Ring-tailed, Photo Conspecific) 0.70 0.12  
  Ruffed lemurs - Ring-tailed lemurs -0.01 0.14 1.00 
  Mouse lemurs - Ring-tailed lemurs -0.06 0.16 0.91 
  Ruffed lemurs - Mouse lemurs 0.05 0.17 0.95 
  Human - Photo Conspecific 0.17 0.12 0.34 
  Photo Human - Photo Conspecific -0.53 0.12        <0.001 *** 
  Photo Human - Human -0.70 0.12        <0.001 *** 
  Location (DPZ) -0.03 0.13 0.80 
  Sex (m) 0.04 0.10 0.71 
  Age 0.00 0.02 0.91 
                
                ***<0.001 - significance levels 
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Ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs exposed to higher levels of contact with humans 
performed better when a human experimenter provided the cues than lemurs that 
were exposed to lower levels of human contact (Table 5 & Fig. 4). There were no 
significant differences in performance between locations after the presentation of a 
human or conspecific photo demonstrator (Table 5). 
Figure 4 Percentage of correct choices in response to human and conspecific demonstrators in the 
population with higher (AW) and lower (DPZ) levels of human socialisation (**p=0.003, see Table 5). 
Represented are medians (black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), upper and lower hinges (whiskers), 
outliers (circles), averages (squares), and the chance level (50%; dashed line). 
 
Table 5 Influence of location on performance with the human and conspecific 
demonstrators of the object-choice experiments (binomial GLMMs, 
comparison to null models: ring-tailed lemurs (human): χ2=7.79, df=1, 
P=0.005; ruffed lemurs (human): χ2=2.01, df=1, P=0.16). 
 
Fixed effects Estimate SE P-value 
  Ruffed lemurs    
  Human - location  -0.52 0.37      0.16 
  Photo Human - location 0.46 0.36      0.20 
  Photo Conspecific - location 0.68 0.37      0.07 
  Ring-tailed lemurs    
  Human - location  -0.79 0.27 0.003 ** 
  Photo Human - location -0.03 0.28      0.90 
  Photo Conspecific - location 0.24 0.27      0.38 
                               
                              **<0.01 - significance levels 
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Discussion 
In this study, we showed that ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs followed the gaze of 
conspecifics depicted in videos, but not of conspecifics presented on photos and 
humans depicted in videos or photos. Ring-tailed lemurs also followed the gaze of a 
human demonstrator, whereas ruffed and mouse lemurs did not. All three species 308 
made use of social-visual cues in form of gazing or pointing gestures presented by a 
human or a conspecific photo to solve an object-choice task. In addition, the level of 
contact with humans influenced ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs’ performance, which is 
important to consider in future studies of other species. 
Ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs followed the gaze of a conspecific depicted in 
videos, supporting the notion that lemurs do follow the gaze of conspecifics (Shepherd 
& Platt, 2008). However, only ring-tailed lemurs followed the gaze of a human 
demonstrator, which is line with a previous study on human gaze-following in ring-tailed 
lemurs, suggesting that the ability to follow human gaze indicates an example of 
convergent socio-cognitive evolution with haplorhine primates (Sandel et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, in the conspecific demonstrator conditions still photos were not as 
effective as videos in eliciting gaze following responses, indicating that not only species 
identity of the demonstrator, but also active motions contain salient information. 
Because many species make use of socio-visual cues presented by conspecifics, 
including reptiles (Wilkinson et al., 2010), birds (Kehmeier et al., 2011) and other 
primates (Kano & Call, 2014; Tomasello et al., 1998), social coorientation appears to be 
a basic cognitive skill of terrestrial vertebrates. 
In the object-choice experiment, all lemur species made use of socio-visual cues 
given by humans and conspecifics on photos to infer the correct location of the hidden 
reward. Because in this, but also in the gaze following experiment, mouse lemurs 
performed with similar success as the two other species, living in groups or activity 
pattern per se do not appear to promote this ability. Moreover, because many species 
of birds and mammals are able to use socio-visual cues in object-choice experiments 
(Miklósi et al., 1998; Kaminski et al., 2005; Ruiz et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2011; 
Malassis & Delfour, 2015; Nawroth et al., 2016), this might also be a basic cognitive 
ability. 
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In both experiments, cues provided by conspecifics were more salient than cues 
provided by a human demonstrator for these lemurs. Interestingly, in the gaze-following 
experiment lemurs were more attentive to videos than to photos presenting 
conspecifics, whereas it was the other way around in the object choice experiment. In 
the gaze following experiment, where individuals had to follow the movement of the 
eyes or the head of a demonstrator, moving actions might be explicit, whereas in the 
object-choice experiment still photos may have provided less unequivocal cues 
compared to a video. Thus, these results only partly support other studies questioning 
the ecological validity of photos in socio-cognitive experiments (Bovet & Vauclair, 2000; 
Morton et al., 2016; Waitt & Buchanan-Smith, 2006), indicating a need for additional 
experiments with real-life conspecifics to assess the ecological validity of photos or 
videos in socio-cognitive experiments (Loretto et al., 2010; Schloegl et al., 2008; 
Wilkinson et al., 2010). 
Finally, ring-tailed and ruffed lemur populations with more intense and regular 
contact with humans performed better in these tasks. Either lemurs performed better 
because they had more experience with humans gesturing, or they were less fearful of 
humans and hence more likely to focus on any given cue in the presence of a human. 
Since all individuals were well habituated to the presence of a human experimenter 
before the beginning of the experiment, we think that differences in performance 
between the two populations are rather due to their general experience with humans. 
The level of human socialisation also influenced performance in tasks involving socio-
visual cues in several other species (Itakura, 2004; Maros et al., 2008; Miklósi et al., 
2003; Lyn et al., 2010). For example, bonobos and chimpanzees reared in a socially 
complex human environment performed better in response to human gestures than 
standard-reared 355 individuals (Lyn et al., 2010). Moreover, the level of socialisation 
influenced performance in wolves, but not in dog puppies (Hare et al., 2002; Miklósi et 
al., 2003). Hence, the nature and frequency of human contact can influence the animals’ 
performance in socio-cognitive experiments involving a human; a potential bias that 
should be considered in future studies. 
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Supplementary Materials 
General Information 
 
Figure S1 Examples for the presented conspecific photo cues. A: Ring-tailed lemur gazing upwards with its 
head & eyes (exp. 1b) B: Ruffed lemur gazing upwards showing its back (exp. 1c) C: Mouse lemur pointing 
& looking towards to the left side (exp. 2b). 
 
 
Table S1 Number of study subjects in both locations. 
 
species location males females age range (years) 
ring-tailed lemurs 
DPZ 1-2 4-5 3-10 
Affenwald 10-11 5-9 3-17 
ruffed lemurs 
DPZ 3 1-2 3-12 
Affenwald 4 3-4 3-20 
mouse lemurs DPZ 4-7 7-9 4-7 
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Experiments 1 & 2: Gaze Following & Pointing Cues       
                              
Table S2 Influence of task on performance within the different 
categories of the gaze following experiment; Tukey’s multiple 
comparison analyses for all three species. 
 
Fixed effects Estimate SE P-value 
Human    
  Head - Eyes 0.93 0.29       0.0082 ** 
  Head - Back 0.18 0.30       0.93 
  Eyes - Back 0.74 0.28       0.0442 * 
Photo Conspecific    
  Head - Eyes 0.20 0.28       0.90 
  Head - Back     -0.24 0.28       0.83 
  Eyes - Back      -0.04 0.29       1.00 
Photo Human    
  Head - Eyes     -0.27 0.33       0.85 
  Head - Back 0.10 0.31       0.99 
  Eyes - Back      -0.37 0.32       0.67 
Video Conspecific    
  Head - Eyes     -0.11 0.30       0.98 
  Head - Back 0.35 0.30       0.65 
  Eyes - Back 0.25 0.30       0.85 
Video Human    
  Head - Eyes 0.06 0.34       1.00 
  Head - Back 0.39 0.33       0.65 
  Eyes - Back     -0.33 0.34       0.76 
 
                                      **<0.01; *<0.05 - significance levels 
 
 
 
Table S3 The influence of task on performance within the 
different categories of the pointing cues experiment (Tukey’s 
multiple comparison analyses). 
 
Fixed effects Estimate SE P-value 
Look - Look & Point    
  Human  0.12 0.18 0.48 
  Photo Human -0.09 0.17 0.60 
  Video Human -0.17 0.19 0.39 
  Photo Conspecific 0.13 0.17 0.45 
  Video Conspecific -0.32 0.20 0.11 
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Figure S2 Comparison of the lemurs’ performance in the different treatments of the gaze following 
experiment: The control condition and the five categories (human, photo conspecific/human, video 
conspecific/human), split up into the separate tasks (head, back and eyes). Represented are medians 
(black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), upper and lower hinges (whiskers), and outliers (circles). 
   Chapter 5  
 
101 
 
Figure S3 Performance of lemurs’ in the pointing cues experiment. Shown are the five different categories 
(human, photo conspecific/human and video conspecific/human) split up into the separate tasks (look 
and look & point). Represented are medians (black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes), upper and lower 
hinges (whiskers), and outliers (circles). 
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General Discussion 
In this thesis, I systematically investigated the cognitive skills of lemurs. My results 
indicate that overall, they have slightly more pronounced physical than social cognitive 
abilities. Furthermore, their performance compares to that of Old World monkeys and 
great apes in many aspects of both domains. Still, comparing the overall results revealed 
that apes outperformed lemurs in the physical domain, while all species performed 
equally in the social domain. In this last section of my dissertation, I will review and 
discuss my main results concerning the cognitive skills of lemurs and address questions 
and theories on the evolution of primate cognition. An important point in my discussion 
will be the applicability of studies in comparative cognition to different species and I will 
reflect on the balance between replication and adaptation of methodologies. 
Furthermore, I will discuss what this study adds to the overall picture of cognitive skills 
in animals and in the end, I will draw conclusions in view of future studies and directions 
in the field of comparative cognition.   
 
6.1 Interpreting the results of the PCTB – Lemurs vs. Apes & Monkeys 
 
 The overall results of my study emphasise that interspecific differences in 
cognitive skills can vary considerably among different cognitive tasks. Lemurs performed 
at the same level as apes and monkeys in the scales on quantity and communication 
and, when excluding the tool use task, also in the scale causality. In the scale space, 
lemurs performed worse than haplorhines and they performed worse than chimpanzees 
for social learning, but outperformed both great ape species concerning theory of mind. 
However, even though all seven species differed less than expected in their 
performance in the tasks of the PCTB, I do not claim that the cognitive skills of lemurs 
equal that of monkeys or great apes in general, but only in some of the tasks as they are 
designed in the PCTB. Thus, I want to discuss three possible explanations for these 
partly unexpected results of the overall comparison: 
First, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, one reason for these results might be 
the tasks themselves, in that the cognitive abilities they test are simply too basal to 
reveal interspecific differences (Schmitt et al., 2012). A variety of studies already 
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showed that even insects or fish can accomplish basal cognitive tasks (e.g. Chittka & 
Geiger, 1995; Chittka & Niven, 2009; Fuss et al., 2014; Schluessel et al., 2015; Loukola et 
al., 2017). Therefore, expanding the test battery by including more complex tests might 
reveal stronger interspecific differences. A good addition in the physical domain would 
be a task on reversal learning as suggested by Vanessa Schmitt (2012). Reversal learning 
is more demanding than basic numerical tasks, as individuals have to choose the smaller 
amount of food or tokens to give a correct response (Schmitt, 2012). Especially in the 
social domain additional experiments, which exclude possible non-social influences, 
appear advisable, since several of the tests of the PCTB might be influenced by non-
social cues, such as local enhancement (discussed in Chapters 3 & 5 and see below). 
Two examples for possible additions that might yield new insights in the social domain 
would be experiments on cooperation between individuals or on their prosocial 
behaviour towards conspecifics. In most cooperative setups, two individuals need to 
organise and work together to obtain an out-of-reach food reward (e.g. Melis et al., 
2006 a, b). During prosocial choice tests, on the other hand, an individual commonly has 
to choose whether to provide a reward only to itself or in addition also to a conspecific 
individual (e.g. Cronin et al., 2012; Burkart et al., 2007).  
Secondly, in most of the experiments only a few individuals of each species 
performed above chance on the individual level (see Chapter 3, Table 1). Thus, another 
possible explanation for the unexpectedly similar results of all seven species is that 
differences between the species cannot be found in their performances but are 
reflected in their learning curves (see Chapter 3). Commonly, for most cognitive tasks 
and species, continuing to retest the same setup leads to an improvement over time in 
the performance of the individuals, which is called learning effect. Within the tasks of 
the PCTB, I could not find an effect of learning for lemurs between first and last trials, 
however, the number of trials administered per task was limited on purpose (mostly 
only 6 trials). Still, the continued testing in the tool use task in Chapter 4 indicated that 
species differ in the amount of trials (or time) they need as practice until they can 
successfully conduct a task (MacLean et al., 2014). Ring-tailed lemurs which could solve 
the tool use task needed fewer trials than solving individuals of both other species, 
which however, might be based on their slightly higher level of dexterity (see Chapter 4; 
Peckre et al., 2016). Thus, interspecific differences might be more readily detectable in 
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the time different species need to reach a certain criterion of correct choices in each 
task (e.g. 80 % correct; see Chapter 3), rather than in overall performance. Hence, if 
testing of individuals in the tasks of the PCTB could be continued, the species-specific 
learning curves could be explored and compared between species (see Chapter 4). 
However, it should be noted that testing all individuals until they reach criterion in all 
tasks of the PCTB would surely be a time consuming and costly work.  
 Finally, some of the tasks of the PCTB can be solved by simply using associative 
learning or even local enhancement and do not necessarily require actual mental 
representation (Terkel, 1995; Elgier et al., 2012; Schmitt, 2012); i.e. inferring the 
rewards’ location through true understanding of the indicating pointing gesture or other 
presented cues. Local enhancement in this context means that the movement of the 
demonstrator towards one cup (intentions task) or the spatial closeness of her finger to 
it (comprehension task), leads to an enhanced attention of the individual to this 
location, which will increase the chances that it will choose this cup (e.g. Terkel, 1995; 
Mikolasch et al., 2012). Thus, a choice based on local enhancement might not reflect the 
cognitive skills the test aimed for, but simply reveal the individuals’ focus of attention.  
 
6.2 A brief Comparison to Gibbons 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, white-handed gibbons have also been tested 
using a subset of the tasks of the PCTB (Yocom, 2010), and their performance fits well 
into the overall picture of unexpected results. This subset included the noise, shape and 
tool properties tasks from the physical domain, and the comprehension, pointing cups, 
attentional state and intentions tasks from the social domain. When I summarised these 
seven tasks on domain-level and compared them to the results of the lemurs in the 
corresponding experiments, ring-tailed and mouse lemurs performed slightly worse 
compared to gibbons in the physical domain, while ruffed lemurs matched their 
performance (see Appendix, Fig. A1). In the social domain, however, gibbons were 
marginally outperformed by all three lemur species. A closer look at the average 
performances in the different tasks revealed that gibbons performed at the same level 
as the lemurs in the noise task of the physical domain, but slightly better in the shape 
and tool properties tasks (see Appendix, Table A1). Similarly, they outperformed lemurs 
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in the social domain only in the pointing cups task, but performed inferior in the other 
three social tasks. However, as mentioned before, the pointing cups task, in which 
gibbons excelled, is not completely convincing for a test of social skills, since it could 
simply be testing spatial memory. As a reason for the gibbons’ poor performance in 
most of the tasks of the social domain, Yocom (2010) argued with their rather unique 
social structure of living in pair-bonded social groups (Bartlett, 2007). However, this 
argument does not match the results of my study, since mouse lemurs live mainly 
solitarily and still performed better than gibbons in the social domain. Similarly, 
comparing the overall performance of lemurs and gibbons rules out brain size as a 
simple reason for a higher level of cognitive skills, as gibbons have much bigger brains 
than lemurs (Isler et al., 2008), and should hence have outperformed them. Still, a 
comparison of the performance of gibbons with all seven non-human primate species in 
the entire setup of the PCTB would be desirable and might facilitate more distinct 
assumptions.  
 
6.3 How did (Primate) Cognition evolve?                                                                                        
 
The overall results of my study allow a critical evaluation and discussion of the 
hypotheses on the evolution of primate cognition, particularly in the light of the 
different socioecological traits the three lemur species of my study represent.  
To evaluate the General intelligence hypothesis (Spearman, 1904), it is important 
to know about the brain measurements of the seven non-human primate species. 
Concerning absolute brain size, the great ape species lead the way with the largest 
brains, followed by baboons and macaques, and within the three lemur species ruffed 
lemurs have the largest and mouse lemurs the smallest brains (see Appendix, Fig. A2; 
Isler et al., 2008). In contrast, relative brain sizes show a reversed picture, as mouse 
lemurs have by far the biggest brains in relation to their body mass. Macaques have the 
second biggest relative brain size and all other species show a roughly equal relation 
between brain and body mass (see Appendix, Fig. A2; Isler et al., 2008). However, even 
with both brain measurements showing very distinct differences between species, my 
overall results reveal no clear evidence in favour of the General intelligence hypothesis, 
since neither absolute nor relative brain size can offer a sensible explanation for the 
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distribution of cognitive skills. For the physical domain, absolute brain size appears to 
predict cognitive skills better than relative brain size (MacLean et al., 2014), but my 
results offer no support for a domain-general one-to-one relationship between brain 
size and cognitive performance. Thus, my results seem to confirm findings of studies on 
primates and other taxa such as dogs or insects, which also could not find a clear-cut 
relationship (e.g. Hare et al., 2002; Chittka & Niven, 2009; Schmitt et al., 2012; MacLean 
et al., 2013; DeCasien et al., 2017).  
However, in recent years, the number of experimental studies and comparative 
meta-analyses investigating the presence of a single “general intelligence” factor (g 
factor) in animals has increased, particularly in primates (reviewed in Burkart et al., 
2016). While some studies could not find evidence for g (e.g. Herrmann et al., 2010), 
others, including some comprehensive meta-analyses, reported g on intra- as well as 
interspecific level (e.g. Deaner et al., 2006; Banerjee et al., 2009; Reader et al., 2011; 
Hopkins et al., 2014). In a literature-based meta-analysis involving 62 non-human 
primate species, Reader et al. (2011) included measures of innovation, social learning, 
tool use, extractive foraging and tactical deception. Their results show evidence for g on 
the interspecific level, which was also correlated with brain size. Thus, g as a factor of 
general intelligence in species is still debated and future studies will be needed to unveil 
further evidence concerning a domain-general distribution of cognitive skills.  
Another aspect worthwhile mentioning is that focussing solely on brain size has 
been increasingly criticised due to the high degree of modularity in the brain (Barton, 
2000; Barton & Harvey, 2000; Healy & Rowe, 2007, 2013). This modularity implies that 
not necessarily the entire brain responds to specific evolutionary selection pressures, 
but that only certain brain regions change in size, while others remain unaltered (Harvey 
& Krebs, 1990; Barton, 2000; Barton & Harvey, 2000; Venditti, 2017). Still, since for 
many species data on particular brain regions (e.g. the neocortex) is not available yet, 
such detailed comparisons are currently not possible (Venditti, 2017). 
Connecting the evolution of intelligence to the diet of a species and its foraging 
effort (Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1980; Milton, 1981; Byrne, 1996), the Ecological 
intelligence hypothesis is still one of the most popular evolutionary theories. 
Nevertheless, despite very recent additional support for this hypothesis (DeCasien et al., 
2017), my results do not reflect a distinct correlation between diet (% of fruit; see Table 
   General Discussion  
 
108 
S1, Chapter 3, p. 51) and cognitive performance of the species. Particularly within the 
three lemur species, the highly frugivorous ruffed lemurs should have outperformed 
both omnivorous species, but overall performances showed no significant differences. 
Furthermore, all three species scored equally in every task of the physical domain and 
ruffed lemurs were even slightly outperformed by the omnivorous mouse lemurs the 
scale space (see Fig. 3, Chapter 3). In contrast, when comparing the spatial memory 
skills of four lemur species, Rosati and colleagues (2014) found that frugivorous ruffed 
lemurs showed better spatial understanding and memory than the omnivorous and 
folivorous species tested. This reduced spatial memory has also been found comparing 
frugivorous spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi) to folivorous howler monkeys (Alouatta 
palliata; Milton, 1981).  
In the social domain, all seven species performed roughly equal, except from a 
slightly superior performance by the baboons (see Chapter 3). These overall results 
seem to oppose the Social intelligence hypothesis, as the tested species have different 
social systems and different average group sizes (see Table S1, Chapter 3, p. 51), which 
should have been reflected in their performance in the social-cognitive tasks. My results 
thus offer further support for those studies, which could not find a correlation between 
various social measures and brain size and hence question the generality of the Social 
brain hypothesis (e.g. Shultz & Dunbar, 2007; Finarelli & Flynn, 2009; Byrne & Bates, 
2010; Schmitt et al., 2012; Benson-Amram et al., 2016; DeCasien et al., 2017). Still, 
many studies on the Social brain hypothesis have used average group size as a proxy for 
social complexity (e.g. Shultz & Dunbar, 2007; MacLean et al., 2013; DeCasien et al., 
2017), which is questionable since group sizes also vary greatly within species (Venditti, 
2017). To give an example, group size in ring-tailed lemurs can range from 4 up to 31 
individuals per group (Sussman, 1991; Hood & Jolly, 1995) and these differences can be 
even more pronounced in other species and taxa (e.g. for primates: DeCasien et al., 
2017, supplementary table). Additionally, living in large groups does not automatically 
imply a higher rate of social interactions or social partners than living in smaller groups. 
Therefore, the number of differentiated relationships that individuals have within a 
group was recently suggested to be a more representative reflection of the social 
complexity of a species (Bergman & Beehner, 2015; Venditti, 2017). Average measures 
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of this proxy across species are still incomplete, but it would be interesting to include it 
in future comprehensive meta-analyses. 
My results also do not offer support for the Cooperative breeding hypothesis, 
since the ruffed lemurs, which exhibit the highest levels of allomaternal care of all seven 
species (see Table S1, Chapter 3, p. 51), should have outperformed the others in the 
social domain, which they did not (Hrdy, 1999, 2009; Burkart et al., 2009; van Schaik & 
Burkart, 2011). An important next step in exploring the influence of cooperative 
breeding on cognitive skills would be to apply the PCTB to New World monkey species, 
since they have not been tested so far. This might offer important insight as 
allomaternal care is relatively common in New World monkeys compared to Old World 
monkeys and strepsirrhines (Chism, 2000; Ross & MacLarnon, 2000).  
Concerning the Cultural intelligence hypothesis children were predicted to 
socially outperform all non-human primates which they did in both previous studies 
(Herrmann et al., 2007, 2010; Schmitt et al., 2012). The fact that lemurs’ performance 
was equal to that of haplorhines in the social domain supports this hypothesis. 
However, whether it is generally possible to test this hypothesis using the PCTB is 
debatable, as the PCTB might not be optimal for comparing primates and children, 
which is the essential comparison for this hypothesis though (Yocom, 2010; Schmitt et 
al., 2012). As mentioned in the introduction, testing of the social domain is likely biased 
in favour of children since they conduct all tests with a conspecific as demonstrator (see 
Chapter 5). Therefore, a comparison between children and non-human primates in the 
social domain seems unreasonable, as it might lead to an underestimation of the 
distribution of social cognitive abilities. After all, a human demonstrator might not be 
able to cross the cognitive boundary required for an understanding of signals from a 
member of another species (Boesch, 2007; Ruiz et al. 2009; Botting et al. 2011; see 
Chapter 5). 
In summary, the overall picture of the performances of the seven non-human 
primate species in the PCTB is not clearly explicable by any of the main hypotheses 
concerning the evolution of cognition. Still, there are some overall conclusions to be 
drawn from these results, which are 1.) they do not support the direct correlation 
between brain size and cognitive skills, 2.) cognitive abilities (in primates) are not 
distributed in a domain-general but rather in a domain-specific pattern, and thus,          
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3.) studying the cognitive skills of an animal species requires a set of tasks covering both 
cognitive domains to avoid biased results.   
  
6.4 Comparative Cognition – Problems and Pitfalls 
                     
In the quest to understand the cognitive evolution in animals and the 
distribution of cognitive skills between species, systematic, comparative studies across a 
wide range of species are mandatory (MacLean, 2012). Therefore, the original PCTB 
appears to be the most suitable approach to the field of comparative cognition, as it 
allows a comparison between various primate species (Herrmann et al., 2007). 
However, it has certain limitations, such as the problem of using a human demonstrator 
for all species in the social cognitive tasks mentioned above. In theory, when excluding 
children, the conditions concerning the demonstrator in the social domain should be 
identical for all non-human primate species, which should permit an interspecific 
comparison. Still, my results confirmed that the level of socialisation with humans has to 
be considered when conducting socio-cognitive experiments with several species or 
even just several populations of the same species (see Chapter 5; Hare et al., 2002; 
Miklósi et al., 2003; Maros et al., 2008). In both, ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs, the level 
of socialisation to humans had a positive effect on the performance in the task on 
understanding human pointing cues (see Chapter 5, experiment 2). 
Additionally, a human demonstrator might more generally not have the same 
influence on different species (Kano & Call, 2014; Schmitt et al., 2014). In the gaze 
following task (see Chapter 5, experiment 1) the results of the lemurs suggest that 
differences between species might exist at least in the social domain. Ring-tailed lemurs 
were the only species that looked up more often after the gaze cue presented by the 
human demonstrator than in the control condition, although all three species 
performed equally well with the photo of a conspecific. Similar differences were found 
between several hominid species when tested for gaze following using interspecific gaze 
cues (Kano & Call, 2014). Chimpanzees and children did only follow the gaze of their 
own species, whereas orangutans, bonobos and adult humans also followed the gaze of 
all other tested hominid species. Kano and Call (2014) argued that attention levels 
towards the presented videos varied between species, which however, would be 
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supported by my own findings that lemurs could focus on the videos for only a short 
time before being distracted or losing interest (see Chapter 5, discussion). This 
inattentiveness was reflected in the poor performance in the pointing cues task when 
presenting the video demonstrator. 
These results indicate that, at least for the social domain, an individuals’ 
performance can be influenced by the species of the demonstrator, even if only by a 
lowered level of attention. Thus, in the last years, researchers have increasingly started 
working with touchscreens in cognitive experiments on various species, to avoid any 
involvement or distraction by a human experimenter during trials (e.g. Taylor et al., 
2002; Leighty & Fragaszy, 2003; Joly et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2014; O'Hara et al., 
2016). This approach additionally excludes a Clever Hans effect, as the tested animals 
cannot use inadvertent cues from human experimenters, such as gaze direction or body 
position, to increase their performance in cognitive tasks (e.g. Umiker-Sebeok & Sebeok, 
1981; Miklósi et al., 1998; Lit et al., 2011).  
However, the inattentiveness towards the video demonstrator also points out 
other possible influences during testing, which are the test subjects’ attentional and 
motivational state towards the experimental setup (Ehrlich et al., 1976). Although these 
are not easy to measure or evaluate, they can potentially have a strong impact on the 
performance of individuals during cognitive experiments (Botting et al., 2011; Auersperg 
et al., 2011, 2012; Teschke et al., 2013). During testing of the lemurs for this thesis, I did 
not incorporate direct measures of attention or motivation, but instead always tried to 
ensure both by carefully observing the test subjects and stopping trials or sessions when 
an individual was obviously inattentive towards the setup (see Chapter 3, Methods). 
Individuals had to enter the testing facilities voluntarily each day and could take “days-
off-work” if they wanted to, which should ensure their general motivation during the 
tests in addition to the food rewards. To avoid a lack of motivation, rather recent 
studies worked with automated experimental systems via touch screens, which are 
offered to the test subjects all-day. With these systems, subjects can choose to work 
whenever they are motivated to do so or can even freely select the task they want to 
work on in each session (Fagot et al., 2015; Calapai et al., 2017). 
 To investigate some of the inter-individual differences in performance in the 
tasks of the PCTB, I conducted additional tests on each individual’s level of inhibitory 
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control and some of their personality traits (Herrmann et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2012). 
As mentioned previously (see Chapter 3), performances of ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs 
in the physical domain did not correlate with any of the observed measurements of 
personality (latency, proximity and duration). In the social domain, no such correlation 
was found for ring-tailed lemurs, whereas ruffed lemurs that approached new stimuli 
more slowly (latency) and less closely (proximity) performed significantly better. One 
explanation for this correlation might be that this more careful approach allows 
individuals to better assess a situation before acting on a stimulus or in a cognitive task, 
although this ability should have been reflected in the performance of the physical 
domain as well.  
Concerning the individuals’ level of inhibitory control, studies by Amici and 
colleagues (2008, 2010) tested several haplorhine primate species in tasks of the 
physical domain as well as their level of inhibitory control. They found that increased 
cognitive skills were best explained by socioecological factors of a species and in 
particular high levels of fission-fusion dynamics. Lemurs’ performances in the physical 
domain and the inhibitory control task in the current thesis, however, did not confirm 
any of these assumptions. Although ruffed lemurs exhibit a dynamic fission-fusion 
system (Baden et al., 2015; Holmes et al., 2016), they did not outperform the ring-tailed 
lemurs living in stable groups or the mainly solitary mouse lemurs. Performance in the 
inhibitory control task revealed no differences between species and level of inhibitory 
control also did not correlate with performance in the two domains of the PCTB (see 
Chapter 3). Another study using a setup possibly more suited for testing inhibitory 
control involved a detour reaching task, but could also find no significant differences 
between ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs (MacLean et al., 2013, 2014). 
The fact that the PCTB is increasingly applied to new species, also from other 
taxa than primates (currently ongoing work: parrots, Krasheninnikova; ravens (Corvus 
corax), Sima & Pika; personal communication) offers the unique chance of an extremely 
broad and comprehensive comparison that may generate answers to important 
questions on the evolution of cognition. However, it also bears problems that always 
arise in comparative studies covering socioecologically very different species, since 
these differences might influence their performance when tested with identical 
methods (Yocom, 2010; Schmitt et al., 2012; Teschke et al., 2013). For example, the 
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seven non-human primate species tested so far, show huge variation in their 
manipulative skills and dexterity (Torigoe, 1985; Holtkötter, 1997). Thus, a comparison 
of results of behavioural or cognitive experiments across species is usually not that 
simple and either fails due to major variation in the experimental set-up or due to the 
incapability of species to perform certain tests (Teschke et al., 2013). To continue the 
example of the tested primate species, a comparison between species of which some 
have physical limitations that influence their general ability to solve a task, such as 
lemurs in the tool use task (see Chapter 4), appears rather inappropriate and does not 
offer a reasonable comparison of their cognitive skills. Thus, for comparative research 
on cognitive abilities of animals the most difficult, but also essential task is to develop 
experimental setups with high ecological and social significance, that are manageable 
for a great number of species or adaptable in a way which does not change the task and 
its difficulty (e.g. Auersperg et al., 2011, 2013; MacLean et al., 2012; Schmitt et al., 
2012).  
 
6.5 What to do next? – An Outlook 
 
Despite the new insight on lemur cognition my study offers, there is still a long 
road ahead to unravel all pieces to the puzzle of cognitive evolution. Earlier in this 
discussion I mentioned some possible future steps concerning the PCTB, but in general 
the importance of such comparative research for cognitive studies cannot be stressed 
enough (MacLean et al., 2012). The only way to gain reasonable information about 
interspecific cognitive differences is to test multiple species with the same task and 
evaluate their performances. Moreover, the variability of species differences in 
performance between tasks in my study supports the notion that comparing several 
species in their performances within only a single task or scale can lead to very biased 
results which could then cause misleading assumptions (Amici et al., 2010; MacLean et 
al., 2012; Schmitt et al., 2012). To give an example of a flawed interpretation: if I took 
the scale theory of mind as the sole measure of social cognitive skills, a comparison of 
the non-human primate results would lead me to conclude that monkeys and lemurs 
had a higher level of social cognitive skills than great apes (see Fig. 3, Chapter 3).        
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Thus, comprehensive approaches that cover a wide range of different cognitive tasks 
are vital to drawing valid conclusions (Amici et al., 2010).  
In her thesis on long-tailed macaques and olive baboons, Vanessa Schmitt (2012) 
already suggested various reasonable changes and additions to the PCTB for future 
studies. An example would be the use of tokens or pebbles instead of actual food pieces 
in both experiments on numerical understanding, since she could show that the sight of 
the food while choosing between different quantities negatively influences the 
performance of individuals (Schmitt & Fischer, 2011). In the following I want to discuss 
further desirable future steps concerning the PCTB and comparative cognitive research 
in general. 
 
6.5.1 Including more Species 
 
Despite those shortcomings mentioned previously, the PCTB is currently still one 
of the most comprehensive setups in comparative cognition. Hence, in order to gain 
more insight into the distribution of cognitive skills, it would be desirable to apply these 
methods to a wide range of species, also from outside the primate order. As mentioned 
above, an inclusion of New World monkeys could improve the picture of primate 
cognition, as assembled by the results of the PCTB. Results on cognitive skills in the 
PCTB from all branches of the primate tree and beyond would additionally allow valid 
phylogenetic linearized least-square regressions (PGLS) to control for phylogenetic 
distances (Pagel, 1997; Nunn, 2011). To give an example, a PGLS could be used to 
determine whether general performance in both domains is influenced by brain size 
(relative and absolute), group size, home range size (absolute and in relation to body 
size) or feeding ecology (e.g. frugivorous, omnivorous, folivorous), as recently 
underpinned by DeCasien and colleagues (2017). Additionally, a PGLS would allow 
inferring whether the performance in the social domain is influenced by the level of 
allomaternal care that the tested species exhibit (high, medium, low; Isler & van Schaik, 
2012), as suggested by the Cooperative breeding hypothesis (Hrdy, 1999, 2009). Such 
large-scale comparisons, ideally including several species from each branch of the 
primate tree, could yield more distinct answers concerning the complicated correlations 
among the different variables, such as cognitive skills, brain size, social skills or the diet 
of a species.  
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6.5.2 The Adapted PCTB 
 
To apply the PCTB to a much broader range of species and taxa, and thereby 
enable a meaningful comparison, certain tasks would need to be adapted to make them 
solvable from a physical point of view (Schmitt et al., 2012). As previously mentioned, 
particularly the tool use and the social learning task are affected, since fine motor 
control is required in both, for example to insert a stick into a tube. Lemurs do not 
possess such manipulative skills (Torigoe, 1985; Holtkötter, 1997), let alone species 
from totally different genera, such as goats or rats. All species are in general able to 
conduct object-choice tasks by pointing with their paw or head towards the chosen item 
or just by walking towards it (e.g. Maros et al., 2008; Plotnik et al., 2013). These object-
choice tasks constitute the basis for many experiments of the PCTB, but the necessary 
level of dexterity for the two tasks mentioned above limits the large-scale multispecies 
comparability of the test battery.  
To give an example, an alternative setup of the social learning task could be an 
artificial feeding box, which offers several methods (e.g. pushing, pulling or sliding) to 
open a trap door to obtain a food reward (Schnoell & Fichtel, 2012). To test for social 
learning in the sense of the PCTB, it would then be possible to train an individual for one 
of the possible methods and use it as a conspecific demonstrator. Adapted in the right 
way, a similar setup would not need a high level of fine motor control and species 
without precision grip or even without hands or paws should be able to solve it by 
manipulating the door with their heads, mouths or beaks. However, an adaptation of 
the PCTB would also imply that those revised tasks needed retesting of those species 
that have already completed the test battery to assure an unbiased comparison.  
 
6.5.3 Going Wild – the Value of Field Studies 
  
It is of vital importance for the overall picture of cognitive evolution to include 
the species’ socioecology and their naturally occurring cognitive capabilities. Hence, in 
addition to behavioural observations from the wild already conducted in many species, 
it would be essential to also increase the number of cognitive field experiments (e.g. 
Lührs et al., 2009; Thornton & Samson, 2012; Pyritz et al., 2013). However, cognitive 
studies are generally more difficult to conduct in the field, since many experimental 
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setups require previous training sessions for the subjects. This is also the case for most 
experiments of the PCTB, in which individuals first have to be trained to actually be able 
to participate at all (Herrmann et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2012; see Chapter 3). 
Furthermore, in captivity it is possible to conduct experiments under controlled 
conditions which are identical for each individual, which is usually not feasible in the 
field.  
Nevertheless, future cognitive research should try to find setups which are 
applicable to captive as well as wild individuals of the same species, as this would yield a 
more comprehensive picture of the cognitive skills of that species. Such an approach 
could also help to further investigate the influence of socialisation to humans. Further, 
additional information on naturally occurring cognitive traits of a species could also 
support conservation efforts (Greggor et al., 2014). In a recent study, Auersperg et al. 
(2011, 2013) designed a complex problem solving test box which has the advantage of 
being generally applicable in the wild as well, since no previous training sessions are 
necessary. This transparent box contains a visible food reward in its centre which can be 
accessed through four different ways of manipulation. Each of these accesses can also 
be blocked separately to encourage further exploration of the box, which offers various 
options for interspecific comparisons. Hence, this promising approach takes the 
adaptability as well as comparability between species into account and similar studies 
will be part of the future of comparative cognitive research.  
 
6.6 General Conclusions        
 
As the first systematic test battery of this magnitude that has been applied to 
strepsirrhine primates and in particular a nocturnal species, the results of my study offer 
substantial new insights and implications for general testing methods in comparative 
cognitive research and for understanding the evolution of primate cognition. I could 
show that lemurs’ physical and social cognitive abilities are not that different from 
haplorhine primates’, at least in the tests of the PCTB. Lemurs showed a good 
understanding for quantities and spatial-causal relations between objects, such as the 
properties of a functional pulling tool. They could use human communicative gestures 
and intentional actions as cues to locate hidden rewards, but did not follow human gaze 
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or try to attract the experimenters’ attention. The overall results of my study neither 
support a direct correlation between brain size and general cognitive skills of a species, 
nor reinforce the idea that cognitive abilities in primates are distributed in a domain-
general pattern. In fact, I could show that a diverse set of different cognitive 
experiments from both the physical and the social domain is essential when studying 
the cognitive abilities of a species or even attempting to compare the performance of 
several species. The future of cognitive research belongs to these systematic and 
comparative studies, which will help to solve the puzzle of cognitive evolution.  
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General Appendix 
 
Figure A1 Performance of the lemur species compared to gibbons in both domains. Represented are 
medians (black bars), interquartile ranges (boxes) and upper and lower hinges (whiskers). 
 
 
Table A1 Results of the seven experiments conducted with gibbons and lemurs. Average performances in 
% and summarised for each domain (grey; PHYS=physical, SOC=social). Tool props=tool properties, comp= 
comprehension, point cups=pointing cups, attent state=attentional state, intent=intentions. 
 
species noise shape tool props PHYS comp 
point 
cups 
attent 
state intent SOC 
gibbons 61.0 78.0 66.0 68.3 58.0 80.0 5.0 61.0 51.0 
ruffed lemurs 63.5 76.9 63.6 68.0 70.9 53.9 34.6 78.9 59.6 
ring-tailed lemurs 59.3 72.8 58.6 63.6 70.8 55.1 21.2 83.6 57.7 
mouse lemurs 50.0 70.6 55.6 58.7 65.4 69.2 21.7 71.1 56.8 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2 Absolute and relative brain sizes of all seven species of the PCTB. Relative brain size calculated 
with (100/body mass (g))*brain mass (g); measures for ECV, brain- and body mass from Isler et al., 2008. 
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